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Abstract
This report presents an account of an empirical study of experiences of supply chain-mediated
influences on health and safety practice and performance in the construction and shipping industries.
It sets out to test a set of propositions concerning the conditions and contexts of these influences that
was developed by two of its authors in a previous study. It is based on four case studies, two in each
sector, each selected in order to examine situations in which supply chain relationships are likely to
influence and support improved health and safety practices and performance. In each case,
documentary evidence and qualitative data obtained from in-depth interviews have been analysed.
These analyses are further supported by a review of the research literature on trends in the structure,
organisation and regulation of work in the sectors and recent evidence concerning supply chain
influences.
Findings confirm the previous propositions with respect to the conditions and contexts governing
positive supply chain effects on health and safety practice. They draw attention to the influence of
health and safety requirements at the procurement stage and in the choice of contractors, as well as to
the role of support, monitoring and surveillance in ensuring compliance with these requirements. At
the same time, they show that supply chain influences on health and safety vary both according to the
business interests of the actors involved and the regulatory contexts in which they work, and that
leverage in supply chain relationships is only one element in a constellation of influences acting in
concert to raise occupational safety and health standards. In particular, there is no evidence in our
study to suggest that such leverage acts effectively without regulation or regulatory inspection.
However, the study does suggest that regulatory strategies need to become more attuned to exploiting
the positive features of supply chain relationships.
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Executive summary
Introduction
This report details the findings of an empirical study into the role of drivers and leverage in supply chains
to support improved health and safety practice. It tests propositions put forward in a previous study by
two of its authors, in which they argued that that supply chain influences on health and safety vary both
according to the business interests of the actors involved and the regulatory contexts in which they are
embedded. Although this earlier review identified both positive and negative supply chain influences, the
present study focuses on exploring circumstances in which the direct effects of supply chain intervention
may support positive practices and outcomes for the health and safety of the workers involved. In this
respect it pays particular attention to the nature of supportive supply chain relations and the role of
monitoring and surveillance in improving supplier health and safety practice. It is not, however, restricted
solely to highly interventionist relations between procurers and their suppliers; it also considers the
possible role of supply chain influences as one element of a constellation of drivers of good practice that
include both business and regulatory factors.
The report presents findings of detailed investigations of how these factors influence organisational and
workplace health and safety management practices and performance in two very different industries:
construction and merchant shipping. These industries were selected because they are high-risk sectors
with significant problems of occupational injury and ill health. They are also in the vanguard of change in
terms of the way work is structured and organised and business undertaken. At the same time, they both
feature prominent examples of the deliberate use of supply chain relations to influence health and safety
management and performance among the business organisations involved. Therefore, they offer good
opportunities to explore the propositions we were seeking to test.
Methods
As a starting point the report presents a review of the relevant literature which updates the earlier review
that led to the present research and focuses more particularly on the two sectors in which its empirical
studies are located. In addition, it gives some special attention to research findings in the food industry,
because this too is a sector in which research has identified a number of cases of both positive and
negative supply chain effects on health and safety practices and performance. The review seeks to
contextualise the empirically based study within existing knowledge concerning how supply chain
relationships can impact on health and safety arrangements and performance. To achieve this, it uses
existing literature to provide an understanding of the wider business processes and dynamics that lie
behind supply chain effects. In doing so, the review identifies a spectrum of supply chain features that
help to predict their influence on practices and outcomes in health and safety among the organisations
involved. At the same time it notes that care needs to be taken not to overly generalise the extent to
which the potential exists for supply relationships to be used positively to influence supplier health and
safety management and performance given how such relationships vary in terms of their nature and, in
particular, with regard to: their length; how far they extend beyond narrow, price-based, economic
transactions to encompass deeper, more relational dynamics potentially based on high levels of mutuality,
collaboration and trust; and the balances of dependency and power they embody. As a result, they must
also be viewed as encompassing considerable variety in terms of both the degree to which they prompt
downward pressures on employment conditions within supplier organisations and the potential which
exists for them to be utilised to support improved health and safety management and performance.
The study investigated the quality of supply chain influences in four different situations, two of which
were in the construction industry and two in the maritime sector. Specifically, it examined the influence
on health and safety practices of supply relations between:
• the developers responsible for the construction of a major sports facility (the Olympic Park) and one
of their principal contractors
• this contractor and its second- and third-level lower-tier contractors and their workers
• the developers in the construction of a major inner city building and infrastructure project and one of
their principal contractors (which was the same company we studied as a principal contractor on the
Olympic Park)
• this contractor and its second- and third-level lower-tier contractors and their workers
• four tanker ship operators, the seafarers employed on eight of their vessels, and the major oil
companies whose products they carried
• a ship management company, the charters and owners of the container ships it managed, the crew of
one of these vessels and the owners of the goods it carried.
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The methods used to undertake these case studies included a review of documentary sources and
in-depth interviews with managers and workers in all of the case studies. The documentation
helped in the understanding of contractual arrangements in place between buyers and suppliers, the
relevant rules and procedures implemented by the organisations studied, and prevailing standards
of health and safety performance. The interviews helped to explore in detail what managers and
workers saw as the significant features of the relations between service suppliers and buyers that
influenced health and safety arrangements, practices and outcomes in the companies in which they
worked or with which they had supply relationships. In addition, the interviews were used to
examine perceptions concerning the effects of other external drivers of occupational safety and
health (OSH) practice, such as experience of regulatory activity and the influence of trade unions
or other actors or procedures in civil society. As well as interviewing participants in the companies
on which the case studies focused, in both sectors key informants representing employer/employee
organisations, trade bodies, trades unions and regulators were also interviewed following
completion of the four cases studies. The purpose of these interviews was to gain further insight
into the generalisability and more general validity of the findings obtained through the case studies. 
We have sought to disguise the identity of all of the organisations and personnel that participated
in the study in order to respect their confidentiality and abide by Cardiff University research ethics
procedures that governed the conduct of the study. The unique position and high profile of the
Olympic Park and the organisations responsible for its development made this impossible, and in
this exceptional instance we obtained their permission to report the case.
Findings
The findings of the research can be separated into three broad areas, each of which is accorded a
chapter in the full report of the study. 
First it was important to provide some contextual background concerning the sectors in which the
case studies are located. For example, the construction industry is a highly fragmented and
structurally challenging sector in which temporary worksites frequently involve large numbers of
organisationally separated contractors working together and in sequence on building projects. The
complex relations thus resulting between clients, designers, contractors and subcontractors present
major challenges for the management of health and safety performance on such sites. Indeed, the
contribution of such challenges to the poor health and safety performance of the sector is the
principal reason for the supply chain orientation of the more recent regulatory provisions on health
and safety management in the industry that apply within the European Union. While small and
micro enterprises dominate the profile of businesses in the industry, there are also some very large
operators engaged in high-profile building projects. During the last decade or so, the health and
safety performance of the industry has been the subject of considerable political and regulatory
attention, much of which has focused on these larger operators who, as a result, have been
encouraged by various approaches to adopt more concerted efforts to find ways to improve health
and safety performance. Among these approaches, procurement and supply chain initiatives have
featured prominently.
The global nature of maritime trade means that much of its activity takes place in situations that
are beyond the reach of conventional national regulatory scrutiny. It is a complex and fragmented
sector. Its vessels and the companies that own or manage them often have distinct features
according to their trade, while the major transformations occurring in the industry in recent
decades have been driven largely by the price and delivery demands of clients worldwide, and have
profoundly affected the nature of ownership and management of shipping, the origins of labour
and its recruitment and management in the sector, as well as ship design and the design and
location of port facilities. Such influences, not surprisingly, have also had a significant impact on
experiences of work and its management in the industry, including that of the management of
health and safety at sea.
Work in both sectors is hazardous and the documented health and safety performance in both is
widely considered to be below what could be regarded as acceptable in terms of the extent of
preventable occupational mortality and morbidity. The management of workplace risks in both
sectors is seen as requiring improvement and is one reason for the level of political and regulatory
scrutiny to which the construction industry has been subject in recent decades. It also encourages
efforts to introduce more globally applicable requirements on systematic health and safety
management in the shipping industry, as well as to raise the profile of regulatory inspection and gain
better international conformity in its delivery. 
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Turning attention to the details of the case studies themselves, the available information on the
documented health and safety performance suggested they were all at the better end of the spectrum
of health and safety performance for their respective industries. This was certainly the case for the
Olympic Park and for the other construction case study, as well as for the principal contractor on
which both these case studies focused. Availability of robust data on health and safety in the two
case studies on shipping was more limited, but the general impression was that the companies on
which we focused were also good performers relative to the average for their trades. 
The supply chains investigated in each of the case studies all demonstrated that requirements of
procurers acted as positive influences on the health and safety practices of downstream suppliers. In
the two case studies in construction, as well as in the case study in the tanker trade in shipping, these
influences were quite strongly interventionist and featured not only the presence of health and safety
requirements in procurement contracts, but also interventions such as certification schemes, training
initiatives and co-ordination activities aimed at providing support to enable suppliers to meet these
requirements, as well as the monitoring and surveillance of supplier OSH performance and practice. 
The situation in the second shipping case study involving the container trade was somewhat
different. Generally in this trade, business relations between customers and the management and
crew of the vessels carrying their goods are unlikely to be characterised by features in which buyers
intervene in the internal management practices of their suppliers. There is no obvious pressure from
the clients whose goods are being shipped for either the ship operator or the ship management
companies to conform to their direct requirements concerning the management of health and safety
on board. Indeed there is rarely evidence of them imposing such requirements. There are two
primary reasons for this. One is that it is not in the clients’ business interests to do so, and the other
is that the structure of the supply chain is too diffuse and the position of the clients whose goods are
being shipped too remote, to allow processes, such as the procurement and monitoring activities
examined in the other case studies, to be used effectively to influence practices on board.
This said, we nevertheless did find supply chain influences at work in the container trade. They
were, for example, evident in the relations between the ship charterers and owners of the vessel on
board which we undertook fieldwork and the ship management company that managed its
operation. There were also references to health and safety standards in the contract between the ship
management company and the charterers procuring its services. There was further evidence that the
companies concerned were aware of the business advantages associated with being able to evidence
good practice in their approaches to health and safety and further awareness that their business
reputations risked damage from exposure of infringements of regulatory standards in this respect.
There was, however, strong evidence in the container trade case study that these pressures worked in
concert with other pressures flowing from the public regulation of shipping that acted to engender a
motivation among businesses to achieve good health and safety standards. 
The second of the chapters addressing the findings of the research presents a detailed account,
based on field observations and interviews with workers, their managers and business clients, as
well as with representatives of peak business organisations, trades unions and regulators, of how
requirements mediated through supply chains influenced perceptions and practices in health and
safety at the workplaces we studied. Looking in greater depth at workers’ and managers’
experiences of the operation of procurement strategies, at certification, training and co-ordination
of activities on construction sites and at the requirements and control of the oil majors in the tanker
trade, it shows how the contractual requirements of procurers are implemented in practice, how
they are perceived by the workers and managers of supplier organisations and the nature and
direction of buyer-supplier relations that influence health and safety practices and outcomes. It
presents a further detailed understanding of perceptions among workers and managers concerning
the role of the monitoring and surveillance they experience in these respects and shows how these
interventionist strategies work towards ensuring compliance with the health and safety requirements
of procurers. While our fourth case study, on the container trade, demonstrated substantial
differences in the degree of procurer intervention experienced by the seafarers and their managers,
their detailed experiences showed supply chain influences – albeit acting in concert with other
external pressures such as those derived from regulatory inspection – to be strong determinants of
compliance behaviour. 
The final chapter returns to the propositions presented by Walters & James in their earlier review. It
examines how they fare in the light of our empirical analysis. It demonstrates that our findings
broadly support the judgement of Walters & James concerning the contexts and conditions of
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supply chain effects. In doing so, it further demonstrates that such effects are neither necessarily
solely vertical within supply chains, nor only in one direction. Thus, we show that in the
construction industry there were substantial horizontal effects observed among organisations
competing for business at the same level and that in this sector, as well as in the container trade in
the maritime sector, there were sometimes upstream as well as downstream influences at work in
some of the supply chains involved.
Conclusions and recommendations
In short, our findings therefore largely endorse the usefulness of the propositions to the
understanding of the wider contexts of supply chain effects. That said, it is perhaps also important
to note that our findings departed somewhat from the propositions in several respects. Two may be
especially significant. One concerns the extent of mutuality and partnership between procurers and
suppliers anticipated in the propositions. Although we found such mutuality and partnership among
some first-tier suppliers and their procurers to be evident in our case studies, what struck us more
forcefully for most of the supply chain relationships, in which leverage on OSH was delivered
through procurement strategies, was the high degree of power imbalance between procurers and
suppliers and the sense that the latter believed they had little choice other than to follow the
requirements of the former if they wished to continue their business relationship. The implications
of this finding for policy should not be overlooked. The second departure from the propositions
concerns the possible negative consequences arising from the interventions in which procurers
exploited this power in the conditions they imposed upon the affairs of their suppliers. These also
should not be ignored. In particular, additional burdens imposed upon lower-tier suppliers to deliver
evidence of compliance with procedures that were merely the requirements of ‘audit trails’ rather
than good OSH practices raises the possibility of them acting to lead indirectly to poorer but
unmonitored health and safety outcomes among workers at these levels. 
A further significant finding that emerges from our case studies and which is especially important
for policy considerations concerns the extent to which leverage in supply chain relationships can be
developed as one element in a constellation of influences acting in concert to raise OSH standards. It
is important to inquire what might be the role of public regulation in this process. There were
indications in the project – especially in the maritime container trade case study, but also evident to
some extent in the other case studies too – that the positive influence of supply chain-driven effects
on health and safety standards may be more widespread than a focus on deliberate direct
interventions suggests. That is, we found that buyers and suppliers in some supply chain relations
which were not especially marked by a high degree of intervention on the part of the buyer,
nevertheless were influenced to support good health and safety practice and performance because
they perceived it to be of relevance to their business interests. In such scenarios – and even where
buyers do not impose inspection and monitoring regimes upon their suppliers to ensure compliance
– there may be opportunities for the further strategic development of public regulation in order to
exploit such perceptions of business criticality in ways that would enhance the health and safety
practices and outcomes for work activity that often lie beyond the reach of conventional regulatory
practice. In other words, there may be further opportunities to extend existing regulatory
interventions that focus on supply chain relationships, such as those in place in construction
internationally as well as nationally in some other sectors such as food, footwear and apparel. To do
so effectively, however, would first require further research to better understand the relationship
between regulation and business criticality in these and other sectors. 
As a point of departure in this respect, it is clear from the present study that, while under certain
conditions supply chain relationships offer opportunities to leverage improvements in OSH
arrangements and standards, they always do so within contexts framed by regulation. There is no
evidence in our study to suggest they act effectively in the absence of, or as substitutes for,
regulation or regulatory inspection. There is instead much food for thought concerning how
regulatory strategies could be more attuned to exploiting the positive features of supply chain
relationships to protect the workers whose health, safety and welfare lie at the end of these chains
and who are increasingly remote from the reach of conventional regulation.
10 Walters, Wadsworth, Sampson and James
1 Introduction and aims of the study
Beginning with some background, this chapter outlines the rationale for conducting the empirical
study presented in the following report. It first presents the theoretical propositions that two of its
authors put forward on the basis of their previous review of existing research on the role of supply
chain relations in influencing health and safety practices and outcomes among the actors involved. It
goes on to outline the aims of the present research in the context of these propositions and concludes
with a brief outline of the structure of the report in which the aims are delivered. 
Some background
In their review of the literature on the influence of supply chain relations on health and safety
management and performance, Walters & James1 developed a number of propositions concerning the
health and safety-related dynamics of supply chains, which they suggested would merit further
empirical exploration. The IOSH Research Committee also indicated that the review of the research
literature examining the relationship between supply chains and health and safety undertaken by
Walters & James would form a useful basis for future empirical research. In this report we present
the findings of such an empirical study. 
Walters & James1 argued that, somewhat in contrast with policy rhetoric, the majority of published
studies show that supply chains frequently generate adverse, rather than beneficial, consequences for
the health and safety of those employed within supplier organisations. Indeed, their review indicated
that only relatively rarely did supply chain management encompass attempts by buyers to influence
health and safety positively. It further suggested that initiatives of this latter type are most likely to
occur where they are seen as supportive of the business interests of buyers and, in particular, when
external economic, social and regulatory pressures serve to engender ‘reputational risks’. In addition,
it appeared that the success of such initiatives was dependent on their inclusion of adequate means
for supervising and controlling supplier compliance with them. 
The theoretical propositions
The propositions that Walters & James developed from their review suggested the following:
• Attention accorded to health and safety-related issues by supply chain buyers varies and reflects
differences in:
• how far the way in which health and safety is managed by suppliers has implications for the 
effective supply of required goods and services to buyers
• the extent to which pressures are exerted by private or public regulation.
• Buyers influence health and safety consequences of supply chains, both directly and indirectly; the
former exert positive effects and the latter exert negative ones.
• Attempts by buyers to influence supplier health and safety management positively will work better
where:
• they are supported by adequate monitoring and penalty regimes
• they occur within a supply relationship which is relatively collaborative and trust-based.
• Collaborative and trust-based relations are more likely to exist where:
• buyers and suppliers have worked together, satisfactorily, for a relatively long period
• the wider institutional context is supportive of them 
• there is some form of regulatory scrutiny in place.
• Buyers’ attempts to influence supplier health and safety management will be less successful where:
• they clash with the business interests of suppliers
• the risks of failing to comply with them are relatively low.
Aims and objectives of the present study
The present research seeks to explore these propositions with detailed investigations of how they
influence organisational and workplace OSH management practices and performance in two very
different industries: construction and merchant shipping. These industries were selected because they
are both high-risk sectors with significant problems of occupational injury and ill health, while they
are also both in the vanguard of change in terms of the way in which work is structured and
organised and business undertaken. At the same time they both feature prominent examples of the
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deliberate use of supply chain relations to influence health and safety management and performance
among the business organisations involved and therefore offer good opportunities to explore our
propositions.
In addition to the empirical research undertaken in these two sectors, we also originally planned to
study similarly constructed experiences in food production and processing, a third sector in which,
because of the organisation of its business relationships, we anticipated finding further interesting
experiences in relation to our propositions. Unfortunately, access to food producing and processing
companies proved too difficult for us to be able to undertake sufficiently detailed and relevant
fieldwork in the sector within the timeframe of the project. Instead we diverted resources from this to
more intensive study in the other two sectors and confined our attentions in food production and
processing to a review of previous research on supply chain relations there.
Finally, in terms of testing the propositions from our previous study, a related objective of the present
research is to provide the more comprehensive understanding that our review of previous research
showed to be needed, regarding:
• which types of supply chain are more or less supportive of the effective management of health and
safety within them
• what factors most influence standards of OSH management and performance within such chains
• how far interventions should be legally based and, more generally, best designed and most
effectively implemented.
Structure of the report
In the following chapters we first develop some reflections on the key issues that emerge from the
literature relevant to our propositions in the sectors we have studied (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 we
outline the methods we have adopted to undertake fieldwork and to collect and analyse qualitative
data. We then present the findings from the case studies we have undertaken in construction and
shipping. This begins in Chapter 4, with a brief review of the sectors and the emergent trends in their
development, health and safety practices and performance and the challenges they present for the
regulation of OSH. Chapter 5 presents an account of the extent to which the evidence of our
empirical research in the construction and merchant shipping sectors contributes to a better
understanding of ways in which supply chain leverage may aid improved OSH performance in
examples drawn from these sectors. Chapter 6 considers the implications of these findings for our
understanding of the role of supply chain leverage in the regulation of health and safety management
more widely. Finally, in Chapter 7 we offer some conclusions that are situated in the wider context of
the previous literature review. To do so, we revisit the propositions developed in the previous review
by Walters & James1 on the contexts and conditions in which supply chain effects are situated, and
examine the extent to which they are supported by the empirical findings presented in the previous
two chapters.
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2 Contextualising the influence of supply chains on
health and safety
This chapter contextualises the current empirically based study within existing knowledge
concerning how supply chain relationships can affect health and safety arrangements and
performance within supplier organisations by drawing on the previous literature review undertaken
by two of the authors.1 In doing so it also seeks more specifically to draw out what is known about
health and safety supply chain effects and influences within the two sectors that form the focus of
the present study, namely construction and shipping. It also reviews research literature on the food
sector as here, too, are found examples of studies demonstrating both positive and negative supply
chain effects on health and safety.
The chapter first explores the evidence concerning the health and safety outcomes flowing from the
dynamics embedded in purchaser–provider relationships. It then moves on to highlight the factors
that are important in influencing these outcomes. The key points arising from these two strands of
analysis are then drawn together in a concluding summary.
The health and safety effects of supply chains
Existing research evidence indicates that the ways in which supply chain relationships affect
experiences within supplier organisations vary considerably as a result of a range of factors, notably
the business rationales and risks underlying them, the balances of interests and power that they
encompass, and the more general form that they take.2–9 It also indicates that these experiences can
be both of a positive and negative nature and that the former are most likely to arise in the context
of particular types of business-to-business relationships. 
In their earlier review of the literature shedding light more specifically on the role of supply chains
in influencing health and safety within supplier organisations, Walters & James similarly found that
these relationships could exert such influence either directly through the proactive interventions of
purchasers or indirectly via (a) the requirements that purchasers impose in relation to such matters
as price, cost, quality, demand responsiveness and just-in-time delivery and (b) management
disorganisation arising in situations of ‘on-site’ or ‘co-location’ outsourcing. 
The direct influence of supply chains
At the policy level in the UK, both government and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) have
drawn attention to the positive role that supply chain management could play in improving
standards of health and safety in the British economy, and have actively encouraged organisations to
take it more seriously. This encouragement has, however, been pursued via voluntary exhortation
rather than legislative action. For example, in its ‘flagship’ guidance on health and safety
management the HSE argues that organisations will want to improve their OSH management
systems as a consequence of pressure from suppliers or customers, and that accidents and ill health
disrupt delivery in supply chains and therefore harm profitability.10 Similarly, a Health and Safety
Commission (HSC) source suggests that good health and safety standards in the supply chain are
important because they ensure quality, value, competence and reputation, and claims that they are in
the interests of all the organisations involved in supply chain relationships.11 Moreover, an action
point in an earlier joint government–HSC health and safety strategy document committed the HSC
to advising ministers on ‘how the principles of good management promoted by the Construction
(Design and Management) Regulations approach can be encouraged in other key sectors’; although
ultimately it was concluded that further use of the law to regulate contractual chains was
unnecessary.12,13
In a similar vein, in the health and safety practitioner literature the business benefits of adopting
such an approach have been aired frequently.14–21 These benefits include enhanced corporate
reputation, the minimisation of reputational risk, greater efficiency and quality flowing from less
disruption due to accidents and worker absence through ill health and injury, and better
management more generally within supplier organisations.
Against this backdrop, there is evidence that at times attempts are made by the purchasers of goods
and services to influence health and safety within supply organisations. This evidence further
suggests that such attempts take three main forms.2 First, the utilisation by ‘purchasers’ of
procurement strategies under which health and safety standards are used as a basis for selecting
contractors; in some cases, these are extended to the imposition of requirements relating to the
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general management of health and safety by suppliers, such as the carrying out of risk assessments
and communication within multi-contractor/subcontractor work sites. Second, industry level
certification schemes aimed at ensuring the competencies of contracting organisations and those
working for them. These are often used as the measures of standards that procurers require
suppliers to demonstrate in the delivery of their operations. Third, there are ‘product-related
initiatives’ focused around the supply of materials for use at the workplace that are undertaken by
trade and industry bodies, as well as individual supplier organisations.
Furthermore, there is evidence that each of these strategies has been used in the construction
industry, both domestically and internationally, and that they can yield positive results. For
example, with regard to the building of the major land works supporting the land/sea link
between Denmark and southern Sweden in the 1990s, evidence showed that initiatives on health
and safety requirements in procurement helped to reduce the incidence of occupational
accidents.22 In a similar vein, controls on subcontracting adopted by Renault in building a new
industrial plant in France in the 1990s were found to have achieved a much-improved accident
frequency rate when compared to the French construction industry as a whole, and to have also
led to an impressive safety performance during the construction of Heathrow Airport’s Terminal
5.22,23
Industry level certification schemes also exist in the UK construction industry, the most significant
of these being the safety passport system developed by the Client Contractor National Safety
Group in the 1990s that is used in the construction engineering industry and the parallel, and
more widely applicable, Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS). In the case of both of
these schemes, claims have been made that they have contributed to higher standards of health
and safety performance, although the evidence to support these claims is far from conclusive,
comprising for the most part anecdotal opinions supplied by either their users or deliverers.24,25
Meanwhile, internationally, a number of examples can be identified of trade or industry bodies
undertaking product-related initiatives designed to support the better management of health and
safety that are of clear relevance to construction. The European Tool Hire Trade Association, for
example, has developed a standard for health and safety and customer service that is aimed at
supporting the safe use of equipment by construction companies.26 How far the standard has
achieved this aim is, however, also unclear.
Similarly, there is some evidence to indicate that supply chain procurement strategies are used in
the food production and processing sector. Most large supermarkets have, for example, signed up
to the Ethical Trading Initiative base code and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority’s
Supermarket and Suppliers Protocol, both of which detail minimum health and safety standards,
while also possessing associated internal codes of practice and the like.27,28 Hard evidence
regarding the success of such strategies in improving supplier health and safety standards is,
however, again lacking. Furthermore, this lack of evidence exists alongside findings which indicate
that supermarkets vary considerably in terms of how far they seek to encourage fair and ethical
employment practices among their suppliers and others, highlighting problems in some cases with
regard to the effectiveness of the auditing arrangements they use to monitor the behaviour of
suppliers.29 The second of these observations serves to highlight a more general issue that has
emerged in relation to ethical trading initiatives, namely the need for compliance with them to be
rigorously monitored and enforced. Existing evidence points to the fact that in the absence of
such monitoring and enforcement, compliance is likely to prove problematic.30,31
Supply chain procurement strategies are similarly much in evidence in the oil and chemical tanker
trade in the maritime industry, although far less obviously so in other parts of the sector. The
maritime industry is itself particularly challenging for regulating health and safety standards due
to a host of reasons that we detail in the following pages, and it therefore presents an interesting
scenario in which to explore ways of enhancing regulation. Supply chain leverage may present one
such opportunity.
The indirect influence of supply chains
In contrast to the limited evidence available as to how supply chains have been used by
purchasers to improve the health and safety performance of suppliers, their indirect effects on
health and safety are rather better evidenced. Furthermore, this latter evidence paints a generally
negative picture of their health and safety implications.
These negative outcomes have been identified as flowing from a number of sources, most notably:
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• problems which arise with regard to the co-ordination of health and safety management in
situations where subcontractor and temporary staff work in physical proximity to in-house
personnel
• cost and price pressures that limit the ability of suppliers to invest in preventive health and safety
measures
• reforms to employment regimes engendered by contractual pressures that act to increase health
and safety risks.
A number of studies and official inquiries into the causes of injuries and disasters in chemical plants
and in the offshore oil and rail industries have, for example, drawn attention to the difficulties that
can arise with regard to the adequate management and control of workers employed by
subcontractors.32–36 A case in point here is the commission of inquiry established by the French
National Assembly to investigate the September 2001 explosion at the AZF chemical factory in
Toulouse (which killed 30 people including 21 workers, 13 of whom worked for subcontractors). The
commission of inquiry determined that problems with contractor safety management constituted a
critical factor in the incident and recommended a ban on multi-tiered subcontracting on so-called
Seveso sites.37
Other studies have reported similar findings in relation to temporary employment.38,39 A British study
in 2000, for example, revealed that around half of the recruitment agencies surveyed did not have
measures in place to ensure that they were fulfilling their legal obligations and that there was a
widespread lack of awareness among agencies and host employers that responsibility for health and
safety is, under current law, a shared one. It further found that agencies were frequently unaware
whether host employers carried out risk assessments, and that the exchange of health and safety
information between agencies and host employers was often poor.40 More generally, a Parliamentary
inquiry in the Australian state of Victoria,41 concluded that the use of ‘labour hire arrangements’ can
complicate the co-ordination of work processes, including occupational health and safety standards,
and that weak lines of communication between labour hire workers and agencies, and host employers
and employees, can lead to the obfuscation of occupational health and safety responsibilities. In
addition, it noted how the cost-sensitive nature of the labour hire industry could lead agencies to
compromises or even non-compliance with OSH duties in relation to such matters as induction
training and risk assessment.
Meanwhile, international research evidence on the OSH effects of outsourcing has produced
remarkably consistent findings. For example, a 2008 review of 25 such studies found poorer OSH
outcomes evidenced in all but two of them.42 Another review, focusing on the consequences for health
and safety of the increased importance of supply chains in modern business practices, also found that
a large majority of the studies it included identified poorer OSH management and outcomes as a
result of outsourcing.43
More specifically, these reviews reveal a considerable body of evidence showing that the types of
work changes commonly resulting from supply chain pressures are linked to a variety of adverse
health and health-related outcomes including increased incidence of cardiovascular disease, burnout
and depression,44,45 as well as to poorer workplace safety outcomes.46–50 Thus, changes where such
linkages have been identified include greater job insecurity, poorer pay, lowered access to training
among precarious workers, and less control over working time,51–56 while the reasons identified for
them have included competitive pressures on subcontractors (resulting in corner-cutting, work
intensification and excessive hours), and disorganisation (leading to, for example, more attenuated
control systems in the workplace, under-resourced operators and undermined regulatory control).57,58
Indeed, on the basis of an Australian investigation of the experiences of those working under
subcontract/outsourcing arrangements in four sectors (childcare, hospitality, transport and building),
the researchers involved reached the conclusion that they were associated with increased economic
competition, as well as work disorganisation, regulatory failure and a divided workforce, and that in
‘any organisation where outsourcing has become common, OHS standards deteriorate’.58
There is also clear evidence of such adverse supply chain outcomes in the construction, food
processing and maritime industries. In the case of construction, numerous studies have identified the
widespread use of subcontracting and its often poor management as important contributors to the
occurrence of accidents and associated injuries in the industry. In particular, financial and time
pressures impinging on subcontractors, the lower levels of supervision and training provided to
subcontractor personnel, as well as poor levels of communication with them and the problems of co-
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ordinating the activities of subcontractors, have all been highlighted as important factors adversely
affecting health and safety management on construction sites.57,59–61
Studies undertaken in the food production and processing sector also amply demonstrate how the
dynamics of supply chains act to create working environments within supplier organisations that
engender risks to worker health and safety.62–64 They have, for example, revealed how supply chain
relationships between supermarkets and their suppliers can lead to increased casualisation and agency
working, unstable patterns of work and working time and work intensification, with one study
concluding that:65
… supermarkets add to the difficulties of managing health and safety as cost pressures and
delivery requirements push companies towards using agency workers, increasing the pace of work
and utilizing long working hours.
A recent study undertaken by the Equality and Human Rights Commission on recruitment and
employment in the meat and poultry processing sector serves to reinforce such conclusions.29 In
finding evidence of the widespread poor treatment of agency workers, including in respect of health
and safety, it found that the main reason for the use of such agency workers was to meet the demands
of supermarkets. It went on to observe how a number of agencies felt that current profit margins did
not allow for compliance with labour laws because of supermarkets ‘driving their prices’ and more
generally noted that some of them thought ‘the downward price pressures exerted by supermarkets
and the way they went about ordering products from suppliers brought about conditions that
supported unethical traders’.
Very similar dynamics and outcomes, in turn, emerge from research evidence shedding light on the
way in which supply chains impact on the work experiences of seafarers. This evidence shows how
the modern logistics of global supply chains have involved the employment of smaller crews, the use
of faster ships and the redesign (and relocation) of ports to achieve shorter times spent on loading
and unloading.66,67 It further highlights how these changes have prompted drives towards work
intensification among a category of workers whose working conditions were already marked by long
working hours, shift work, intensive work patterns and serious physical hazards,68,69 and among
whom occupational mortality and morbidity rates are one of the highest for all occupations. In
addition, clear evidence exists of a range of adverse work-related psycho-social health effects.70,71
Explaining health and safety supply chain effects
The wider literature on the employment effects of outsourcing within supplier organisations indicates
that they are intimately connected to the nature of supply relationships. It follows that to understand
the effects of supply chains on health and safety, attention needs to be paid to how they are shaped
by the nature of such relationships and the factors that influence those that develop in particular
cases.
Forms of supply chain relationships
It has long been recognised that supply chain relationships can vary in terms of their nature.72 For
example, Powell has drawn a distinction between two forms of externalisation, or contractualisation
– ‘market’ and ‘network’ – and goes on to identify differences between them in terms of three sets of
characteristics: the normative basis of compliance/co-operation; the primary means of inter-
organisational communication used; and the methods adopted to resolve conflicts.73 Other writers
have drawn similar distinctions, although the terms used to describe the two categories identified
have varied. For example, labels used to describe the second of the types of external relationship
described by Powell include ‘quasi-firm’,74 ‘relational contracting’,75 ‘dynamic network’,76 and
‘obligational contractual relations’.77
Perhaps the most widely used of these categorisations is that developed by Sako in an analysis aimed
at shedding light on the relative competitiveness of Japanese and British manufacturing industries.77 In
this she juxtaposes the above-mentioned ‘obligational contractual relations’ (OCR) with ‘arms-length
relations’ (ACR) as a means of establishing ‘the ends of a multi-dimensional spectrum of possible
trading relationships’ that can exist between manufacturing buyers and suppliers. In doing so she
views obligational relationships as being characterised by relatively lengthy and ongoing links, a
substantial degree of mutual dependence and therefore a high degree of risk (and power) sharing, an
emphasis on objectives that extend beyond issues of cost to embody a substantial focus on quality
and innovation, and the presence of trust-based relationships which are in turn supportive of, and
exist alongside, open communications and joint problem-solving behaviour. Meanwhile, transactional
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relationships are seen to embody characteristics that effectively represent the mirror image of
collaborative ones in that they are seen to be relatively short-term, to place a heavy emphasis on cost
competitiveness, and to be less marked by trust-based relationships, power sharing, mutual
dependence and joint problem-solving. 
For Sako, the ACR and OCR contracting models lie at each end of a spectrum of trading
relationships. A number of other analysts have effectively echoed this point concerning the way in
which supply chain relationships take ‘intermediate forms’. Adler, for example, has argued that all
such relations can potentially embody elements of ‘hierarchy’, ‘trust’ and ‘market’ and that the central
difference between them consequently resides in the different reliance placed on them.78 At the same
time, however, Adler further argues that while all three of these elements might be present in a
particular inter-firm relationship, it needs to be recognised that within a capitalist society they operate
‘under the overall predominance of the market’. 
The upshot of such analyses is, therefore, that supply chain relationships vary considerably in terms
of the extent to which they are of a trust-based and collaborative character and hence encompass co-
operative (partnership) joint working, rather than more ‘arms-length’ and transactional relations. It
follows from this that, from the perspective of health and safety, they are also likely to vary
considerably with regard to how far they:
• encompass relational exchanges that extend beyond the merely transactional, and relatively
distant, ordering of goods and services and hence potentially involve attempts to influence how
health and safety is managed within supplier organisations
• embody a focus on cost minimisation and the imposition of delivery and other requirements that
can engender the types of adverse indirect health and safety effects detailed above.
The determinants of supply chain relationships
A range of factors have been identified as shaping the nature and dynamics of supply chain
relationships. In what follows the main factors are discussed through an exploration of three issues:
• the institutional context within which relations are established 
• the outsourcing objectives of buyers
• the extent of mutuality that exists between the risks and interests of buyers and suppliers.
Institutional context
A number of pieces of research have identified that the wider institutional context within which
supply chain relationships are established can exert an important influence over their nature. In doing
so, this research has indicated that such contexts can differ in the extent to which they act to facilitate
the establishment of collaborative, as opposed to more adversarial, relations between buyers and
suppliers. 
In an analysis of how ‘institutionalised rule systems, particularly of technical standards’ affect
supplier relations in the British and German mining machinery and kitchen furniture industries, for
example, Lane found that marked national differences existed in these systems which had significant
implications for the relationships established between buyers and suppliers.79,80 In particular, she
concluded that a number of aspects of the German institutional context served to support longer-term
and closer relations between customers and suppliers, notably by easing the drawing up and
interpretation of contracts and, more generally, reducing opportunism and risk among contracting
parties. These aspects included the much more extensive use of industry technical standards, the
creation of such standards, as well as rules on the ‘standardisation of business terms in contractual
relations’ and ‘market conduct’ by trade associations to which all but the smallest firms belong, the
degree to which this membership of associations supports contacts between firms, and the presence of
a system of contract law which affords greater protection ‘to the weaker party’.79
In a similar vein, Sako’s77 study of the comparative competitiveness of the Japanese and British
manufacturing industries, referred to above, also highlights that a number of features of the
historical, cultural, financial and employment relations contexts of buyer and supplier relations in
Japan serve to better support OCR-type relationships. For example, attention is drawn to how the
Japanese legal framework not only insists on the exchange of written contracts intended to provide
legal protection to weaker contracting parties, but also appeals to the reputation effect and moral
responsibility of stronger parties to prevent them from abusing their market power, and offers
informal dispute resolution services to facilitate the sustenance of trust relations. Indeed, because of
such differences, Sako concludes, perhaps somewhat controversially and pessimistically, that ‘it would
be neither feasible nor desirable to adopt OCR-type supplier relations in Britain’. 
Such studies therefore point to the fact that supply chain relationships are shaped not only by the
narrow interests and exchanges between supply chain buyers and suppliers but also by the wider
institutional context within which they operate. Developments in sectors which are the focus of
interest in the current study add weight to this point.
In construction, the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations (CDM) 2007 not only
provide clients with legally based encouragement to influence health and safety management within
suppliers, but also appear to have met with some, albeit qualified, success in this regard.81,82
Meanwhile, with regard to the positive examples of major construction projects mentioned earlier, it
can be noted that, because of their size, prominence and degree of risk, all of them were the subject of
close scrutiny from regulatory inspection. In addition, their high profile and the major contractors
involved provided opportunities for inspectors to exert influence on the design, management and
execution of the activities involved, not least because of the reputational risks they encompassed. The
available evidence suggests that these features helped ensure appropriate leadership and commitment
from both clients and contractors as well as increased will and capacity on their part to monitor and
audit compliance with OSH management standards. This also means, however, that the projects
concerned should be viewed as exceptional in terms of the context within which they were
undertaken. This is particularly so when it is borne in mind that, as shown in Chapter 4, the
construction industry is dominated by small and micro enterprises, with around 80 per cent of
employment within it being based in firms employing fewer than 250 people. Thus, in terms of
composition, much of the industry cannot be viewed as operating in institutional contexts marked by
high levels of regulatory attention and reputational risk. It is therefore unsurprising that one study on
the influence of the CDM Regulations on the procurement and management of small building work
suggested that they ‘left ambiguities, primarily through specified exclusions to application, through
which health and safety responsibilities may be downplayed or even simply disregarded’.83
Meanwhile, there would seem little doubt that the activities of the Ethical Trading Initiative and the
Gangmasters Licensing Authority, notably the latter’s protocol on supermarkets and suppliers, have
both served to raise the profile and importance of supply chain management issues in the food
production and processing sector. Indeed, more widely, the extensive literature on global supply
chains84–88 highlights how it has been the involvement of a range of actors, including social interest
groups, trades unions and non-governmental organisations beyond the immediate supply relationship,
that has acted to prompt and sustain initiatives to improve conditions for vulnerable workers at the
end of such chains. Of particular note for present purposes is the fact that in the global food, garment
and footwear industries, the business case for supply chain controls to improve health and safety
conditions in the supplying farms and factories of the southern hemisphere has not been made
directly from the improvement of the health of the workers concerned, or even from the possible
increased efficiency and quality arising from this improvement. Rather, it has been made from the
potential for improvement in the public image of the client and the consequent selling potential of its
‘labels’ in northern hemisphere markets, which otherwise might be threatened by bad publicity
associated with the exposure by such actors of poor labour conditions in its supply chains. 
The available evidence on the construction and food production and processing sectors consequently
suggests that attempts to utilise supply chains positively to influence the employment conditions of
workers have, for the most part, not emerged spontaneously from a narrow consideration of business
interests and objectives. Instead, such attempts have been intimately connected to the way in which
perceptions of these interests and objectives have been re-shaped by a range of external pressures, or
drivers, which serve to increase the business risks associated with the operation of supply chains in
both domestic and international contexts; pressures that have arisen not just as a result of legislative
requirements and the actions of regulatory agencies, although these have played a role, but also from
the activities of other groups and bodies in civil society.
A similar picture can be seen, albeit more indirectly, to emerge in relation to the maritime industry.
Thus, the increased usage by ship owners of ‘flags of convenience’, as again noted in Chapter 4, can
be seen to have occurred as a result of a desire on their part to register vessels in national
jurisdictions marked by lower regulatory employment standards. Similarly, the increased reliance they
have placed on the use of labour from developing economies has also reflected a cost-reduction logic
and has evolved alongside evidence indicating that non-compliance with employment standards is far
from uncommon in an industry where obvious difficulties exist with regard to regulating the
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employment conditions of seafarers while at sea. As a result, the industry as a whole cannot be seen to
be fundamentally shaped by the presence of strong institutional pressures to utilise supply chains to
enhance labour standards. Yet, as explained in Chapter 4, there do seem good grounds for believing that
examples of such pressures are likely to exist in the oil and chemical tanker trade because of the
reputational risks faced by major chemical and oil companies flowing from civil society groups, most
notably in relation to environmental protection.
The objectives of supply chain buyers
A substantial body of literature exists on the considerations that have informed the growing reliance on
the outsourcing of the supply of goods and services.89–95 In general this indicates that the growth of
outsourcing has been centrally driven by rational business logics which view outsourcing as contributing
to improved competitiveness and financial performance through such means as cost reductions,
enhanced production and service efficiency and quality and the transference of business risks onto
others, be these the suppliers of products, services or labour, or the workers engaged in the relevant
work activities. 
Existing survey evidence supports the view that a number of different motivations inform the use of
outsourcing. In the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, for example, when managers were
asked why services had been outsourced, the most common responses given were to achieve cost savings
(47 per cent), to gain an improved service (43 per cent), to achieve a greater ‘focus on core business
activities’ (30 per cent) and to ‘acquire greater flexibility’ (10 per cent).96 It would further seem, on the
basis of existing evidence, that such factors are frequently interrelated.97 Thus, in a manufacturing-based
study undertaken in the USA, Harrison & Kelley found that the three main reasons for outsourcing
were ‘capacity constraints limiting expansion’, ‘access to specialised skills and tools not available at the
plant’ and ‘cost cutting’.98 However, they further found that these motivations were not necessarily
mutually exclusive, as the following quote illustrates:98
… even where managers do cite cost-cutting as a rationale, it is rarely separable from the motivation
to transcend perceived capacity constraints. In more than three out of four cases where labor costs
were important to the decision to subcontract, a capacity or technology constraint was also reported
by management to at least temporarily limit expansion at the plant.
It is further clear that the objectives of buyers do have potentially important implications for the type of
relations they seek to, and do, establish with suppliers. In one study, for example, Cousins & Lawson
found that the adoption by buyers of a ‘leverage sourcing strategy’ (that is one which attempts to gain
access to a cost or price advantage in relation to the purchase of items that, while of strategic
importance, have little supply risk) was not statistically related to collaborative supply chain relations.99
In contrast, such relations were found to be statistically associated with the adoption of a ‘critical
sourcing strategy’ in respect of ‘scarce and/or high-valued items that have a high profit impact and high
supply risk’. 
A linkage between the scope and intensity of buyer–supplier interactions and relations has also been
found in a number of other studies. For example, in a survey of manufacturing organisations
undertaken by Heide & John, the existence of ‘joint action’ between buyers and suppliers, and
‘verification efforts’ by the former, were associated with the percentage of end product value accounted
for by the component being supplied, an inability to forecast technical requirements accurately, and the
existence of difficulty in measuring supplier compliance with expected outputs.100 
Given these differing motivations, and in particular the fact that a reduction in labour costs is not
necessarily a prime motivator, it cannot be straightforwardly assumed that outsourcing necessarily has
adverse implications for health and safety standards among supply chain providers. It would, however,
seem reasonable to conclude that proactive attempts on the part of buyers to protect and enhance such
standards are likely to be most common where the issue is viewed as being intimately connected to the
business objectives underlying their outsourcing strategies and policies – for example, when good
standards of health and safety are considered to play a potentially important role in ensuring that
outsourced goods and services are provided reliably and to an appropriate standard. In addition, the
fact that a desire to reduce costs can potentially exist alongside other more ‘qualitative’ objectives also
suggests that proactive (positive) action of this type can exist alongside price-based pressures which at
the same time act to challenge existing standards of health and safety within supplier organisations. 
The observations made in the preceding section regarding the role of reputation risks in prompting some
purchasers to take an active interest in how health and safety is managed by their suppliers in the
construction, food production and maritime industries can be seen to fit well with the suggestion that
considerations of business criticality are important in influencing supply chain strategies. In addition,
existing knowledge relating to the first two of these sectors adds further weight to the view that such
an interest can exist alongside contradictory pressures that are more problematic in OSH terms.
With regard to the procurement of contractors in construction, for example, there is some evidence
pointing to the fact that health and safety, along with issues relating to financial soundness, technical
ability, and management capability, are the most common issues considered by procurers during the
pre-qualification and bid processes.101,102 In general, however, the available evidence suggests that
while contractor experience, quality record and reputation are the most influential criteria for
selecting contractors at the pre-qualification stage, tender price exerts the most significant influence
over the eventual subcontract award. These findings therefore further point to the need to take care
not to extrapolate too widely from the positive supply chain effects found in the case of some large-
scale construction projects, since they arguably imply that, in the absence of strong countervailing
forces pushing in the opposite direction, health and safety considerations often play a relatively junior
role in subcontracting decisions within construction.
Turning to the food production and processing sector, research also indicates that health and safety,
while being an issue of interest to some procurers, may also be ‘trumped’ by other more business-
critical considerations. Supermarkets, for example, have been found to pay more attention to food
hygiene rather than OSH issues when auditing suppliers.65 Furthermore, pressures on suppliers to
manage health and safety effectively have been found to exist alongside strong downward cost
pressures that serve to encourage suppliers to develop employment regimes which generate the types
of adverse, indirect health and safety outcomes detailed earlier.29
Taken together, such findings therefore point to the fact that in both the construction and food
production and processing industries, proactive supply chain actions on the part of purchasers in
respect of health and safety do not necessarily say much about the priority accorded to the issue
relative to other business considerations. They also reinforce the point that any benefits of such
proactive actions can potentially be outweighed by the negative health and safety effects flowing from
the need on the part of suppliers to operate employment regimes compatible with the downward cost
pressures exerted by purchasers.
Mutuality of buyer and supplier interests
The responsiveness of suppliers to the demands of buyers, both at the pre-contractual stage and
subsequently, cannot be sensibly considered in isolation from the implications that these demands
have for their own business interests. In line with this point, the balance of dependency between
buyers and sellers has been particularly identified as exerting an important influence over the
relationships established between them.
A fear of too great a dependency may lead suppliers to resist an over-close involvement with buyers.
On the other hand, the existence of a high degree of such dependency may lead to willing compliance
with buyer demands. In a similar vein, a low level of supplier dependency can lead them to resist to
some extent the demands made by buyers. For example, a failure of a security contractor to respond
to a request to provide health and safety training for emergency procedures noted in one study was
observed to reflect the fact that the contract concerned ‘was not important to the overall success of its
business’.8 Meanwhile, where suppliers constitute an important source of specialist expertise/
knowledge, then buyers may be in a position of relatively high dependency, with the result that they
may not be well placed to gain a substantial degree of influence over the supply relationships
established.3
The balance of dependency between buyers and suppliers can consequently serve significantly to
shape the nature and dynamics of immediate supply chain relationships by having important
implications for the distribution of power and risk within supply chains.103 As a result, it can
influence such matters as how far suppliers (rather than buyers) shape the terms on which they
undertake work and the degree to which they are willing to take heed of, and comply with, buyer
requirements. It can also exert an important influence over the scope that exists to establish
collaborative, partnership-based relations. 
Against this backcloth, within the food production and processing sector existing research clearly
indicates that large supermarket chains often occupy a relatively powerful position vis-à-vis their
suppliers and hence have a potential capacity to influence their health and safety policies and
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practices, as well as their wider employment arrangements. Indeed, evidence relating to supermarket-
supplier relationships more generally strongly reinforces this. In 2000, for example, the Competition
Commission found that certain practices of large supermarkets in relation to their suppliers ‘were
operating against the public interest’; a conclusion that led to the establishment of a Supermarkets
Code of Practice covering such issues as standard terms of business, prices and payments, and
consumer complaints.104 Subsequently, in 2006, the Commission undertook another investigation, the
findings of which led it to conclude that a number of problematic behaviours on the part of
supermarkets would, if left unchecked, reduce suppliers’ ability and incentive to invest and innovate –
which in turn could act to the consumers’ detriment.105 In addition, in the light of its findings, the
Commission set up a new statutory code, the Groceries Supply Code of Practice, covering all large
retailers with a turnover of more than £1 billion. It unsuccessfully sought the agreement of large
retailers to establish an Ombudsman to monitor and enforce compliance with the code; a failure that
has resulted in the present government committing itself to introducing, through legislation, a
Groceries Code Adjudicator.106
Furthermore, there are good grounds for believing that large construction clients and companies often
occupy a similarly powerful supply chain position. The examples of the successful management of
health and safety in large-scale construction projects mentioned earlier point in this direction. The
composition of the industry similarly does so given that, as highlighted in Chapter 4, while the vast
majority of firms in it employ fewer than 10 workers, a quarter of the industry’s output is generated by
fewer than 125 large companies which each employ 600 or more people.
As to the maritime industry, the situation is less clear. However, given estimates indicating that
multinationals are responsible for around 70 per cent of world trade, there would seem to be good
grounds for suggesting that such corporations will often be in a position potentially to influence the
health and safety arrangements of ship operators based on what is a highly competitive industry
marked by an excess of capacity. 
Conclusions
Overall, then, the existing evidence lends support to the propositions advanced by Walters & James,1
summarised in the Introduction to this report (see Chapter 1).
It indicates that a combination of managerial disorganisation arising from outsourcing and associated
commercial pressures within supply chains can generate adverse health and safety outcomes in supplier
organisations. Such outcomes encompass higher rates of worker injury and a range of negative
occupational health outcomes prompted by commercially driven work re-organisation that gives rise to
greater job insecurity, work intensification, less control over working time and poorer pay.
Paradoxically, these situations occur against the background of a growing interest among policy
makers and practitioners in the role that powerful supply chain actors can potentially play in
improving supplier health and safety management and performance. On the basis of existing evidence,
it would seem that such potential does indeed exist to utilise supply chains in this way. At the same
time, however, while a range of attempts to so use them can be identified, their detailed nature, how
far they have been successful and what factors influence their impact, for the most part remain unclear. 
More generally, it seems that care needs to be taken not overly to generalise either the extent to which
supply relationships generate adverse health and safety outcomes or the potential that exists for them
to be used positively to influence supplier health and safety management and performance. Thus, as
has been seen in the existing literature, such relationships vary considerably in terms of their nature
and, in particular, with regard to their length; how far they extend beyond narrow, price-based,
economic transactions to encompass deeper, more relational dynamics potentially based on high levels
of mutuality, collaboration and trust; and the balances of dependency and power they embody. As a
result, they must also be viewed as encompassing considerable variety in terms of both the degree to
which they prompt downward pressures on employment conditions within supplier organisations and
the potential which exists for them to be used to support improved health and safety management and
performance. Indeed, it is clear that such pressures can potentially exist alongside purchasers’ attempts
to influence positively how health and safety is managed by their suppliers – a combination that raises
the possibility that in some cases purchaser–supplier relationships may simultaneously generate adverse
occupational health outcomes, while also apparently acting to improve the management of safety. It
was to explore the dynamics of some of these issues, in situations in which it is likely that positive
supply chain pressures to improve health and safety practice among suppliers are operational, that the
case studies reported in the following sections were undertaken. 
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It is further clear that how purchaser–supplier relationships impact on supplier health and safety and
the willingness of purchasers proactively to seek to influence it are both intimately connected to the
business interests and distribution of power embedded within them, and the wider institutional
context within which they are established. The available evidence indicates, for example, that the
importance of non-price objectives relating to such matters as quality and the gaining of access to
specialist skills that are important to purchasers, as well as the complexity of the goods and services
to be supplied and their business criticality, are all factors exerting an important potential influence
over the willingness of buyers to intervene to influence the internal operations of suppliers.
All this said, previous literature when considered as a whole suggests that only in relatively narrowly
defined circumstances will market-based business motivations alone serve to encourage the proactive
use of supply chains to improve health and safety standards within their suppliers. Indeed, it points to
the fact that such interventions on the part of purchasers are most likely to occur in the face of non-
market external pressures stemming from such sources as relevant legislative requirements and
liabilities, meaningful scrutiny from inspection agencies and, as the examples provided relating to
global supply chain developments demonstrate, action from civil society groups and agencies that give
rise to reputational risks. The extent to which we have found this to be the case in the situations we
have studied is also explored in subsequent chapters.
It is additionally clear that such general observations about the role of supply chains in influencing
health and safety management and performance in supplier organisations would seem generally
applicable to the two sectors, construction and shipping, which are the specific focus of this study, as
well as to food processing and production. It is clear, for example, from the evidence reviewed that in
each of them there are grounds for believing that negative, indirect supply chain effects are apparent.
It is also clear that such chains are at times used by large, powerful purchasers to influence positively
and directly how health and safety is managed by their suppliers, with some limited evidence pointing
to the utility of this usage.
Furthermore, there would seem to be grounds for concluding that such attempts positively to
influence supplier health and safety arrangements arise as a result of the presence of a combination of
business considerations and surrounding institutional contexts that act to encourage their
development. It also seems that they can exist alongside the presence of downward cost pressures that
have the potential to affect adversely the working conditions of those working in supplier
organisations.
The fact remains, however, that, as is the case more widely, existing evidence does not provide a
sound and detailed understanding of the factors that influence the development of such proactive
initiatives aimed at influencing health and safety within supplying organisations, the extent to which
they are successful and the conditions under which they do generate beneficial outcomes. In the
following chapters we hope to go some way towards remedying this lack of understanding through a
detailed examination of several examples of potentially positive supply chain influences on OSH
management among suppliers. 
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3 Methods
In this research a mix of methods was used to investigate propositions derived from a previous
extensive review of the literature on supply chain relations and health and safety management and
performance (summarised in Chapter 1).1 This section first presents a brief account of the research
design, with some caveats concerning the limitations of the methodological approach adopted in the
field. This is followed by an outline of the four situations in which supply chain effects of
organisational arrangements for health and safety were examined, the aims of the research approach
in each case and the methods used to collect and analyse our data. Finally, a brief account is
presented of the methods used in the stakeholder interviews also undertaken in the fieldwork in order
to develop some broader perspectives on the findings.
Research design
The primary aim of the research was to deliver a detailed, empirical study of supply chain
relationships and the factors that influence the presence, and outcomes, of attempts to use them as
leverage to shape positively the way in which health and safety is managed by suppliers. Within this
overall aim, the study’s objective was to test the propositions (see Chapter 1) derived from our
previous study1 relating to the sources of such influence, with a view to identifying the extent of their
validity and exploring any further avenues of influence.
Given the intention that the study make a contribution to future policy debates on both the
management and regulation of such supply chain relations and their influence on OSH, it was further
important for attention to be focused on the supply chain relations likely to generate lessons that can
contribute to the development of initiatives with potentially significant health and safety benefits.
This consideration, in turn, led us to wish to investigate supply chains involved in sectors where there
were relatively high-risk work activities. In designing the research, therefore, two such sectors were
selected: construction and the maritime industry, in which injury and fatality rates are a cause of
widespread concern. They are also sectors which, because of structural and organisational features of
the employment and business relations within them, are unusually difficult to reach with conventional
approaches to regulatory inspection. Moreover, they are sectors exhibiting marked differences in
relation to the types of supply chain characteristics commonly found within them.
In order to explore further possible differences in the effects of supply chain relations and to address
the propositions outlined in the Introduction, we chose to examine two sets of supply chain
relationships in each of the two sectors. As a result, the study supports both ‘within sector’ and ‘cross
sector’ comparisons, allowing for insights not only into the influences exerted on the structure and
dynamics of supply chains by sectoral-level factors such as the nature of product market competition,
surrounding regulatory arrangements and labour market conditions, but also those stemming from
variations in management attitudes, strategies and policies. 
The primary focus of the fieldwork within each of the four sectoral-based studies was on the in-depth
study of relationships between those at the head of supply chains and their ‘first tier’ suppliers. This
decision reflected four considerations. First, a recognition, amply supported in our earlier conducted
literature review,1 that an adequate understanding of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of supply chain operation
cannot be gained unless such chains are investigated in a detailed and contextualised way. Second, as
this literature review also highlighted, that it is the behaviour of those at the ‘head of supply chains’
that typically exerts the most important influence over what happens within them. Third, that gaining
such a contextualised view is likely to be problematic ‘along the length of a supply chain’ given the
difficulties associated with obtaining the required level of co-operation needed from all the
organisations involved. Fourth, we reasoned that it was important that the operation of supply chain
effects be explored from the perspective of both managers and workers in the light of evidence
suggesting that these perspectives can vary widely. This said, in practice in the fieldwork undertaken
in the construction sector we were able to examine supply chain relations with second-and third-tier
contractors, while in the maritime sector use of field data gathered in the course of several long-
distance sea voyages provided a rich source of information on the perspectives and practices of
seafarers of all ranks concerning supply chain effects on their work practices.
In the construction industry we considered two different construction projects undertaken by the
same contractor. In the first of these we anticipated finding some strong evidence of the propositions
of Walters & James1 in operation because of the unusually high profile and external scrutiny of the
safety arrangements and performance in the construction activities involved. The second project,
although it was a large build, was not subject to anything like the same level of external scrutiny. In
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such circumstances we reasoned that it would be interesting to test the extent to which the
propositions applied in this situation and to seek explanations for any differences observed.
In the maritime sector we examined a situation (in the oil and chemical tanker trade) in which we
thought it likely we would find supply chain relations that were relatively simple and long-standing,
with similarities to the ‘obligational contractual relation’ type of relationship classically described
by Sako77 and where the operation of the propositions of Walters & James1 might be anticipated.
Alongside this we undertook a second study in a different trade (container shipping) in which
supply chain relations were considerably more ‘arms-length’ and transactional in nature. This
second case study therefore focused attention on the supports and constraints relating to the
transferability of supply chain management strategies to promote OSH at sea to other trades in the
sector. In this way, through an examination of the same elements of external and internal influence
on the systematic management of health and safety within the supply chain of labour and services
in this second example, we were able to compare and contrast experiences in very different supply
chain situations in the same industry. As a result, we were able not only to test the key propositions
identified previously, but also to gain a better understanding concerning (a) the preconditions for
the success of such strategies and (b) the role of critical external and internal drivers in achieving
and sustaining such success.
Caveats
‘Opportunist and indicative’ research
In undertaking field research on industries not noted for their ease of access, located as they are in
diverse and geographically separated settings, we were obliged to be flexible and accommodating in
our approach to research design. At the same time, with limited resources and operating within
significant time constraints, we were further obliged to be both opportunist and creative in our
approach to gaining access to field situations and in undertaking research when in them. This led us
to adopt a mix of methods in our fieldwork, drawing our data from situations and in ways that
varied according to circumstances, on a case-by-case basis. The methodological inconsistency thus
engendered, which purists in social science research methodologies will be quick to note, can be
seen to limit the extent of strict comparability in the analysis of the findings we have drawn from
the case studies undertaken. However, we believe that despite this limitation our approach has
generated findings that are of sufficient intrinsic interest overall to justify the varying data
collection approaches we have used. As Eysenck famously stated in relation to studying social
phenomena, ‘sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases
– not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!’107 We have
done so in each of our cases and we think that the lessons thus learned in our analysis of these
experiences are both valuable in their own right and applicable to the propositions we have set out
to test. 
The range of supply chain relations
In each of the two sectors we originally intended to include:
• types of supply chain activities that differed significantly in terms of the likely ‘business
criticality’ of health and safety issues within them
• buyer–supplier relationships that varied with regard to their length, the distribution of power
within them and the degree of mutual dependency they embodied
• buyer demands on suppliers that varied in terms of the intensity and relative importance of
‘price based’ considerations
• buyer–supplier relationships that differed with regard to the presence or absence of attempts to
influence supplier health and safety management and the nature of such attempts 
• supply chain relations that were established against the background of markedly different
regulatory contexts.
Overall, we think we have considered situations that reflect these issues. This was especially so in
the maritime sector where the structure, organisation and business arrangements in the two trades
we studied were very different and where the role of supply chain influences on health and safety
management practices also differed greatly in significance, as we shall argue, because of these
organisational, structural and business differences. However, in the case of the construction industry
it should be acknowledged that the two examples we studied were in many respects organisationally
and structurally quite similar, with both close to the model of supply chain management in which
buyers attempt to use their business relationship with suppliers to influence their health and safety
management practices. The principal contractor that was the subject of study in both cases was a
high-profile firm with a publicly stated strong commitment to improving safety standards.
Nevertheless, this similarity did have an important advantage in that it enabled us to explore how
far the behaviour of this contractor varied against the backcloth of different situational contexts –
the high-profile Olympic Park and a rather more typical ‘large build’ construction project, where
there was less of a widely publicised and overt commitment to ensuring safety.
Field research methods
In this section we outline the methods we used to gather data in the four workplace cases.
Review of documentary sources
In both sectors relevant documentary sources were scrutinised in order to inform the development
of interview schedules for the collection of data in the field. These included the material reviewed
to provide the industry profiles and OSH practice and performance analysis presented in the
following chapter. In addition to this and more specific to the case studies themselves, however,
were materials concerning company organisation, policies, practices and outcomes, including
those addressing health and safety, and those on other aspects of company organisation and
business. This was generally documentation produced by the companies themselves – both buyer
and supplier organisations – as well as additional relevant materials from regulators and other
parties involved with the scrutiny of company activities. In certain cases, such as for example in
the case of the Olympic Park where the wider profile of the work activity we were investigating
was considerable, these additional sources of relevant material were very extensive. 
The aims of the case studies 
The main aim of our case studies was to assess the impact of the supply chain strategies of
procurers on occupational health and safety management and performance among their
contractors. In each case we wished to explore how significant features of the relationships
between the procurer and their suppliers influenced the delivery of effective health and safety
management. A second, related aim was to explore how these relationships, and the structures
and dynamics of the supply chain within which they were embedded, were themselves shaped by
sector-level factors such as the nature of market competition, surrounding regulatory
arrangements, labour market conditions, leadership and management attitudes, strategies and
policies and other external influences like public profile and reputational risk. Fulfilling these
aims enabled the realisation of a third aim, which was to explore the preconditions for the
transferability and sustainability of good practice in health and safety management in the sectors
concerned.
The intention of the four case studies was, in short, to gain an adequate understanding of the
‘how’ and ‘why’ of supply chain operation in influencing OSH management by evaluating how
those at the head of a supply chain influence what happens within it. Therefore the investigations
included exploring the role of leadership, procurement strategies, systematic management,
certification systems, communication, worker involvement, inspection and audit in securing good
practice in health and safety management, and performance in the supply of labour and services.
The operation of these factors was investigated both in the relationship between the contractor
and the procurer and in that between the contractor and the firms it had contracted as second-
and lower-tier contractors engaged in the delivery of its work programme. In so doing we
investigated the reasons for the success of the strategies of the procurer/principal contractor in
securing and maintaining high standards of health and safety management. We also examined the
external and internal drivers that contributed to this success and which helped determine its
sustainability and transferability to other parts of the sector. To achieve this, three of the four case
studies (1, 2 and 4) involved semi-structured interviews (or group discussions where appropriate).
For these case studies, participants were approached through their organisations and provided
with copies of the study information sheet, summary leaflet and consent form (see Annex) in
advance. Consent was obtained from each individual prior to interview. In the other case study
(3), existing data (collected in a broadly similar way) were re-analysed (see below).
The construction sector case studies
In accordance with the research design, the two studies undertaken in the construction industry
both focused on the same contractor (an organisation we have chosen to call TitanCF Industries).
This company was a large well-established construction engineering company. In the first case
study we explored its role as one of the principal contractors on the Olympic Park. Our second
case study examined its role in a large inner city development and regeneration scheme. 
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Case study 1: The Olympic Park
On the Olympic Park, TitanCF Industries was selected, following discussions between the research
team and the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) Learning Legacy Project team, while the lower-tier
contractors were selected and approached by TitanCF Industries, again following discussions with the
researchers. TitanCF Industries began work on the Olympic Park at the outset of the project and so
was involved in the preparation work. At the time the interviews were conducted, the organisation
was focused on the infrastructure of the Park and was involved in the construction of bridges, roads
and underpasses and landscaping. As a general rule the company used subcontractors primarily for
very specialised work and would tend to carry out tasks such as landscaping with its directly
employed labour. On the Park, however, the company had been encouraged to contract out this
work, and the participating subcontractors in this case study were primarily involved in landscaping.
Table 1 gives outline details of the organisations that took part in the research in the Olympic Park
case study.
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Tier Approximate overall
number of employees
Business type
1 3,000 Civil engineering 
2 500 Commercial landscaping
2 100 Landscaping and engineering
2 100 Marine-based civil engineering, dredging and remediation
3 100 Water features, irrigation and waste water treatment
3 200 Commercial grounds maintenance, gardening and landscaping 
3 500 Civil engineering
Table 1
Participating
organisations in
the Olympic Park
case study
Interview number Position
Procurer – head of supply chain
1 Head of health and safety
2 Deputy head of procurement
3 Director of construction
4 Head of procurement
Deputy head of procurement
Supplier and procurer – Tier 1
5 Contract manager
6 Procurement manager
7 Health and safety manager
8 Project manager
9 Contract manager
10 Supervisor
Supervisor
11 Worker
Worker
Interviews and group discussions were carried out at the ODA London offices and on the Olympic
Park itself between September 2010 and March 2011. In total 27 people took part in the case study
across 21 interview or group discussion sessions: five from the head of the supply chain; nine from
the Tier 1 contractor; eight from the Tier 2 level; and seven from the Tier 3 level (this includes one
individual employed at Tier 2 but acting as a health and safety adviser at both Tier 2 and Tier 3
levels). The positions of all the participants are given in Table 2.
Table 2 
Positions of the
Olympic Park
interview
participants
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Table 3
Participating
organisations in the
Forum
Development case
study
Interview number Position
Supplier and procurer – Tier 2
12 Supervisor
13 Manager (link to Tier 1 and Tier 3)
14 Health and safety adviser (Tier 2, and also for Tier 3)
15 Procurement manager
18 Project manager
19 Worker
Worker
20 Supervisor
Supplier – Tier 3
16 Manager (link to T2)
14 Health and safety adviser (Tier 2, and also for Tier 3)
17 Project/Procurement manager
20 Supervisor
Supervisor
21 Worker
Worker
Tier Approximate overall
number of employees
Business type
1 3,000 Civil engineering 
2 200 Labour supply for civil engineering
2 3,000 Multi-utility company 
3 50 Civil engineering
Table 2 (contd.)
Positions of the
Olympic Park
interview
participants
Case study 2: The Forum Development project
In the second construction case study, TitanCF Industries began work at the Forum Development site
at the outset of the project and at the time the interviews were conducted for this study it was focused
on the infrastructure of the site. The Forum Development was a large infrastructure and mixed
building project on a 67-acre site at an inner city location. It was undertaken by a partnership
between a developer and the owners of the land on which the building work was taking place.
Together we have referred to these parties as the Rome Consortium; although the developer was the
active partner and the one that took part in our interviews. The Rome Consortium employed a group
of organisations to deal with logistics, data collection and other site and project-wide activities. We
have referred to these organisations collectively as SPQR – the delivery partner. Table 3 gives outline
details of the organisations that took part in the Forum Development case study.
Interviews and group discussions were carried out on site in May 2011. In total 10 people took part
in the study across seven interview or group discussion sessions: one from the head of the supply
chain; four from the Tier 1 contractor; four from the Tier 2 level; and one from the Tier 3 level. The
positions of all the participants are given in Table 4.
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Interview number Position
Procurer – head of supply chain
1 Project manager
Supplier and procurer – Tier 1
2 Project manager
3 Construction manager
4 General foreman
5 OSH adviser
Supplier and procurer – Tier 2
6 Project manager
Procurement manager and OSH adviser
7 Worker
Worker
Supplier – Tier 3
6 Supervisor
* The original data were collected in the course of two PhD investigations undertaken under our supervision by
Syamantak Bhattacharya (in 2006) and Conghua Xue (in 2009). With the co-operation of Bhattacharya and Xue, we were
able to re-analyse these data specifically for supply chain influences that had not been previously sought from the data.
Table 4
Positions of the
interview
participants in the
Forum
Development case
study
The maritime sector case studies
The maritime industry is highly segmented and the distinct trades of which it is constituted are very
different in the ways in which they are organised and conduct business (see Chapter 4). We selected
two trades where we anticipated finding such differences reflected in the features of the supply chains
in which we were interested. Thus, we collected data from tanker companies and their trade
organisations in which we anticipated finding simple supply chain relations between charterers and
ship operators, and from the container trade in which relations are more complex. 
Negotiating access to shipping companies, their personnel and the organisations with which they do
business is not easy. Asking them questions about the nature of their business relations with charterers is
even more difficult. To conduct meaningful interviews with seafarers themselves in the course of their
work presents further substantial challenges for researcher access. To gather the data we required,
therefore, needed an innovative and opportunist approach to fieldwork. To achieve this we approached
the collection of field data at several levels.
Case study 3: The tanker trade
In our first maritime sector case study we explored perceptions among independent tanker operators
and their crews of the influences that the strategies of major oil companies have on their health and
safety management arrangements. Following a review of the relevant literature, it was evident that
major oil companies had a strong interest in these matters and a range of systems in place requiring
appropriate health and safety management on board the tankers they chartered to carry their products.
We were able to analyse two extensive qualitative data sets collected to examine health and safety
management practices on board oil and chemical tankers for these perceptions of supply chain effects.*
There were four companies involved, two of which were large global traders and two others, which
were both Chinese companies, trading on Asian routes. Some of the companies involved operated
chemical tankers as well as oil tankers and, in the case of the Chinese companies, research voyages were
conducted on these vessels as well as on oil tankers. However, since the seafarers on these vessels had
usually also sailed on oil tankers, their responses to questions involving supply chain effects were
generally based on their experiences on the latter.
In each case we explored the operation of such influences on arrangements for health and safety
management on board ships from the perspective of both officers and ratings as well as the management
of the ship operating companies concerned. 
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In the course of their combined fieldwork, Bhattacharya & Xue interviewed nearly 120 seafarers while
sailing with them on board eight different vessels. They also interviewed 23 shore-based managers in the
four companies responsible for operating these vessels. Among other things, the resulting data contained
a rich source of information on ship operating companies’ strategies in relation to OSH management
and seafarers’ experiences of them on board ships. This especially included the experience of the
operation of systems to implement the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, covering reporting
and communication systems for safety management, inspection practices and audit and review, as well
as the involvement of the seafarers themselves in securing good practice on board the tankers on which
they sailed. In all cases, supply chain influences were identified by respondents in response to wider
questions on the influences on shipboard management arrangements for OSH. Although the questions
asked were different in both studies, there were substantial overlaps in the responses they elicited. In the
analysis presented here we have focused solely on the material volunteered by respondents concerning
supply chain influences on health and safety management practices.
Case study 4: The container trade
In our second maritime sector case study we examined the activities of a ship management company
which, among other things, was responsible for the management of a fleet of ships engaged in the
container trade between Europe and North America. Interviews were conducted in the offices of the
ship management company (which we have called Eagle Shipping), where we interviewed the eight
senior staff responsible for procurement, safety management, contract compliance, auditing and ship
inspections. Additionally, we undertook a transatlantic voyage aboard one of the container vessels
managed by Eagle (we have renamed it the Sea Hawk), which was operated by a second company (we
have called this company QPR). On board we interviewed all of the ship’s senior officers, and a
representative selection of junior officers and ratings – 14 interviews in all. Informal contact with QPR
staff occurred incidentally aboard the vessel and on arriving at, and departing from, the vessel. A third
company owned the vessel (we have called this company Griffin). However, in the eyes of both the ship
management company and the seafarers, the engagement and influence of this company with the
management of health and safety onboard ship was negligible and we therefore deemed it unnecessary
to undertake interviews with its representatives.
Interviews with informants at sectoral levels
In both sectors, key informants representing employer/employee organisations, trade bodies, trades
unions and regulators were also interviewed following completion of the four case studies. The purpose
of these interviews was to gain further insight into the generalisability and more general validity of the
findings obtained through the case studies. Again, we have not named the personnel or identified their
positions within their organisations as this would allow for deductive disclosure of identities. Altogether
12 such key informants were interviewed. In most cases the interview took the form of a fairly open
discussion based around our propositions and the issues that participants in the case studies had found
significant.
Research instruments
The formulation of the interview schedules was informed by the findings of our earlier review of the
literature, as well as by the more general aim of testing the propositions that we derived from this
review and detailed in the protocol for the study overall. Study protocols and information sheets were
produced for the project overall and adapted for each sector. Examples of the interview schedules and
prompts used in the study are found in the Annex.
Data analysis 
All formal interviews were tape-recorded and written transcripts were produced. They were coded prior
to further analysis, using a thematic framework, through NVivo software to identify and code issues of
relevance to determining supply chain influence and addressing the research questions. Throughout the
analysis considerable attention was paid to the triangulation of data and the facilitation of carrying out
‘within sector’ and ‘cross sector’ comparisons. To this end, the case study and key informant data were
considered at the individual, sectoral and project levels. This involved the research team members for
each case study working both independently and collaboratively throughout the analysis process.
Confidentiality 
The confidentiality of all participants in the study was respected. Cardiff University has a well-developed
and rigorous system for scrutiny of research proposals for ethical approval and its procedures were
adhered to. All interviews carried out during the case studies were therefore undertaken on a
confidential basis and care was taken to ensure that the confidentiality of interviewees was preserved as
far as possible. To this end, transcripts of interviews were stored electronically on an anonymous basis
and password-protected. This said, one of the case studies was carried out on the Olympic Park. This
high-profile sports facilities building project was unique in the UK. Its identity was therefore impossible
to disguise. Indeed, the high profile of the building work on the Olympic Park was among the reasons
why we selected it as a suitable case in which to explore the conditions that mediate the effects of supply
chain influences on health and safety management, practices and experiences. Moreover, agreement with
the ODA enabling the research allowed it to incorporate an account of some of our early findings into
the dissemination of examples of its Learning Legacy strategies during the course of the project.108
Despite this, we have endeavoured to make anonymous the principal contractor on which our case
study focused as well as all of the lower-tier contracting organisations that took part in the study and
each of the individuals we interviewed, following the same procedures in this respect as those in the
other case studies reported here. 
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4 Construction, shipping and occupational safety and
health
This chapter seeks to outline and contextualise the detailed qualitative findings obtained from the
four case studies undertaken. It begins by providing background information on the structural and
organisational features of the two industries from which the studies are drawn that have implications
for health and safety management and performance within them. The chapter then moves on to
outline what is known about standards of health and safety performance in these industries, as well
as the companies that headed the supply chains studied. Finally, the chapter outlines the sources of
information that were available to the research team regarding the health and safety effects of these
supply chains. It outlines the way in which the supply chains were structured in each case and briefly
describes the salient features of their effects on health and safety practices.
Structural and organisational features of the two industries
This section considers the structure and organisation of the two industries and reviews recent trends
in their development that present some challenges for the regulation and management of OSH. 
Construction 
Current figures suggest that approximately 8 per cent of the workforce in Britain work in the
construction sector.109 This means that there are over 2.5 million people working in the industry in
over 300,000 enterprises,109 making it one of the largest industrial sectors in the UK according to
Office for National Statistics (ONS) figures quoted by the HSE in 2009.110 It is also significant in the
national economy: in 2008 construction output for Great Britain was approximately £123.6 billion
and it contributed around 6 per cent of gross domestic product (ONS figures, quoted in HSE
2009).110 In 2009 the HSE gave this description of the sector:110
Projects and sites are ephemeral in nature, constantly changing in status, covering a huge range of
construction processes of varying complexity and scale. The work processes and people change
almost daily on sites. Projects involve those who procure, design, specify, manage and maintain
buildings and structures as well as those who undertake the process of building them – the supply
chain. ‘Construction’ ranges from large, high profile projects such as Heathrow Terminal 5 and
the Glasgow Commonwealth Games facilities carried out by major principal contractors for large,
competent clients, to small refurbishment projects of shops and domestic roof repairs undertaken
by a self-employed contractor. 
Overall the industry follows a ‘top–down’ structure, with principal contractors subcontracting very
significant proportions of projects. Much of the workforce is mobile, with 54 per cent having worked
outside their current region of employment and over one third (35 per cent) working as owner-
managers.109 Employment is often short-term and informal, with perhaps 600,000 informally
employed in the sector, and there is significant employment of foreign/migrant workers
(conservatively estimated at about 8 per cent of the construction workforce).110 In addition,
contingent forms of employment, such as subcontracting and agency contracts have long been widely
used in the industry,111 which is increasingly characterised by such flexible forms of employment
(including employment by gangmasters, conservatively estimated at around 3 per cent of construction
workers) and by self-employment (both genuine and bogus; at least 40 per cent of workers are self-
employed or covered by the Construction Industry Scheme for tax, and in London the level of self-
employment is approaching 90 per cent).112
This trend towards contingent employment is further confirmed by recent work carried out by
MacKenzie and colleagues113 which showed that 98 per cent of the (220 enterprise-size stratified)
construction firms surveyed reported using subcontract labour, and 41 per cent reported using agency
staff, with most reporting increases in the volume of work allocated via these contracts and many
also reporting increases in the range of tasks covered by them in the previous five years. The authors
went on to argue that the UK employment model, with its minimal levels of regulation on contingent
forms of employment, in fact encourages employers to use such contracts to protect themselves
against the risks of unpredictable market conditions. This is of particular concern during recession
and economic crisis, leading to widespread redundancies throughout the sector. For example, ONS
figures show that the total volume of construction output fell by 4.1 per cent from August 2010 to
August 2011.114 Similarly, the Construction Skills Network suggests that output fell by 13 per cent
between 2008 and 2009 and, in 2009, predicted a reduction of 400,000 workers by 2011.109
Furthermore, for those remaining in the industry, pre-planning of work is frequently minimal,
worker representation is generally weak, job security and skills training are meagre, and the level of
unionisation is low (around 10 per cent), all making for frequently poor worker consultation and
participation. 
The construction sector is made up of a very wide range of enterprise sizes, dominated by small and
micro enterprises: approximately 92 per cent are micro firms employing less than 10 workers, and
most of the rest employ 10–49 workers.109 Despite these figures, around 20 per cent of employment
is in the 0.1 per cent of firms employing more than 250 workers, with around a third of
employment in the smallest micro firms,113 and approximately a quarter of the industry’s output is
generated by fewer than 125 large companies which each employ 600 or more people.110 In
particular, these very large operators are engaged in high=profile building projects which are often
government or other public sector procurements: in general, the public sector procures 30 to 40 per
cent of total construction output in the UK annually.112 The fragmented nature of the industry is also
mirrored in the many bodies and organisations representing its various parts, with no single
organisation including all those involved in the industry.110
Arguably, therefore, the construction sector effectively operates as (at the very least) a two-tier
system. High-profile, often public sector, work is carried out by very large contractors at one end of
the spectrum, and very small, more often private sector, build and repair work is carried out by
small and micro firms at the other, with a large gap between them with respect to management
capacity. 
Shipping
Merchant shipping operates on a global basis. It is arguably the first truly globalised industry
encompassing a fully globalised labour market.115 Developments over the last 20 or so years have
enabled the industry’s owners to trade on a basis relatively free from state regulation, to drive down
the cost of labour through outsourcing, and to improve competitiveness by increasing transportation
speed. In parallel with this, organisational restructuring has meant that financial ownership has
become increasingly separated from fleet and human resources management in the industry.
In 2008 some 8.2 billion tons of cargo were transported by sea, contributing about US$380 billion
in freight rates to the world economy. Since then the impact of the decline in the world economy has
been felt, with trade falling by 4.5 per cent to 7.8 billion tons in 2009.116 According to Lloyd’s
Register figures, the world merchant fleet consisted of 102,194* ships in 2009, approximately
54,000 of which were cargo-carrying vessels. 
The maritime industry is made up of distinct sectors or ‘trades’ which carry different types of cargo
in a range of types and sizes of vessel, operating over varying distances. Stopford117 suggests there
are four broad groups relating to:
• the energy trades (including oil, coal and gas) which represent 44 per cent of cargoes
• the metal industries (including ores and steel) with 18 per cent
• the agricultural trades (such as grain, sugar and forest products) which represent 9 per cent 
• other cargo, such as cement and other minor bulk and dry cargo (for example value
manufactured or semi-manufactured goods such as textiles and vehicles) with 28 per cent. 
Stopford indicates that these sectors are served by three broad categories of shipping, based on the
types of cargoes carried and the services provided: bulk transport, liner transport and specialised
cargo transport,117 with a further two categories of service sector vessels and passenger ships.118 Each
of these categories operates differently and under different market conditions.
In terms of ownership of the overall world fleet, Japan and Greece dominate the industry, owning
16 per cent and 15 per cent respectively in 2009, followed by Germany and China (10 per cent and
8 per cent).119 However, ships are registered to different maritime administrations and in terms of
deadweight tonnage, which forms the basis for the adoption of international conventions, with
Panama by far the largest (22 per cent), followed by Liberia (11 per cent).119 This is significant
because flags with the largest tonnage have the greatest involvement in international bodies such as
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which make regulations and conventions. 
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* All vessels, including fishing and passenger vessels, of 100 gross tons and above.
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As a whole, the industry operates as a service sector, with charterers renting space on board ships – or
whole ships – from ship owners to carry their goods. Within this system, ship owners may retain
responsibility for the vessel and crew, but in recent years this relationship has become more complex as
it has increasingly also included third-party ship management (where ship management companies are
responsible for vessels in which they have no financial stake). Larger management companies may
manage substantial fleets and they also tend to have their own crewing agencies in the major labour
supply countries (such as the Philippines and India), which in turn may outsource to locally based
agencies. All of this makes for complex supply chain relationships and responsibilities. 
Recent estimates suggest that there are about 1.37 million certified seafarers,120 while others estimate
that over 1 million are working onboard ships worldwide at any given time.121 Crews are normally
structured into two main classes of officers and ratings responsible for navigation, cargo, maintenance
functions (deck) and engineering functions (engine). In addition there are other departments for catering
as well as specialist functions. Crews are predominantly male and almost always made up of a range of
ethnic groups (often with officers of one nationality and ratings of another), and they frequently work
together for only relatively short periods of time. Operators can and do replace crews of one nationality
with those from different, and less costly, nationalities, often with little notice. This can mean that the
pay and conditions of individuals in similar roles on the same vessel may be different. It can also result
in communication problems because of seafarers’ unfamiliarity with each other and with the vessel they
are charged with operating. 
Regulatory requirements of the maritime administration (flag) with which a ship is registered determine
(at least in part) the number of the crew on a ship. In practice, a ship operator needs to ensure that there
is an individual with the relevant certificate for each role onboard. The widespread use of crewing
agencies often means that the owners and charterers, and even the ship managers, may have little in-
depth or long-term involvement with the workers on board their ships. 
In parallel with this, trends in ship design and shipbuilding have been towards the production of larger
vessels with greater cargo capacity. At the same time, crew sizes have fallen across the range of merchant
ships, with some estimates suggesting that the crew of an average cargo ship is now about 60 per cent
smaller than in 1970.122 This reduction has been achieved primarily through advances in technology and
increases in automation. As Alderton and others put it:122
… during the past 20 years or so there has been a reduction in the size of crews. In the early 1970s a
typical 10,000 grt [gross register tonnage] bulk cargo carrier would have had approximately 40 crew
members. Today, a much larger (that is 30,000 grt) bulk carrier is likely to have only 18 to 25 crew
members on board. The same crew size pattern applies to cargo-carrying ships of all kinds. The
decline in the size of crews also makes it difficult for seafarers to be given shore leave. Smaller crews
mean that labour is intensified with seafarers working longer hours and performing flexible tasks.
Furthermore, crew sizes also vary by flag, with those on second (as opposed to national) registers or
flags of convenience generally smaller, possibly as a result of less stringent regulation.123
The implications for supply chains and health and safety brought about by the extent of the outsourcing
prevalent in the sector are quite complicated. For example, the shipment of goods, whether they are raw
or manufactured materials, is likely to involve several levels of organisations in business relations, in
addition to those between the owner of goods and the party directly responsible for their transportation. 
Health and safety performance
Both construction and shipping are hazardous industries. In this sub-section we outline some broad
features of OSH performance. In the case of construction, we are able to supplement this broad
understanding of the industry’s OSH performance with some further data on the performance of the
company that was the principal contractor on both the sites on which we undertook our case studies.
Unfortunately such information was not available in any reliable form from the shipping companies that
were the subject of our studies in the maritime industry. However, we concluded from the testimony of
all of the participants in these case studies that we were in every case dealing with organisations at the
‘better end’ of the industry in terms of their health and safety performance.
Construction
Health and safety performance in the construction industry, in terms of both overall numbers and rates
of injuries and fatalities, has improved significantly over recent decades. In the UK, the rate of fatal
injuries followed a significant downward trend during the 1990s and early 2000s, but levelled off
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from about the mid-2000s.110 However, it is still a high-risk industry, with the largest number of
worker fatalities of any sector,110 accounting for over one in four (27 per cent) fatal injuries, nearly one
in 10 (9 per cent) reported major injuries and 6 per cent of over-three-day injuries among employees.114
Most recent RIDDOR figures show that in 2010/2011 there were 50 fatalities (a rate of 2.3 per
100,000 construction workers per year), 18 of which were to self-employed workers.114 This is an
improvement on the average over the previous five years of 61 fatalities, 19 of which were to the self-
employed.114 It also represents a reduction of two-thirds compared with figures from 1990/1991, which
is comparable with the reduction seen in other industries.114 Falls from height are the biggest cause of
fatalities (50 per cent in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009), followed by being struck by a moving/falling
object, being struck by a moving vehicle, building or structure collapse and overturning plant.110
Similarly, RIDDOR figures show that in 2010/2011 reported non-fatal injuries have fallen by over a
third (38 per cent for major injuries and 36 per cent for reported over-three-day injuries) in absolute
terms, with rates reduced by about a quarter (25 per cent for major injuries and 22 per cent for
reported over-three-day injuries) since 2007/2008.114 In 2010/11 there were 2,298 reported major
injuries (a rate of 173.2 per 100,000 per year) and 4,784 reported over-three-day injuries (a rate of
360.5 per 100,000 per year) among construction workers.114 The most commonly reported injury types
were handling (28 per cent of all injuries) and slips and trips (23 per cent), which is similar to causes
and proportions for the rest of British industry (31 per cent and 27 per cent respectively).114
It is important to note here that these figures undoubtedly represent ‘the tip of an iceberg’, as most
accidents are simply not reported. The significance of this under-reporting was highlighted in a
government-sponsored inquiry into the causes of recent fatal accidents in 2009:112
It is a disgrace that we have such a low level of reporting serious accidents, let alone near-misses…
If we had a higher proportion of reporting serious accidents, it might help us to achieve a more
accurate picture about fatalities.
The HSE report110 which was a part of the basis of the fatal accident inquiry also identified a number
of factors which are likely to impact on health and safety performance in the industry, including
fragmentation and scale of the industry; supply chain and contractual influences; bogus (or false) self-
employment; skills and competence; vulnerable workers; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;
leadership, planning and management of health and safety; public sector clients; and regional
differences.
Reported levels of work-related ill health in the construction industry are also falling, though here
again it is well known that the health effects of work in the industry are substantially under-reported.
While incidence (new case) rates of certain conditions, such as musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) and
dermatitis, are significantly higher than the average for the other industries combined, others, such as
mental ill health, are significantly lower.114 This has been confirmed by recent work by Stocks and
colleagues124 showing that male construction workers in the UK had significantly raised standardised
incidence rate ratios for respiratory and skin disorders, as well as MSDs. These were 3.8 (3.5–4.2),
which is a rate approaching four times higher than that for all other UK industries combined; 1.6
(1.4–1.8) and 1.9 (1.6–2.2) respectively. 
Occupational cancer also continues to be a significant problem for the industry, with the recent Cancer
Burden Survey 2010 suggesting that over 5,000 new cases of occupational cancer each year are the
result of past exposure in the construction sector.114 Recent figures also suggest that over half (56 per
cent) of occupational cancer registrations in men are related to the construction industry, with about
half (nearly 4,000 per year) of occupational cancer deaths attributable to exposure to carcinogens in
the industry.114 The most significant carcinogen remains past exposure to asbestos (71 per cent),
followed by silica (16 per cent) and diesel engine exhaust/environmental tobacco smoke (6 to 7 per
cent each).114
Overall in 2010/2011 about 2.3 million working days were lost in the industry (equating to 1.1 days
per worker) due to self-reported work-related illness or workplace injury, with Labour Force Survey
figures showing that most of this (just over 75 per cent) was the result of health problems (as opposed
to injury).114
The available figures for the construction industry as a whole, then, suggest significant progress over
recent years in relation to fatalities, injuries and ill health. However, as Philip White, the HSE’s Chief
inspector of construction, points out in the Construction Division’s work plan for 2011/2012:125
… these improvements are not mirrored to anything like the same extent on smaller sites where we
still find many instances of unacceptable standards.
Indeed, recent figures (for the five years between 2003/2004 and 2007/2008) show that two-thirds of
fatalities were among the self-employed or those working for firms employing 15 or fewer workers and,
similarly, that two-thirds of accidents occurred on small sites (with 15 or fewer workers), making it very
clear that those working for smaller firms in the industry are at greater risk.110 The Donaghy Report
noted that, although some larger companies have worked to tackle work-related ill health issues, this
is:112
… often a matter of last resort for SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises] who are more
focussed on the necessity to ‘make do’ and get the job done. For this group sometimes even the
provision of adequate temporary welfare facilities proves a step too far.
Against this background, Donaghy and her colleagues suggested that fragmentation in the industry,
together with issues including training and skills, pre-qualification, team working and the extent of self-
employment, remained key issues in the construction sector with regard to fatal accidents.112
In terms of the regulatory responses to this situation, there are several points of relevance to the present
research. The nature of the complex relations between clients, designers, contractors, subcontractors and
workers in the construction industry, together with the myriad sets of worksite circumstances, present
major challenges for the management of health and safety performance in the sector. At least in part as a
response to these issues, the health and safety performance of the industry has been the subject of
considerable political and regulatory attention during the last decade or so, much of which has focused
on larger construction companies. The regulatory framework provided by the Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations and its supporting guidance126–129 encourages purchasers to exploit the
opportunities they have as powerful supply chain players to influence improvement among suppliers.
Indeed, the contribution of the complex challenges to the poor health and safety performance of the
sector is the principle reason for the supply chain orientation of these more recent regulatory provisions
on health and safety management in the industry that apply within the European Union.
The construction industry, therefore, is subject to significant regulation, particularly in relation to health
and safety, and merits its own division within the Field Operations Directorate of HSE, intended to
provide a clear focus and responsibility for construction work, as well as a 10-year Construction
Priority Programme designed to improve the HSE’s impact in the industry and ensure that risks are
properly controlled through engaging with stakeholders.110 In particular, the Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations of 1994, revised in 2007, are intended to integrate health and safety into
every aspect of construction from the concept and design phases, through the planning and building
phases, and on to demolition work. These regulations give specific duties to the client, designers and
contractors and their aim is to encourage communication, co-operation and co-ordination throughout
the supply chain in order to identify and eliminate (or effectively manage) risk. In addition, the Office of
Government Commerce (OGC) and Common Minimum Standards (CMSs), which are intended to drive
up standards in public procurement, are other sources of potentially significant influence in this regard,
though currently the OGC has no enforcement powers.
Concern about the difference between large and small contractors is also clearly reflected in the HSE’s
approach to the industry for 2011/2012, which involves spending more time regulating smaller sites
while, for large contractors, carrying out fewer site visits and putting more emphasis on ‘challenging
large contractors at board level’.125
As we will see in subsequent chapters, this approach was much in evidence on the large worksites on
which the principal contractor that was the subject of our research operated and in which the HSE’s aim
to ‘use the supply chain to influence standards’125 was also evident.
Health and safety performance in the construction sector case studies
In 2008/09 the overall accident frequency rate for reportable construction injuries was 0.4 per 100,000
hours worked (or four per million). Both case studies, as well as the Tier 1 contractor itself,
performed significantly above this industry average.
TitanCF Industries, the Tier 1 organisation involved in both construction case studies, is a recognised
industry leader not only in terms of civil engineering but also in relation to health and safety practices
and performance. It currently has a directly employed workforce of over 3,000 and had a turnover of
The limits of influence  35
£644 million for 2009 (which has doubled since 2000). Its own figures show that in 2010 the total
number of lost-time incidents for the organisation fell by 40 per cent on 2009 levels, with those
resulting in more serious injuries falling by 25 per cent; while the use of Observation Cards increased
significantly. The accident frequency rate at the end of 2009 was 0.21 incidents per million hours
worked. In 2010 there were 18 reportable accidents, down from 30 in 2009 (and 51 in 2000); and 41
lost-time injuries, down from 63 in 2009. The organisation has had no fatalities in the period 2006 to
2010. It also has an unbroken record of a 10 per cent reduction in accidents year-on-year since 1999,
giving it one of the lowest injury rates among the UK Contractors Group (UKCG). The organisation
has won a number of safety awards and described 2010 as its best ever year for health and safety
performance.
The safety record on the Olympic Park (on which our first case study was focused), where peak
workforce levels were approximately 12,500, has remained significantly better than the industry
average throughout the work. In February 2011 the Park achieved its seventeenth set of 1 million
man hours worked without a reportable incident since 2006. The ODA’s contribution to this has been
recognised by the British Safety Council (both the five-star and Sword of Honour awards). In fact, the
Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) reported that within the 60 million hours
worked on the Park, 24 periods of 1 million hours were (RIDDOR-reportable) accident-free. The
overall accident frequency rate was 0.17 incidents per million hours worked, which RoSPA describes
as lower than for the construction industry as a whole and more in line with the average across all
UK employment sectors.127 Near-miss reporting was equivalent to 100 reports for every RIDDOR
event. Similarly, the ODA reported that over the 66 million hours worked there had been 109
reportable injuries and no fatalities, with the workforce recently completing 3 million consecutive
hours worked without a reportable incident. The Olympic Park is the first Olympic project in the
world to have been completed without an accident-related fatality.
The safety record on the site of the Forum Development Project, which was the second case study,
also remained significantly better than the industry average throughout the work. At the time of
writing (December 2011), there had been no reportable accidents since the start of work. This good
safety record was confirmed by the case study organisation:
We’ve held a good track record on this site, over the, since 2006 we’ve had one reportable
incident and that was due to the fact that the guy had a slipped disc problem already, so in the
longest sense we had to report it, but we’ve had a good record up to now. We are about on just
about 1 million work hours without injury, so it has been very good. So from a health and safety
point of view we’ve maintained really good standards and we are quite happy with it. (Project
Manager, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
Shipping 
Historically, merchant shipping has always been a dangerous industry to work in. Its unique work
circumstances mean that seafarers are at risk of whole vessel losses (as a result of collisions,
groundings, foundering, structural and engine failure, fires and explosions), as well as individual
events (such as accidents and illnesses), with the latter resulting in more deaths per year than the
former.
Dating back to the 19th century, when industrialisation created an increased demand for maritime
transport, official records show that seafaring was among the most dangerous of occupations.130
During the first half of the 20th century conditions improved and mortality rates correspondingly fell,
but seafaring was still identified as the most dangerous occupation in the UK.131 There have, of
course, been further substantial improvements over the decades since then, in terms of living
conditions on board ship as well as safety measures and practices. Nevertheless, Roberts & Marlow
have shown that merchant seafaring still has the highest mortality of any UK occupation other than
commercial fishing.132 These authors reported a mortality rate of 46.6 per 100,000 person years,
nearly 28 times that for the general British workforce, concluding that the fatal accident rate
remained 16 times greater than that for the average British worker.71
Although there are well-recognised difficulties inherent in comparing mortality internationally (for
example, in terms of the inclusion or otherwise of ‘natural’ deaths at sea, as well as suicides,
homicides and so on), recent research shows that, like the UK, seafaring is among the most dangerous
occupations for many nations, with a mortality rate seven times higher than that of shore-based
workers in Sweden;133 10 to 20 times higher than the average in Germany;134 over 11 times higher
than that for men working on land in Denmark;135 10 times greater compared with land-based
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industry in Norway (combined shipping and fishing industries);136 and 10 times higher than in land-
based industry in Iceland.137 Indeed, comparison of their results with those from other recent studies
led Roberts & Marlow to conclude:71
Seafaring is therefore often the second most hazardous occupation after commercial fishing in
advanced western economies.
In fact, Li & Wonham121 suggest that the annual mortality rate (from all causes) for seafarers
worldwide is 2.5 times higher than that for UK seafarers, suggesting that this significantly raised level
of occupational hazard is far from limited to the West. Seafaring, therefore, is a dangerous job
wherever it is carried out, but it is markedly more dangerous in some national fleets as compared to
others. Comparisons between national fleets generally suggest that losses are greatest among flag of
convenience (FOC) and non-OECD countries. For example, Nielsen & Roberts69 found all-cause
mortality rates per 10,000 seafarers of 3.5 in Sweden, 9.1 in the UK, 23.9 in Hong Kong and 26.5 in
Singapore. Furthermore, even within this categorisation, second register rates are higher than those of
national registers, and newer FOC rates are higher than older ones.115 Other research has also
identified within-fleet differences in relation to factors such as types of vessel, as well as both their size
and age. Bulk carriers, for example, have been the subject of particular concern because their
structure, size, age and cargo weights are all associated with an increased risk to safety.132
The picture in relation to seafarer fatalities, therefore, is complex, not least because of the long-
acknowledged and widespread difficulties around data comparability. However, these problems are
significantly exacerbated in relation to injuries, in particular because, as with other industries
(including construction), these incidents are often simply not reported. Nevertheless, such data as there
are suggest that the pattern is similar to that of fatalities, with seafarers at greater risk of occupational
injury than their shore-based counterparts. For example, Hansen and colleagues138 found notified
accident rates of 3.1 per 100 employed seafarers per year, and rates of accidents causing permanent
disability of 0.34 per 100 employed seafarers per year in Denmark, compared to 1.8 and 0.22
respectively for all shore-based industries. Although data from outside the advanced market economies
are even scarcer, there is no reason not to conclude that the pattern of higher rates among FOCs and
second registers is also apparent. However, as Ellis and his colleagues139 point out, despite
international requirements, maritime administrations have failed to systematically collect and collate
incident data.
Research has identified patterns within seafarers’ accident data, pointing to locations, types of work
and vessels with the highest accident rates. Those involved in heavy work on deck and in holds are at
greater risk,138 as are engine room personnel and galley staff.140 Moving around the vessel from one
task to another is a major cause of accidents,140,142 which is confirmed by the findings of Jensen and
colleagues143 that over 40 per cent of non-fatal injuries are caused by slips, trips and falls; a figure
similar to the 46 percent (followed by 20 per cent each for manual handling and machine operation)
found in Marine Accident Investigation Branch data by Li & Shiping.144 The highest accident rates also
tend to be on small general cargo ships (coasters) and ‘roll-on, roll-off’ (ro-ro) ships, which may be
linked to these vessels’ work patterns and intensity of activities as a result of their frequent port visits
(and associated fast turn-around times).138 Hansen and colleagues138 also found that the accident risk
for such vessels decreased with seafarers’ length of employment aboard a single ship and frequency of
return to the same ship, suggesting a protective effect of familiarity with the vessel; something which is
becoming less common with the increasing use of short-term and agency employment within seafaring.
In addition to the relatively higher risks of injury and fatality faced by seafarers, the profession has
historically been associated with significant health risks caused by living and working at sea. These
ranged from problems of nutrition, infectious disease and mental health on long voyages in the 19th
century to continued problems today, often now associated with acute disease coupled with the lack of
access to medical care at sea135 or exacerbated by factors resulting from globalisation (such as
increased stress and fatigue associated with the restructuring of work). Again, however, detailed,
accurate and comparable data on work-related ill health among seafarers is scarce, partly because of
problems of reporting and recording, but also because of the ‘healthy worker’ effect (where those no
longer well enough to work leave the industry; a particular problem with seafarer data because of the
regular medicals required to allow seafarers to work) and the frequently long time lag between
exposure and the onset of illness.
Nevertheless, there is some epidemiological evidence to suggest that seafarers may be at greater risk of
certain medical conditions such as coronary heart disease,145–147 lung cancer148 and alcohol-related
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disease (such as cancer of the liver, larynx, mouth and throat, cirrhosis and pancreatitis),149 all of
which may be linked to lifestyle factors and stress.150–152 However, it is difficult to disentangle the true
extent of occupation-related risk from ‘background’ levels of the prevalence of these conditions
among the general population, not least because of the weaknesses in the limited data available.
Other research has also suggested that seafarers may be at greater risk of health effects linked to
hazardous chemicals they encounter as part of their work and/or within cargoes,68 such as various
cancers145,148,153–155 and other neurotoxic effects,156,157 as well as injury and poisoning.158 Again,
however, cause and effect are difficult to establish because of a lack of adequate data and the long
latency between exposure and illness. The latter is particularly problematic among seafarers who are
frequently employed on a series of short contracts across a range of employers and agencies over the
course of their entire careers.
Other recognised occupational diseases associated with working at sea include noise-induced
deafness, MSDs, and mental health problems (including stress and fatigue, as well as complete mental
breakdown and suicide). For example, an Australian study found that 80 per cent of responding
seafarers reported experiencing stress, with 60 per cent indicating that this was moderate to high
stress,159 while work from the UK has suggested that fatigue is a significant problem160 associated with
specific aspects of seafaring such as shift work, sailing schedules and leave time, poor sleep quality,
high job demands and stress.161–163 Such findings, in turn, receive support from work showing that 64
per cent of responding car carrier crew experienced fatigue, with levels higher among those on short-
cycle as opposed to deep-sea vessels (78 per cent compared with 53 per cent),66 and are of particular
concern given the associations that have been identified between: (a) fatigue and ill health;163–165 and
(b) fatigue and poorer cognitive performance,166,167 personal injury168 and vessel accidents.169 Again,
however, data are generally scarce and as a result levels of concern and corresponding concerted
efforts at prevention are much lower within the shipping industry than elsewhere. In addition,
seafarers have long been at greater risk of injury or death from violent crime at work (both in port
and at sea), a factor which continues today71 and is now further exacerbated by the piracy that is
increasingly linked to the global seafaring industry.
Seafarers’ working arrangements (involving rigid hierarchical structures and frequently temporary and
very short-term crews made up of combinations of nationalities as explained above) also provide
significant potential for victimisation, harassment and bullying, with recent work suggesting that this
may be relatively common. For example, 27 per cent of survey respondents in one study reported
experiencing verbal or physical abuse in the previous 12 months, and 30 per cent reported having
witnessed victimisation of others,170 while more generally high levels of job insecurity among seafarers
have been identified.66,171 Furthermore, working hours, which are subject to international regulation
(specifying that seafarers should have at least six hours uninterrupted rest during a 24-hour period),
are frequently falsified by seafarers in order to avoid ‘creating waves’ and making trouble for
employers they wish to continue to work for; for example, 86 per cent of seafarers on board car
carriers in the recent study by Kahveci & Nichols66 reported failing to get even this minimal level of
rest. These factors in combination are of very serious concern given the obvious links between levels
of work and fatigue123 and their potential consequences for both individuals and ships.
In addition, arrangements for seafarers’ welfare at work vary between ship types, shipping companies
and ports. Although areas such as accommodation, food and sanitary conditions are covered by
international regulations, provisions are frequently inadequate as identified by Port State Control
inspection.172 Facilities, and access to them, also vary by vessel and often by rank as well with, for
example, 84 per cent of seafarers in a recent survey reporting email provision on their ship to which
they had no access, and 40 per cent of senior officers having access compared to only 3 per cent of
ratings.173 All of this is of particular significance given the very protracted amounts of time seafarers
can spend in these environments, and the associations between such facilities and the mental and
emotional wellbeing (and so ultimately the safety) of individuals and crews.174 Indeed, seafarers often
compare life on board ships to being in prison, although Kahveci has observed that:173
… a review of the UK Prison Service information books for prisoners demonstrates that the
provision of leisure, recreation, religious service and communication facilities, [is] better in UK
prisons than it is on many of the ships.
Overall, therefore, it is clear that seafaring remains one of the most dangerous occupations, with
seafarers at significantly increased risk of occupational accident, injury, death, illness and violence.
What is equally clear, however, is that: (a) the industry has insufficient reliable data to make
accurate comparisons either within its own sphere (for example between fleets, flags, vessel types)
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or more widely with other sectors (such as construction); and (b) the data it does have certainly
represent just the tip of the iceberg. This is of particular concern given that the global and
globalised nature of the industry means that: 
• FOC administrations continue to thrive (as they fulfil a market need by reducing operating
costs through the reduction of registration and regulation levels and associated expenses)
• the organisation and structure of the work itself is increasingly subject to increases in speed,
intensity and bureaucracy as well as decreases in job security, training and communication
(again all in order to reduce costs and increase efficiencies)
• labour hire practices are increasingly exploitative with seafarers frequently subject to contingent
employment contracts.
All of these are factors that reduce the incentive for monitoring health and safety performance and
collecting mortality and morbidity data on the one hand, while also increasing the potential for
stress, fatigue, ill health and accidents on the other.
Finally, unlike the construction industry, there is no regulatory measure in the shipping industry,
either national or international, that is explicitly focused on regulating OSH management through
increasing the responsibilities of the actors involved in supply chain relations. 
Why supply chain influence?
Given the hazardous nature of the industries in the present study and the challenges they provide
for the effectiveness of conventional regulatory strategies, it is not surprising that various
innovations in regulatory strategies for risk management have been developed in these sectors. This
is especially true in the construction industry, where since the 1990s regulations in the UK and the
European Union have attempted to address the complex chain of responsibilities for workers’
health and safety that have been created by the fragmented structure of employment in the sector.
As a result, regulatory strategies have explicitly included coverage of health and safety
responsibilities arising from relations between procurers and suppliers in the labour and service
supply chains that permeate the sector. 
In the maritime industry, there has been less focus on supply relations in efforts to regulate risk
management and account for the complex chains of responsibility created by the deregulation and
restructuring of employment and the labour force. Nevertheless, international standards – such as
those found in Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the ISM Code, in the requirements of the Standards
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) on seafarer training and qualifications, and in
the International Labour Organization’s Marine Labour Convention – as well as some national
efforts to protect labour (eg in relation to crewing agencies in the Philippines) all to some extent
represent attempts to address the complexities of the sector. As in construction, there would also
seem to be potential to use supply chains to improve the management of health and safety on
board vessels.
One of the most interesting elements of change in the modern maritime industry concerns that
taking place in the relationships between clients, shipping companies and the seafarers that crew
the ships carrying clients’ goods from port to port around the world. The limited available
literature suggests that the nature of these relations may have significant effects on health and
safety management at sea. It further suggests that shipping companies may resemble the ‘porous
organisations’ identified in land-based examples, where the demands of clients, superimposed upon
relations between employers and employees which are themselves no longer entirely determined by
the nexus of law surrounding the contract of employment, come to dominate concerns about the
management of work and as such influence the nature of working conditions and the work
environment.
While much of this influence may lead to work intensification and poorer working conditions,
there is also the possibility that, as with the construction sector, in certain cases it may contribute
to the improvement of health and safety management and working conditions, provided certain
preconditions apply. Moreover, since in some parts of the world the industry is somewhat remote
from regulatory scrutiny, it is possible that such ‘supply chain effects’ on health and safety
management may even be better placed to contribute to improved health and safety outcomes in
the sector than more conventional approaches to regulatory scrutiny of health and safety at work.
It is also the case that, in common with the construction sector and partly as a consequence of
regulatory measures, there have been varying degrees of political and business pressures placed on
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major operators to introduce their own ‘voluntary’ standards and practices. As we shall see in the
case studies outlined next, in parts of both industries these pressures have resulted in considerable
efforts to use supply chain relations to influence OSH management practices among downstream
suppliers.
Supply chains in the construction and maritime sectors: an outline of the nature
and effects of the examined supply chains 
This section briefly outlines the structure and effects of the supply chains in the four case studies
as experienced by the workers and managers who participated in our research.
Construction 
As described in Chapter 3, we undertook two case studies in the construction industry. In both
cases they were examples of the conscious use of the supply chain to demand standards of health
and safety management and practice among contractors and subcontractors. However, there were
a number of differences between the case studies in the way this was achieved and how it was
perceived by the organisations involved. 
There are three main sources of evidence showing the operation of the regimes in place to ensure
good health and safety management and practice in the case studies. The first and perhaps most
obvious is found in data on reported injuries, ill health and incidents. As outlined above, these
data strongly suggest that the systems for ensuring safety in the construction of the Olympic Park
were operating effectively in terms of reported injuries. This, as far as we were able to tell from
the less robust data available, was also the case in the Forum Development case study. On both
sites, there were no fatalities and considerably fewer reported injuries than might have been
anticipated from data on the performance of the industry overall, and fewer than experienced in
comparable large construction operations. However, on its own this tells us little about the
contribution of arrangements within the supply chain to achieving this improvement.
A second source of evidence is found in the operational data generated through the monitoring
and audit arrangements in place. Here there was a wealth of information concerning the
operation of arrangements for safety practices and procedures on the Park, including the
qualification and training of personnel and the operation of risk assessment and management
procedures. There was also information on recorded near-miss incidents and such like and, more
importantly, actions taken in response to them. As the following chapter demonstrates, overall the
evidence available from these sources would indicate that a robust, responsive and extensively
monitored OSH management system was in operation on the Park, which extended beyond
arrangements with principal contractors and appeared to generate substantial intelligence
concerning safety. Again, there was much less robust data on these issues in the second case study,
although it was sufficient to convey the same general impression of overall good practice.
However, this tells us relatively little about the perceptions of the personnel involved concerning
the efficacy of these arrangements, their dependence on supply chain relations and the
contribution of such arrangements and relations to improving either the safety of the workers
concerned or the operational practices of their employers. A third source of data in this respect
can be gleaned from information collected during interviews and discussions with representatives
of employers and workers at various levels in the supply chain during the investigation. We will
concentrate on these data in subsequent sections.
Working on the Olympic Park
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the supply chain relations studied at the Olympic Park.
It shows the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) as the procurer at the head of the chain, and
CLM (a consortium made up of CH2M Hill, Laing O’Rourke and Mace) as the delivery partner
charged with ensuring compliance from the principal (Tier 1) contractors on the ODA’s behalf.
There were several of these Tier 1 suppliers involved in the construction of the Park and the
company on which we have focused our studies, and called TitanCF Industries, was one. In turn,
in their contracts with the ODA, the Tier 1 suppliers were charged with assuring compliance from
their contractors and subcontractors with regard to OSH requirements. There was, however, as
shown below, a ‘double assurance’ built into the arrangements for monitoring compliance with
required OSH standards: not only did the immediate procurers have systems in place to monitor
compliance from their contractors, but the organisations at the head of the supply chain also had
monitoring procedures that reached down into the supply chain and – in theory at least – were
able to provide a double check on compliance from contractors at the lower levels.
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The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the direction of influence in the supply chain. Thus, in a
straightforward way, through requirements at the pre-tendering and tendering stages, ODA
procurement strategies made clear the expectations of the standard of health and safety management
and practice required at the Park, and made successful tendering contingent upon these expectations
being met. As a principal contractor, TitanCF Industries was therefore under a contractual obligation
not only to implement these requirements in its own work but to demand the same level of adherence
to standards of health and safety management and practice among its own contractors. These
contractors likewise were further obliged to require them of their own contractors and so on
throughout the supply chain. Monitoring of the delivery of these standards was undertaken by the
organisation for which they were being delivered, that is the (contracting) organisation in the tier
above. But as the dotted arrows also indicate, the system for ‘double assurance’ of standards was
achieved through further monitoring of compliance undertaken both by the ODA and the delivery
partner through the various feedback, communication and training arrangements also in place in the
overall systems for managing safety and health at the Park. The operation of all these arrangements
and how managers and workers at various levels of the supply chain perceived their effects will be
discussed more thematically in the following chapter.
The Forum Development – working on a large infrastructure project 
Supply chain relations in our second case study are represented in Figure 2. As with the Olympic
Park, the simplest expression of the use of the supply chain to influence OSH is demonstrated by the
direction of the arrows. The principal difference between the two case studies was the absence of any
arrangements through which the procurer or its delivery partner directly monitored the activities of
second- or third-tier contractors in the Forum Development, as was the case on the Olympic Park. 
Shipping 
Unlike the case studies in the construction industry, the two undertaken in the maritime sector
concerned very different trades. As one senior trade union official stated of the industry:
It’s so different from one trade to the next – it’s not really one industry – it’s several.
A consequence of these contrasts, immediately apparent in the two case studies we undertook, was
that there were fundamental differences in the structure and functions of the supply chains involved.
These were created by the structure of the trades and the dominance within them of different business
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practices and associated variations in the nature of the economic relations subsisting between supply
chain actors. Thus, in the tanker sector, there was a relatively straightforward situation in which
major oil companies contracted with independent tanker companies; while in the container trade,
relations between ship operators and the organisations whose goods they carried were more varied,
diffuse and complicated. As a result, whereas the conscious use of supply chain influences by major
oil companies was clearly in evidence in the tanker trade in ways somewhat comparable to that seen
in the construction studies, their role and possible use to influence OSH management and practice in
the container trade was both less evident and more complicated. 
Availability and usefulness of sources of evidence in the maritime sector were also somewhat less
straightforward than in construction. Data on reported injuries, ill health and incidents in the
industry are notoriously incomplete and unreliable.69,121,175–177 We were therefore unable to make use of
this source in more than a very general way. However, as we have indicated previously, overall these
data suggest that while the maritime industry is among the most hazardous, there is some indication
from routinely collected data that the tanker trade performs somewhat better on several measures of
OSH performance when compared to other trades. This is so, for example, in terms of data on ship
incidents, on Port State enforcement and, to a lesser extent, on the outcomes of inspections
undertaken by or on behalf of the major oil companies.
A second source of possible evidence might be found in the operational data generated through the
monitoring and audit arrangements in place within shipping companies. However, in the companies
we studied, such information was either not collected in sufficient detail or with sufficient rigour to
be useful for the purposes of the research, or was not made available to researchers. In effect,
therefore, with the exception of some limited reference to data providing some general indication of
safety performance, we of necessity concentrate on the information we have obtained from the
managers and seafarers involved in the two case studies.
The tanker companies
The supply chain arrangements relating to the tanker companies studied are summarised in Figure 3.
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Figure 3
Tanker supply
chain schematic
With their capacity to choose which ships to employ, charterers have the opportunity to be influential in
the way that ships are operated. The oil sector has arguably advanced furthest along this road because
of the small number of large players in the sector. While the major oil companies (generally referred to
as ‘oil majors’) claim to account for some 20 to 30 per cent of the market in the maritime transport of
petrochemicals, the other 70 to 80 per cent is served by independent tanker operators. The main source
of business for these companies, however, is the transport of petrochemicals for the oil majors. These
companies are therefore in an extremely powerful market position at the head of the maritime oil
transport supply chain. The representative organisation for the oil majors is the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF), through which they are able to present their views within the
IMO and other regulatory and legislative arenas and additionally organise more direct approaches to
tanker companies in terms of improving safety in the transport of their product.
The dominance of the oil majors is much in evidence in the sector. To compete for contracts, tanker
companies must ensure their ships are maintained and operated at a level dictated by the oil majors,
including with respect to arrangements for the management of health and safety on board. Vessels and
the companies that operate them are vetted and required to meet rigorous standards concerning a
matrix of procedural and staffing requirements that influence, among other things, the management of
OSH. Inspections are performed according to standard report formats developed by the OCIMF (see
below) and provide each member oil company’s vetting department with the information necessary to
apply its criteria for the selection and/or continued use of tankers and their operating companies. Tanker
vetting inspections are usually carried out during unloading operations, with the prior agreement of the
ship owners and operators, and include access to confidential documents relating to the vessel’s
maintenance and classification. Where a fleet operation fails to meet the required standards, even if it is
because of the lower performance of only one owner’s ships, it may result in the entire fleet being denied
business. Oil majors’ investment in the management of the vetting process is considerable. The level of
dominance exerted by the chemicals industry over the independent companies that transport its goods is
not as great as that of the oil majors, but as we shall see below, it follows the same pattern.
As Figure 3 also shows, safety management issues with relevance to the berths at the refineries and oil
terminals where tankers load and unload their cargoes are also significant. Since many of these are
owned and/or operated by major petrochemical companies they are further able to require contractual
safety management standards from tanker operating companies in relation to these too. A similar
situation prevails in the chemicals sector.
As well as producing technical and operational guidelines for the sector, the OCIMF has developed a
common ship inspection report programme (SIRE). Launched in 1993 as a response to concerns of sub-
standard shipping, SIRE is presented as a ‘risk assessment’ tool. Using a standard inspection guide,
information is entered into a database enabling potential charterers to access up-to-date inspection
information concerning oil tankers.178 Since its introduction, more than 180,000 inspection reports
have been submitted to SIRE. On average, programme recipients access the database at a rate of more
than 8,500 reports per month. OCIMF members appoint the inspectors who make these reports.
In addition to the SIRE inspection system, the Tanker Management and Self Assessment (TMSA)
programme claims to provide a best practice guide to ship operations and a means by which to
determine ship operator quality. It offers ‘a comprehensive tool to help ship operators measure and
improve their management systems’. As well as providing instruction and methods to encourage ship
operators to assess their safety management systems (SMSs) against key performance indicators and
develop continuous improvement, it provides an online tool enabling them to share their results with
those who might request them for the purposes of their own internal vetting. The advantages to oil
companies of the implementation of such a tool are obvious, as is the business necessity on the part of
such tanker companies to ensure they comply with the requirements of the scheme. According to the
latest OCIMF Annual Report,178 the TMSA programme continues to grow, with more than 1,200
companies now registered to submit reports.
There are 576 SIRE inspectors accredited under the programme. The majority (463) are accredited to
inspect larger tankers (Category 1 ships) while a few (eight) are accredited for small tankers (Category 2
ships) and others (105) for inspecting various additional kinds of vessels including barges, those used for
towing vessels carrying petroleum products, and vessels carrying packaged cargoes (Category 3 ships).
They are selected by OCIMF member organisations and are required to familiarise themselves with the
inspection processes by attending SIRE inspections in the company of SIRE-accredited inspectors, before
attending an OCIMF SIRE Inspector Training Course. Following the course they must complete a
written examination and successful candidates are then further audited during an inspection before
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being accredited as inspectors. The SIRE accreditation process is cyclical and each accreditation period
runs for three years. There are 28 SIRE auditing inspectors who, according to OCIMF,178 are at the
heart of the SIRE inspector accreditation programme. They are experienced inspectors who collectively
audit approximately 150 SIRE inspectors each year.
External guidance and monitoring activities through the supply chain in the petrochemical tanker trade
are not limited to the activities of OCIMF, SIRE and the TMSA programme. In relation to chemical
tankers, since the 1990s the Chemical Distribution Institute (CDI), a non-profit making organisation
founded in 1994 and funded by the chemical industry, has aimed to ensure the development and
preservation of an inspection system for the transport and storage of bulk liquid chemicals.179 The CDI
Marine Scheme was created to improve the safety and quality performance of bulk liquid chemical
shipping. It now provides annual inspection reports on over 600 ship operators and 3,000 ships.179 Ships
having a CDI-Marine Scheme report are also listed on the European Quality Shipping Information
System used by Port State Control authorities. Chemical terminals acknowledge the CDI standards, and
their role is influential in determining whether vessels are able to visit their berths.
In our case study in the tanker trade, we found widespread awareness among seafarers and the
managers of the operating companies from which our data were collected concerning pressures from the
major petrochemical companies in respect of arrangements for OSH management on board their vessels.
We were able to explore their perceptions of the significance of these pressures in our analysis of the
OSH management on the vessels, and several themes emerged from the data which we look at in greater
detail in following chapter. While the nature of the industry and its activities is considerably different
from construction, there were a number of similarities in the way that supply chain influences on OSH
operated. These were especially evident in relation to the scale of the potential damage to the business
and reputation of powerful and influential actors in the supply chain as a result of health and safety
failures among their suppliers, and in the lengths to which these actors were prepared to go to make
explicit their health and safety management requirements of their contractors and to monitor
compliance with them.
The container companies
The fourth of our case studies focused on a cluster of businesses connected to a ship management
company based in the UK that we have called Eagle Shipping. The supply chain in which Eagle Shipping
was involved is shown in Figure 4. The business relations involved in the ownership, management and
operation of the ships were somewhat complicated, but as our sectoral level interviews in the industry
confirmed, fairly typical of those generally found in the shipping industry. Griffin owned QPR, which
subcontracted technical ship management to Eagle, which in turn managed the vessels. However, QPR
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retained the role of cargo management and therefore had a relationship that might best be described
as running parallel to Eagle Shipping. In relation to cargo planning, QPR therefore retained a direct
relationship with the vessel, which did not run through Eagle channels. Additionally it is worth
noting that Eagle Shipping contracted with Eagle Manila (a crewing agency) for the provision of
crew. 
Eagle Shipping provided technical management for a modest fleet, which comprised vessels for two
sister companies (the same parent owned all three companies) and for a Swedish company (QPR). In
total it provided technical management for 14 vessels in a variety of trades which were not
associated with the offshore oil industry and four vessels which were.
The container vessels operated by this company were owned by QPR, which was in turn owned by a
large shipping line – Griffin. QPR made many of the operational decisions about the vessels and was
a major point of contact for Eagle management (for example, the purchasing manager liaised directly
with them). However, Griffin played a more proactive role in a small number of areas, for example
in relation to bunkering (fuelling), which it wholly controlled. Eagle had only held the contract to
manage the vessels on behalf of QPR for around 18 months before the time of our investigation.
On board ship both QPR and Eagle were recognised by seafarers as having a strong association with
them and with operational matters. Griffin produced literature for all of its fleet, which was
available on board; but notwithstanding these efforts Griffin remained largely ‘off the seafarers’
radar’ except when it came to issues of fuel quality and bunkering. The seafarers themselves were
employed by either Eagle or its Philippines-based crewing agency, Eagle Manila. Officers had
permanent contracts but ratings did not. Rather unusually, all the seafarers were on rotations back
to the same vessel.
While such complexities of ownership, management and operation are not uncommon in the
maritime industry today and also extend to practices in the tanker trade, the nature of the business
relations between the companies and those whose goods they were transporting was quite different
to those described in the previous case study on the tanker trade. In the container and car shipping
undertaken by QPR, goods belonging to a considerable range of clients could be loaded and carried
on board their vessels in any one voyage. The safety interests (if any) of the smaller of these clients
appeared to have made little impact on the management and crew of the vessels, while those shown
by larger clients were restricted to the conditions under which their goods were transported. 
The safety of the cargo was reported by seafarers on board to be the overwhelming concern of the
charterers. Charterers took an interest in the cargo holds, the lashings and the cleanliness, but
generally this interest did not extend in any overt way to the arrangements for managing the health
and safety of the crew. 
There was one customer that was regarded as an unusual/exceptional case. It had undertaken a more
general auditing of the conditions of life and work on board. This was described as useful by some
seafarers as audits were generally approved of and sometimes picked up minor issues to be dealt
with such as old paint being stored for too long:
SEA 14: [Company name] has been here doing audits, I think it is, I don’t know but for me it is
feeling it started when they had, years ago when they started covering the child labour in the
manufacturers, now then they took out the system to control and this includes also the transport.
So they came here and they asked the crew, they want to see hospital facilities, make sure the
crew get properly paid, the resting hours, so yeah [company name] they did that. 
Interviewer: What did the [company name] auditors look at?
SEA 15: Safety, health, like the paint locker and how was the ventilation, and that the labels
were there and the MSDS [material safety data sheet] and this stuff. And they were very
interested in the engine and how it works and like this and well, the standard, how it looks like –
I mean the general what you see, the housekeeping and things like that, clean linens. 
However, this was an exception and seemingly a spin-off from the particular corporate social
responsibility agenda pursued by a large multinational retail company. It was remembered because of
its exceptional nature rather than because it was in any way typical of the normal practices of
customers. 
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As we discuss in the following chapter, generally in the container trade the business relations between
customers and the management and crew of the vessels carrying their goods were more typical of the
arms-length trading relations that Sako77 argues are least likely to be characterised by features in which
buyers exert a direct and significant influence over the internal management practices of their suppliers.
There was no obvious pressure from the clients whose goods were being shipped for either the ship
operator or the ship management companies to conform to any requirements concerning the management
of health and safety on board the vessels shipping them. Indeed, with the exception of the one example of
a client that had carried out some auditing, there was no evidence of them imposing such requirements.
There were two primary reasons for this. One appeared to be because there was no immediate or obvious
reason why it was in the client’s business interests to require particular standards of OSH management on
board the ships transporting their goods. The second reason was that the structure of the supply chain in
question was too diffuse, and the position of the clients whose goods were being shipped too remote to
allow processes, such as the procurement and monitoring activities examined in the other case studies, to
be used effectively to influence either the ship operators and managers or the seafarers in this last case
study. 
Despite this lack of an obvious direct supply chain influence of customers on their suppliers, however, our
case study demonstrated that relations between parties in the network of business connections involved in
container transport nevertheless sometimes influenced health and safety practices at sea. We will have
cause to return to this observation in the final chapter of the report. 
Conclusions
In short, both construction and shipping are comparatively hazardous industries in which the
management of risks to workers’ health and safety is made substantially more difficult by the structure
and organisation of work in the sectors. In this respect, both represent challenges to conventional
approaches to OSH management and to its regulation. Regulators, employers and trades unions in both
sectors are not unaware of these challenges and have attempted to address them in various ways.
Innovative approaches to regulation that pay some regard to the fractured nature of the structure and
organisation of work are evident and of relative long-standing in the construction industry; and so is
strong and directive political pressure upon the leading organisations in the industry. These pressures
would appear to have had some impact on the consciousness of at least some of the major organisational
players in the industry and it is evident from the case studies undertaken in the present research that this
consciousness is reflected in concern about public image and reputational risk, which in turn has led to
conscious efforts to impose influence on the health and safety management arrangements of contractors
through the supply chain. Exactly how and with what effects this is achieved in the situations we studied
is explored further in the following chapter. It is important to note, however, that in this respect we are
referring to large and prominent business organisations in the construction industry and not necessarily to
the industry as whole. This is an issue to which we will return in the final chapter of the report.
In the case of the maritime industry, responses to the situation are somewhat more varied. To begin with,
the regulatory provision for OSH management remains both limited and conventional in the extent to
which it takes account of the structural and organisational determinants of OSH outcomes in the sector.
The ISM Code merely requires the implementation of a fairly standard SMS among ship operators and
on the vessels for which they are responsible. It makes little allowance for the challenges to
implementation and operation of safety management brought about by the structural and organisational
features of work and employment in the industry. Nor are there any regulations that specifically address
these features in ways comparable to the CDM Regulations in the construction industry. Moreover, while
structural and organisational challenges for OSH management are evident in all trades in the sector, there
are substantial differences between trades in their nature and extent and in the responses to them. As our
case studies demonstrate, there are some situations in which the concerns of companies at the head of
supply chains about their commercial success, reputational risks, liabilities for environmental damage and
so on, have led to substantial interventions in the OSH management arrangements of the downstream
suppliers of transport for their goods. At the same time, our case study in the container trade
demonstrates that such business and regulatory determinants and the contexts in which they occur are
not found ubiquitously across the industry as a whole. In the container trade, while supply chain
pressures may still play some role in influencing good practice in OSH management, they do so less
obviously, and more as one element of a constellation of influences that also include regulatory
compliance pressures and further business concerns among the organisations in the sector regarding
matters such as image and market position. Again, we explore the detailed experience of these
pressures in the following chapter and will have cause to return to their implications in the final
chapter of this report.
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5 Direct and indirect supply chain effects on health
and safety arrangements: experiences in construction
and shipping 
This chapter explores how the situations we have studied in the construction and maritime sectors can
be understood in terms of supply chain leverage on OSH management practice. In essence, following
from the outline at the end of the previous chapter, the account in the present chapter focuses on how
personnel within the organisations we studied perceived the impact of strategies adopted by buyers upon
the health and safety practices of themselves and their suppliers by considering in turn four issues:
• the nature of procurement within the supply chains studied
• the provision of health and safety support to suppliers
• arrangements for the monitoring of compliance with the demands of upstream clients
• the way in which supply chain influences were in part shaped by wider aspects of the surrounding
external environment. 
The influence of procurement 
Having identified perceived supply chain influences to a greater or lesser extent in all the situations we
examined, we sought to understand the impact of these on the procedures and practices of the
organisations we studied. In essence the most direct pressures were those associated with standards that
could be required of suppliers in the terms of the contract under which they supplied their services and
the monitoring of their delivery by buyers or their agents.
Procurement practices
By far the most common and long-standing supply chain procedure to influence the practice of those
supplying goods and services is for buyers to make the practices required a condition of the contract
between themselves and their supplier. Allied to this is the related procedure of demanding certain
qualifications or pre-qualifications from potential suppliers and their workers, as definitions of the
standards of competence required for eligibility to tender for contracts. Common requirements in
relation to OSH in this respect include evidence of adoption and operation of certified OSH
management systems by contractors, certification of competencies and training acquired by their
managers, supervisors and workers as well as evidenced standards of performance in terms of OSH
outcomes.
As might be anticipated in a complex building project such as the Olympic Park which involves large
numbers of contractors and subcontractors, there were extensive procurement arrangements in place in
which health and safety standards featured prominently. The ODA approach was described in detail in
its Health, Safety and Environment (HS&E) standard,180,181 which was intended to remind contractors of
their legal responsibilities and set out how consistent good practice was to be achieved across all
projects on the site. Health and safety was incorporated from the inception and planning stages and the
ODA’s intent to involve the supply chain is clear throughout the standard:
Suppliers are responsible for adequately resourcing their work to meet this standard including self-
monitoring, auditing and reporting against the KPIs [key performance indicators].* Suppliers with
sub-suppliers are also responsible for communicating these requirements through their supply chain
and monitoring compliance.181
This approach was also very clearly evident from interviews with senior OSH staff within the ODA:
… the client leadership issue is very important; the difference between us and a lot of public sector
organisations is that we are incredibly intrusive, as some of the CEOs – I meet with all the CEOs of
all our principle contractors every three to four months – and as one of them said to me a couple of
meetings ago, he said ‘you lot set out what you were going to do four-and-a-half years ago, and we
all said ‘oh yeah, we have heard it all before, that’s what they all say.’ So the only difference is that
your lot have done it!’ So we have been really clear about that, we are incredibly intrusive into the
supply chain for all sorts of reasons in terms of how much money people are paid, are they being
employed properly… (Director of construction, ODA)
* See Appendix, Table 5.
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Similarly, in the tanker trade members of the management of the tanker companies were under no
illusions concerning the importance of meeting the oil majors’ requirements in order to secure their
business. This was the case in both the oil and chemical tanker companies. As one marine
superintendent said: 
Now it was the cargo-owner market. There were no other choices. If your ship doesn’t accept
inspection, it doesn’t have cargoes to carry and your company goes into bankruptcy. (TMAN 5)
These requirements were felt to cover a whole range of operational activities in which the oil majors’
vetting procedures were seen as intrusive:
We expect those oil majors’ inspection; meanwhile, we also fear these companies’ inspection. Their
inspection was very strict. They would inspect from the major part to tiny point, the glove you
wore, the torch you used. The inspection was very strict… as seafarers, we also feared, since their
inspection included hundreds of items. The inspection was very much detailed. (TSEA 1)
On the Olympic Park, the ODA used HSE guidelines180 in the development of its pre-qualification and
tendering process.181 In addition, it held workshops with key stakeholders to identify their views, needs,
aspirations and wishes for what the ODA should be trying to deliver, as well as what was both legal
and realistic. The results of these workshops fed directly into the ODA’s procurement policy. Its main
element was a ‘balance scorecard’ used to rate organisations on a number of key areas, including
health and safety. The ODA regarded its approach as an extension of the CDM Regulations:
And in a way, from a health and safety point of view you could say that this is a further
development and extension of that legal duty in the CDM Regulations for a client to ensure that a
suitable and sufficient health and safety plan is in place. (Head of health and safety, ODA)
Even before pre-qualification, in order to maximise the number and diversity of contributing
businesses, a brokerage service known as ‘CompeteFor’ had been established by the ODA.182 Potential
contractors completed a questionnaire created by a buyer, allowing buyers (generally Tier 1
contractors) to shortlist possible subcontractors for invitation to tender. Effectively, this system
represented a series of vetting processes for organisations prior to the pre-qualification and tender
stages. It was mandatory for Tier 1 contractors to use ‘CompeteFor’ to source subcontractors, ensuring
a consistent approach to procurement, including the emphasis on health and safety, throughout the
supply chain:
… what CompeteFor does is we mandate in all our Tier 1 contracts for your sub-suppliers you
must use CompeteFor to source them. And as part of CompeteFor we are required certain policies
to be published before they can publish their profile on CompeteFor and one of which is our safety
policy. (ODA Deputy head of procurement) 
… so get our Tier 1 supplier to use the same system, the same methodology, the same approach in
procuring their second- and third-tier suppliers. (ODA Head of procurement)
The pre-qualification stage was intended to ensure that suppliers had the competencies and capacities
to meet the requirements of the HS&E standard. To this end, they were required to complete a pre-
qualification questionnaire (PQQ), which was fed into the balance scorecard. The health and safety
section of the PQQ asked a number of questions concerning the suppliers’ policies and arrangements
for OSH management. In addition, they were required to submit supporting documents detailing these
arrangements and their OSH performance, as well as their own procurement and monitoring
arrangements to ensure their contractors met OSH standards. The weight attached to the health and
safety part of the PQQ was apparent:
… they may be the greatest company, they might be potentially the cheapest but if they have got a
dismal health and safety record (and these are questions that we specifically ask within out PQQ
documents), and then if they have a report or – God forbid – they have had a fatality in the last
year or so, I’m sorry but they don’t go forward. So these are principal criteria that we start with at
the beginning of our procurement process and we score those. (Procurement manager, TitanCF
Industries [Tier 1])
In the Forum Development, our second case study in construction, again health and safety assurance
was in evidence in the procurement procedures in the supply chain, but the client/developer, Rome
Enterprise Consortium, did not take as prominent an interventionist role as the one actively pursued by
the ODA on the Olympic Park:
The way we manage the build-out of the site is that as a developer, we have a working partnership
with four main contractors. So all of the work is done through those four main contractors … they
are the four main contractors we always use. Whether that will change or not, I don’t know, but it
seems to work quite well at the moment. (Project manager, Rome Enterprise Consortium [Procurer])
While recognising the need for high standards of health and safety management, the procurer left it to
the Tier 1 contractors to work out the details of how they were to be achieved:
… the four main contractors from board level agreed some not basic, some quite intricate and
advanced health and safety standards… They have to work to that as a minimum because they all
agreed it together, that that was the minimum; so we are not, sort of, imposing a standard on them
but we just recognise there needs to be a standard… (Project manager, Rome Enterprise Consortium
[Procurer])
Similarly, the procurer remained at some distance from the day-to-day management of health and safety:
We like to do it through our Tier 1 contractors because at the end of the day they are the guys
managing the activity on site, we are not actually doing that. (Project manager, Rome Enterprise
Consortium [Procurer])
On the Olympic Park, the development of the PQQ was something that TitanCF Industries (the Tier 1
contractor that participated in both case studies) felt involved with and also intended to continue to use
on projects after the Olympic Park:
… it is a very effective process and so it certainly is something we have developed here and, you
know, to be fair with the ODA and CLM, and it is something we have developed and it’s certainly a
robust way for our work for major projects and special projects. And that is definitely something I
will take forward to these next big jobs that we are after, and it is an effective process. (Procurement
manager, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
It was also evidently used throughout the supply chain:
[We are] not supposed to use a subcontractor until they have done that questionnaire, and part of
that questionnaire will include health and safety issues. So make sure they have got health and safety
plans and policies and that kind of thing is in place. It depends on how big the company is and what
kind of work it is, but the idea is we can’t officially place an order or they can’t get paid until they
have done that questionnaire. (Health and safety adviser, ArgonautCF Construction [Tier 2, also
acting for Tier 3])
In terms of subcontracting, the ODA made clear that principal contractors were responsible for ensuring
that health and safety was addressed in a similar way during procurement:181
The supplier is responsible for ensuring during their procurement process that the competence of
sub-suppliers to address HS&E matters is assessed, and only those capable of meeting the standard
are appointed. When appointing sub-suppliers, checks shall be made to ensure that the sub-supplier
shall devote appropriate resource to meet the standard. During this process and after appointment, it
is the responsibility of the supplier to ensure that sub-suppliers are aware of and understand the
requirements of the standard as it applies to them, and to manage the relationship to achieve
compliance, and to monitor and report performance.
The same expectation of quality control throughout the supply chain was evident in the Forum
Development project; however, here again it was clear that the site developer was less interventionist
than the ODA and did not seek to influence either the procurement practice or the relationships
between the Tier 1 and lower-tier contractors in terms of health and safety (or in any other matters).
Rather, it expected TitanCF Industries to do this:
No we don’t [ask for potential suppliers’ previous health and safety records], I think it is very much
driven by… it is unusual that, it is almost selected through the supply chain if you like, in that the
principal contractor would vet all of that information before suggesting them to us, because we
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employ them to manage that process on site… I don’t think so, no we don’t tend to [seek to
influence relationships between Tier 1 and lower-tier contractors] because we almost feel that
by doing that we might be influencing such that it is, absolving some of the responsibility of the
principal contractor… It maintains their responsibility, that is the idea. (Project manager, Rome
Enterprise Consortium [Procurer])
Interviews with TitanCF Industries personnel on both sites also suggested that, as a consequence of
these supply chain pressures, they believed their company’s investment in health and safety was
increasing and that it was important that the company had appropriate documentation and an
excellent safety record in order to win further work:
Yeah, I mean I think it is our performance on the Olympic Park, and definitely our health and
safety performance, which has helped us on other major jobs in the last two years. So I can
only think of positive things from the health and safety on site here, definitely nothing negative.
(Supervisor, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
This was because they understood the contracting organisations’ health and safety records and
reputations to be perceived by clients as key factors in winning contracts:
… health and safety is fundamentally the winner of all contracts these days. People say cost,
but at the end of the day if you have a bad track record anyway you are going to cost more;
you are going to cost the client, you’re going to cost your reputation, you are going to cost
health and safety sustainability and environment – it is one of the key drivers for winning work
these days in any pre-qual or any tender. (Project manager, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
And this was something that was also apparent when TitanCF Industries’ managers talked about
their approach in their own procurement procedures used for their contractors:
So the driver is very much geared around the safety element of understanding what we are
going to do, and I won’t deny part of that is so when we then say, ‘We want you to participate
in this, we want you to attend this workshop, you can’t do that, that ain’t in budget, you stand
there till you sort it’… So if they then come back to us later on to say ‘we won’t stand in for it,
we ain’t interested’ – if you aren’t prepared to buy into the culture, go and work for somebody
else! (Construction manager, TitanCF Industries)
The Tier 2 interviews on the Forum Development site also made it clear that participants believed
an organisation’s health and safety record and reputation were key factors in winning contracts:
It is comparative, it is included in our own bids basically and that is [HadrianCF
Construction’s] pride. We promise to beat their bid, so there is a health and safety course that
goes into it, so basically it is included in the price. I mean you have to show your qualifications
and your processes. (Project manager, HadrianCF Construction [Tier 2])
There was little doubt, however, that the ethos on the Olympic Park was one that generated
unusually high expectations of health and safety management, and it was equally clear that health
and safety was not always such a paramount factor in work for other clients. Several participants
identified past health and safety record and the price of their tender as the two key factors on
which winning a contract depended, but drew a distinction between the client on the Olympic Park
and previous clients, particularly smaller ones. On the Park, health and safety was seen as the
overriding factor, whereas for other clients money was much more significant, with health and
safety regarded as a bonus but not the first priority, a perception shared at several levels in the
supply chain:
… we are working with really good, proactive, intelligent clients which makes our life a lot
easier to work with them and we can bounce ideas off them. (Project manager, TitanCF
Industries [Tier 1])
… the level here is very high and that is drummed into you right from the very start. On other
sites it is drummed in at the start and then it tends to, if production dates aren’t met, on other
big construction sites it does tend to slip away and get a bit of a back seat compared to getting
things done. Whereas that is not going to happen and we don’t want that to happen, health and
safety is out right at the front. (Manager [link to Tier 2], OmegaCF Contracting [Tier 3])
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The highly interventionist arrangements in construction and the oil and chemical tanker industries were
less apparent in the supply chains of the container trade. Nevertheless, in subcontracting the operation of
its vessels to Eagle Shipping it was evident that QPR was looking for a ‘quality’ operator with a good
reputation. The management at Eagle identified its reputation with regard to both safety and regulatory
compliance as an essential factor in winning the contract to run QPR’s vessels. Furthermore, in the
standard contract used (and often adapted) in the subcontracting of ship management, several clauses
pertain to regulatory compliance and to the management of safety. For example, a clause on regulatory
compliance specifically mentions regulation relating to seafarer qualifications (STCW) and to the ISM
Code. It states:183
… the Managers shall in a timely manner make available, all documentation, information and records
in respect of the matters covered by this Agreement either related to mandatory rules or regulations or
other obligations applying to the Owners in respect of the Vessel (including but not limited to STCW
95, the ISM Code and ISPS Code). 
Another clause dealing with SMSs requires that:183
Where the Managers are not the Company, the Owners shall ensure that Crew are properly
familiarised with their duties in accordance with the Vessel’s Safety Management System (SMS) and
that instructions which are essential to the SMS are identified, documented and given to the Crew
prior to sailing. 
As we outlined in the previous chapter, here there was no obvious pressure from clients who ultimately
owned the goods being shipped for either the ship operator or the ship management companies to
conform to requirements from them concerning the management of health and safety on board the vessels
shipping them. Indeed, with the exception of the single example given of a client that had carried out
some auditing (see Chapter 4), there was no evidence of them having such requirements. As already noted
in Chapter 4, this was firstly because there was no particular business advantage to clients for them to do
so and secondly because, even if they did, the structure of the supply chain generally meant it would have
been difficult for them to directly influence either the ship operators and managers or the seafarers in this
case study. 
The seafarers perceived only limited interest in arrangements made for their health and safety among the
charterers (QPR) and they were unaware of the nature of the contractual arrangements between Eagle
Shipping and the vessel owners (also QPR, which was in turn owned by Griffin). Instead, they generally
saw the priorities of the charterers (QPR) as being focused on getting the cargo safely and in undamaged
condition from point A to point B as quickly as possible:
We’ll load it as fast as possible and get out of here; I have done my job now go home. […] I don’t
think they [the clients whose goods were being shipped] are really aware of this because they put their
car on the dock and then the ship is gone and the car is gone. Of course they are checking that it is
safe for the car of course, they have to do that. (SEA 15)
Aboard ship the overall view seemed to be that while some cargo owners dealing with QPR did take a
certain interest in the vessel, this interest did not really drive standards forward or change things on
board. The seafarers thought that the priorities of QPR in acting on behalf of the cargo owners to whom
it provided a service were about reasonable costs, speed of delivery and avoidance of bad press. 
However, there were also signs that this was a relatively narrow expression of a more complex reality,
since the seafarers were also aware that many relationships with shippers were long-standing and, to
paraphrase a frequently aired view, ‘if they keep coming back for more business then all must be well’.
Effective safety management was regarded by both the personnel of the ship management company and
the seafarers on board the Sea Hawk as implicit in the maintenance of this business relationship. From
the perspective of Eagle Shipping, for example, QPR – as the vessel charterer subcontracting to other
customers to place their cargo on the vessels – wanted to show off a well-run and safe fleet:
The way I see the client we’ve got, I mean the client’s men are boarding [name of a European port]
every time there is a wander round the ship as well, they’re from QPR. But I think the clients
themselves are quite responsible party, they are not Greeks. You know they want to show a vessel a
reasonable standard to the customer because they have got to convince the customer to send their
goods, and there are a lot of other shipping companies out there. But if you can show your
customer a nice, clean, well operated, well-manned ship, well maintained – he is more likely to
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send his goods with you than somebody who comes in with a manky old rust bucket hanging to
bits. You know, you are going to say ‘are my goods going to get across the Atlantic?’ (MAN 2)
Aboard and ashore, reference was made to charterers visiting the vessels to inspect cargo holds and
check on the safety standards relating specifically to the transport of cargoes:
Oh yes, yeah. If any new contractor comes along he wants to ship his cargo out, he will go and
visit the ship, especially if it is ro-ro, because he wants to know that the ship is not going to
throw it about in the bottom of a hold and it is securely lashed down and it is not going to
move. We have had nothing yet that has broken away, they chain everything down, absolutely
solid. (MAN 3)
There were pressures on the ship management company to demonstrate that it generally maintained
high standards of management. Such high standards were part of its self-image and its business
strategy. It was, for example, beginning to check that its own suppliers were International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9008 and 14001 accredited, because there was a belief that
clients might be concerned with such matters:
And for the ISO 14001 this is because there is a bigger drive on us as a management company, a
lot more clients that are taking the decision to be a bit more environmentally friendly, they
realise that shipping gets a bit of a bad name for itself and we are just moving with the times.
We are also now looking at, on one of the KPIs we’ve got, I think they say 5 per cent of all our
supplies should be ISO 14001 approved. So we are now going out to a lot of suppliers to cover
those requirements as well. (MAN 1)
The personnel of the ship-management company also felt that safety on board the ships it managed
was primarily driven by their own efforts. The rationale they gave for doing so was a mixture of
ethics and ‘good business sense’. In relation to their own procurement policies, for example, on
personal protective equipment (PPE – for example coveralls, boots, gloves), the company had
decided to implement higher quality than required by minimum regulatory standards. In the case of
coveralls the company spent some considerable time considering which higher standard coveralls to
purchase. It searched for coveralls with greater fire-retardant qualities because it was keen that these
should meet the minimum requirement for its offshore vessels. This was partly because it wanted
one supplier for all coveralls and it needed to supply its offshore vessels, but it was also because it
was thinking about its public image:
Plus also there is an element of corporate image as well. We want to maintain that, so we want
to make sure that the brands are on all our boiler suits, as well as the control of quality. (MAN
1)
The contract for ship management under which the company operated meant that the cost of such
items was passed directly on to the ship principals (ie to QPR in the case of its vessels). While there
did not seem to be opposition to this, mention was made of one occasion where a (different) ship
owner on a tight budget raised some objections. Eagle senior management had quickly dealt with
these:
… those things got nipped in the bud in quite an early stage and not through myself, but
through [senior manager’s name] it would be mentioned to them about the standard that we
maintain and it is cheaper to pay for the extra for the PPE than to pay out for a burns claim or
something like that. (MAN 1)
In relation to QPR, Eagle had never been approached to reduce standards. In fact there were
examples of situations in which it had been asked to improve them. One of these was in relation to
food provisioning. The feeding rate for Griffin ships was regarded as quite low (€5.75 per person
per day) and requests from officers for their own specialist foods, which were quite expensive, were
difficult to meet. Eagle attempted to deal with this difficulty by bringing provisioning in house and
‘cutting out the middle man’ to improve cost efficiency and quality. 
When asked who or what was determining the overall standard of safety on board the vessels Eagle
managed, the response was: 
MAN 2: I’d say that was more down to us.
The limits of influence  53
Interviewer: You would?
MAN 2: I mean I have just done a technical inspection on one of the vessels and my technical
inspection I will of course look at safety items. Yeah, I would say it is more ours.
Generally, managers seemed to feel the drivers for doing so were twofold: it was the right thing to do to
keep people safe, and there was also a business case for safety:
MAN 2: It is care for the individual and everyone else around, but the individual comes first. I mean
you read any ISM manual and the master has overriding authority to save a life. Life comes first,
safety at sea, SOLAS.
Interviewer: But there are other companies who have a different view?
MAN 2: There are, but within this company the promotion is, that is as [person’s name] says that is
one of our selling points to the clients is we have a safety culture.
They were aware of regulatory standards and knew that their contract with clients made meeting them
obligatory, but argued that the company worked to a standard that was higher than regulatory
minimums:
No, no, no I mean I work for Eagle, but we all have our guidelines to work with and we have
SOLAS, MARPOL… and MED regulations and you have got to make sure you comply with all
those. And we experience, you know, what is and what isn’t allowed. (MAN 2)
The desire to comply with regulations (or indeed, to work to higher standards) was not for fear of the
cost of penalties for non-compliance but was seen more as concern for business reputation. In this sense,
therefore, charterers did become important:
MAN 4: Because effectively these days, I don’t know if you know the Paris MOU and the company
calculator, because whatever ships you have directly reflects on the company rating.
Interviewer: So you are very much trying to avoid deficiencies and detentions?
MAN 4: Yeah, which is exactly what, whatever, what the client wants anyway, whatever they say. If
a client says, ‘well no you can operate it here’, they are not saying ‘the operator here will accept so
many deficiencies a year’… So we offer the best. The best practice that we can.
In other words, they were aware of the potential for a bad business image and the consequent effects on
their business that could result from the public availability of records of non-compliance, and sought to
avoid such non-compliance as much as they could. At the same time, through the same sources they
could make themselves aware of ships with records of poor compliance and thus avoid taking on the
management of such ships when seeking new business.
The seafarers were also aware of the drivers for safety from the ship management company, which was
seen as an important influence on board:
SEA 17: I think since I was new here in Eagle… the only things I notice… Eagle is very strict for
safety, that is the only thing saying about Eagle. They are very taking care really of safety. I think it is
not for the [offshore] ships only, I think for all the ships in general.
Interviewer: And when you think about Port State Control or Eagle when you are working in the
engine room, which one of those – [Eagle] or Griffin or QPR – which one drives your health and
safety practice? Which one encourages you to work safely?
SEA 20: Of course Eagle, mostly Eagle.
Interviewer: Eagle, ok. And how do you see that? Is that because they produce documentation or
procedures? How do Eagle influence your health and safety?
SEA 20: For example we are going to repair some engines… like [a] generator. We have a checklist
54 Walters, Wadsworth, Sampson and James
that we are ticking off before the job started, like: isolator, electrical switches, something like that,
close all the fuel valves.
Interviewer: And the checklist comes from where?
SEA 20: Eagle also.
In short, therefore, while supply chain relations with the clients who shipped their goods with QPR
in the ships that it had contracted to Eagle to manage did not themselves provide much in the way
of direct influence on the OSH management standards applied on board, these relations
nevertheless did ultimately influence conditions on board, albeit indirectly. As the seafarers
themselves pointed out, there was a perception in both Eagle and QPR that if their clients had
cause to believe that their goods might be at risk as the result of the poor management of their
transport, then they would take their business elsewhere. It was therefore important to QPR to
contract the management of the ships it had chartered to a company whose standards of
management were of suitable quality and, in turn, it was important to Eagle to be seen to be
delivering this quality in the way it went about managing the ships. Since the management of safety
was understood and widely accepted to be an important element of managing affairs at sea,
indicators of the standards to which this occurred in practice and the avoidance of situations in
which safety management failure might be identified were regarded as important to the continued
business between QPR and Eagle – and the business of the latter with its shippers was seen to be to
at least to some extent dependent on the maintenance of these standards. There was also a sense
among these companies, which were operating at the ‘better end’ of the market, that quality
management was one of the indicators of competitive edge and therefore worthwhile pursuing from
a business perspective. Again, since quality in the provision of management generally could be
associated with indicators of good safety performance, this was a further influence that helped to
maintain good standards of health and safety on board ship. However, as we shall discuss later,
these influences on the quality of OSH management did not operate singly, but were just one
element of a set of influences in which both regulation and regulatory inspection were also
important. 
Supporting health and safety practice 
A criticism of the effectiveness of procurement practices in the past (and especially in the
construction industry) was that their delivery, once the contract had been awarded, often fell some
way short of expectations. For example, a study into fatal accidents in the construction industry
found that there was an ‘absence of strong agreed paths of influence from contracting strategies to
specific organisational factors’.25 In our case studies in construction and the tanker trade there were
signs that procurers had taken a highly interventionist approach towards achieving compliance
from their suppliers. While such intervention was most obvious in terms of the
monitoring/inspection strategies they used (and which are explored further in the following sub-
section), there was also considerable evidence of interventions intended to support improved OSH
management among suppliers who might otherwise not have the capacity to operate at this level
and whom it was necessary for procurers to bring up to the required standards. 
There were many examples of such support evident on the Olympic Park. In particular, the ODA
supported contractors with the provision of training, health checks (through the Park occupational
health service), as well as with information on safety and security on the Park and by organising
regular Park-wide campaigns targeting various issues. Lower-tier interviews made clear that
personnel understood training was compulsory for workers on the Olympic Park, as was
possession of construction skills cards. TitanCF Industries personnel indicated that everyone
attended a behavioural safety training course:
… behavioural safety training that all the operatives go through ‘Beyond zero’ training, it is like
a workshop that goes on for half a day, it is like a forum on issues… (Tier 1 supervisor)
This observation was corroborated by its subcontractors:
I mean we have actually attended all of ‘Beyond zero’ courses so I think all of our guys, there
might be a couple of agency guys that haven’t attended, just waiting for the new course to sort
of turn up again and we will send those along to it. (Health and safety adviser, ArgonautCF
Construction [Tier 2, also acting for Tier 3])
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Tier 2 interviewees referred, for example, to the monthly meetings for supervisors and for all Tier 2
contractors, methods statements, wearing of specified PPE, near-miss cards and weekly meetings to
discuss these cards, audits and inspections (both internally and by the Tier 1 contractor), weekly
progress meetings, timesheets, toolbox talks, plant record sheets, incident monitoring and daily
briefings and so on, all of which, might be delivered by their upstream procurer, but which they were
aware were driven by the ODA and its delivery partner CLM. There were acknowledgements from
interviewees in the lower-tier organisations that their companies’ health and safety systems had been
improved by this support:
Ah, it’s about a million times better, I can tell you that. Everything is more exaggerated so you’ve
got to pay more attention, so it is better. (Tier 3 worker)
In addition, staff from upstream organisations were frequently ‘seconded’ into lower-tier organisations
to help with supervision and health and safety. The extent of management of lower-tier organisations
by Tier 1 contractors varied both with their size and experience, as well as with different work
situations. Interviewees also spoke of how the ODA aimed to promote the creation of an effective
safety culture by such means as the encouragement of near miss reporting; the use of safety climate and
employee satisfaction measures; the running of behavioural safety management programmes; the
employment of benchmarking, recognition and incentivise schemes; and Park-wide health and safety
campaigns.181
In the Forum Development project, while it was not developed to the same extent as on the Olympic
Park and was operated by TitanCF Industries rather than the Rome Consortium, a similar pattern
prevailed. Training was provided for subcontractors and workers employed by lower-tier organisations:
It is everybody and it is thrown out to them all… An example of them all getting involved is, we
run a monthly workshop out on the site. We package different areas up and they all go and look
into each other’s work zone, and we do inspections that way. (Construction manager, TitanCF
Industries [Tier 1])
The aim of TitanCF Industries’ approach was to bring its subcontractors into its own systems and
culture:
So we are running ‘Beyond zero’, that has been running for about three years, [that] campaign.
And what our supply chain would have been bought in and been made part of that. So various
seminars and workshops for them to bring them onboard and buy into our belief… I mean we
have a proactive approach; not everybody sees the world as we do obviously, but we would like
them to. (Project manager, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
In the tanker trade, a typical example of support through intervention was the TMSA programme
introduced by OCIMF in 2004. The programme was intended to be used as a tool to help vessel
operators assess, measure and improve their management systems. Currently in its second edition, it
builds on operators’ earlier experience with TMSA and on feedback received from the industry. Its
scope has also expanded to encompass all tanker vessel operators, including those managing coastal
vessels and barges. It is based on encouraging operators to assess their SMSs against KPIs and it
provides best practice guidance. Interviewees in the tanker trade were well aware of its existence: 
Since TMSA they now have control even over us in the office. They can say how to run our ships,
how to manage store supply, which courses we should conduct in-house, how many additional
safety equipments should be placed on our ships and so on… (Manager)
As intended by OCIMF, this intervention had a direct effect on the form and content of the SMSs of
some ship operators and on board some ships. As one company quality and safety manager said: 
Nowadays, the revision of the SMS is directed by the syllabus of the oil majors. Since the oil
majors’ inspection syllabus has often been changed, the SMS was led by their change. Since their
syllabus kept changing, we must track and follow their revision and its latest requirement. 
How to ensure contract compliance 
The findings of previous research suggest that while clients tend to be familiar with setting contractual
requirements on health and safety in the procurement of services, they are generally far less engaged
with efforts to monitor compliance or undertake post-completion review of such arrangements.82
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However, in our case studies, we found substantial examples both in construction and in the
petrochemical tanker trade of ways in which this criticism is now addressed by heads of supply
chains through monitoring and inspection regimes.
Monitoring compliance with the requirements of the ODA 
After the procurement stage, once work was underway, the ODA had three broad approaches to
monitoring health and safety management and performance on the Olympic Park:
• monthly completion of the HS&E scorecard reporting performance by principal contractors (for
example numbers of toolbox talks, the presence of behavioural safety systems), lead designers and
construction, design and management (CDM) co-ordinators
• monitoring and audit of the health and safety performance of suppliers
• monitoring and reporting on the practical application of risk management and compliance with the
HS&E Standard to the Executive Management Board.
Tier 1 contractors were expected to use their own management systems to monitor and audit their
health and safety performance and to investigate any accidents and incidents. The role of the delivery
partner, CLM, was to project manage and monitor the Tier 1 organisations and their health and safety
management and performance. Contractors at all levels, therefore, were periodically inspected and
audited by CLM181 to validate and verify the self-monitoring. The formal scorecard and accident
reporting systems were web-based, allowing principal contractors, designers and CDM co-ordinators to
self-monitor and submit monthly reports on accidents, incidents, significant near misses and other health
and safety data electronically.
The CLM assurance team, which carried out inspections and audits of contractors, identified health and
safety priorities three months prior to the work using the monthly HS&E scorecards; compliance
reviews; and information from the monthly meetings between the assurance team and key project
personnel. CLM itself was also monitored by the ODA to ensure that its targets (on which payments
depended) were met:
… there is a task order which defines what CLM has to do in order to earn their income, both their
base and their bonus associated with H&S; and on a monthly basis, they have to submit a monthly
report which describes activities, events, performances, etcetera, and they have to submit that to me,
and I and our construction director need to sign off that we are satisfied with those reports. Both are
a demonstration of their work and are valid and on that basis, that particular component of their
billing for that particular month is deemed to be valid. (Head of health and safety, ODA)
The ODA’s approach was summed up as follows:181
The emphasis throughout the works shall be on suppliers conducting their own monitoring, auditing
and investigations and providing assurance that the information so generated is valid and verifiable.
Suppliers and their personnel shall also cooperate fully with any monitoring, audits or specific
investigations carried out by suppliers above them in the supply chain, by the Delivery Partner or its
representatives and by the ODA and its representatives. Such HS&E assurance activities will be
conducted in order to maintain and improve HS&E performance. The techniques to be employed
include: site HS&E inspections; HS&E audits; Corrective Action Requests (CARs); fact finding
meetings; coordinated HS&E reviews; and monthly reports/score card.
Interviews with ODA personnel identified a number of specific systems for monitoring health and safety
performance and management including: near-miss cards which fed into the near-miss register; on-site
mini safety departments (consisting of a safety adviser and an assistant); safety/accident books; risk
assessments; method statements which included mini risk assessments; hold points; behavioural safety
systems such as ‘Beyond zero’; daily briefings; and reviews of method statements and risk assessments.
The ODA’s Health and safety director was supported by safety adviser assistants and by health and
safety officers. Part of the health and safety officers’ role was to monitor health and safety on site by
inspecting and reporting two or three times each week; and by putting together a sheet of photographs
each Friday of issues or areas needing to be addressed the following Monday – photographs such as
these could also be issued sooner than Friday for urgent issues. For the latter, supervisors within each
tier were responsible for checking and reminding workers about health and safety matters on a day-to-
day basis (for example, PPE); they in turn were answerable to health and safety advisers within each
tier; and these advisers were answerable to the Tier 1 Health and safety managers (who were answerable
to the ODA and CLM).
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Similarly, the interviews with TitanCF Industries gave details of its systems and monitoring
procedures. These began with the Project Management Plan, which included an integrated
management system from which was developed the Operation Mode, which controlled the
management of the works through risk assessment, method statements and appropriate health and
safety documentation as well as work controls (such as permits for particular operations, many of
which were developed on the Park) and inspections. Interviewees described how method statements
were drawn up for every job and were constantly monitored and updated if necessary. All method
statements included hold points (ie points where the work must be checked and signed off by an
authorised person before it can continue):
All engineers and supervisors know that if you don’t get to that point and it hasn’t been signed,
you don’t carry on. (Contract manager, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
They also described their electronic reporting system for near-miss recording and distribution to CLM
project managers, who in turn distributed the information to all the Tier 1 contractors who could then
decide which information to disseminate to their teams and subcontractors. 
Tier 2 interviewees also mentioned many of these systems. They were aware that unsafe work would
be stopped, possibly photographed and sent to the organisation’s director:
… it is very heavily policed, I get absolutely annihilated if everything isn’t in the right boxes and
that box isn’t filled in and the hours, and the service hours and the rest of it. Everything has to be
crossed and double checked, and filled in properly. (Supervisor, ArgonautCF Construction [Tier 2])
It was understood that TitanCF Industries was the client but there were examples given of CLM
stepping in on matters of safety:
… obviously they sort of come up with the rules, [TitanCF Industries]; they have to adhere to the
rules and because we are Tier 2 we also have to adhere to them as well. So at the end of the day
we are working for [TitanCF Industries], we are all working under CLM and the ODA, so to
speak. Yeah, I mean we have had a couple of things with CLM before, they warned us that we
were getting mud on the roads because our jet washer was frozen up at the time, when we had the
snow – so there was nothing we could do about that, and then all of a sudden they come along
and shut the gate and lock the gates up. (Health and safety adviser, ArgonautCF Construction
[Tier 2, also acting for Tier 3])
Tier 3 organisations again referred to many of the same systems and procedures. They were aware
that there were independent weekly safety inspections which could result in work being instantly
stopped if something was unsafe. Tier 3 workers talked about the card system used for on-site
offences:
… like you walk around here without your glasses on, yellow card! What happens is, if you get
two yellow cards then you are issued with a straight red and that’s you off! Yeah and I don’t know
if it is true or not, but they apparently put you on a black list, so you can’t come back onto the
Olympic site for five years or something like that. (Workers, OmegaCF Contracting and
GammaCF Contracting [Tier 3])
Monitoring the Forum Development project
A slightly different emphasis on monitoring was evident in the second construction case study – the
Forum Development project. Here, as already noted, the procurer’s approach was generally ‘hands
off’, with a number of other organisations involved in managing the supply chain. Nevertheless, it did
require some monitoring:
We do collect data… we use [organisation name] as our employer’s agent for the development
and we ask that they collect data from the principal contractors on any accidents and the details
of any accidents that happen on site. So we certainly want to know about anything that is
reportable, and fortunately I don’t think we have had very many of those – we may have had
three or four in three-and-a-half years, so that is not bad… so [organisation name] collects that
information but also on every project, on every contract we have a monthly contract meeting
and health and safety forms part of the reporting. So each month each contractor will report on
their project and there is a section in there about health and safety. (Project manager, Rome
Enterprise Consortium [Procurer])
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The procurer also took part in a weekly site tour, which involved the TitanCF Industries site safety
advisor, foreman and engineer and, on some occasions, a representative of the subcontractors.
However, generally the emphasis on the site was on the Tier 1 contractor taking responsibility for the
monitoring of compliance from lower-tier contractors with its safety systems and this was a conscious
approach from the procurer. When asked whether they checked if initiatives were being passed on to
lower-tier organisations the procurer respondent said:
No, no we don’t do that. But it is one of those things; it is almost we measure it through its own
success in that we know it is happening. (Project manager, Rome Enterprise Consortium [Procurer])
There were various forms of feedback used for monitoring the activities of contractors, built into their
systems for safety on the site, including the formal systems (for example the ‘Safe on site’ and ‘Beyond
zero’ boards); as well as toolbox talks, daily briefings, method statement briefings and activity briefings
(all of which were followed by discussion and consultation time); and informal approaches such as
suggestions boxes, observation cards, the near-miss card reporting system and various safety
workshops.
Monitoring was also a key part of these processes:
… the compliance sheet, that is basically what the ganger or the supervisor out there he’ll probably
sign it two or three times a day, just to check that the lads are sticking to it. (General foreman,
TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
I also audit for the company so anywhere I find something else I see I feedback… So there is
always one of us picking up something that is going on in other jobs. So anything we pick up
comes back, we talk about it and actually we got a merit for here. (Construction manager, TitanCF
Industries [Tier 1])
In terms of its subcontractors, TitanCF Industries required them to provide their own method
statements and activity plans, which had to be signed off before work could begin. And it was clear
that refusal to co-operate would mean that suppliers would not win any future work. The Tier 2
interviews also suggested a detailed level of monitoring at an individual level:
… we try to follow the strict rules and you see the foreman come all the time to check if everything
is safe, the general foreman [individual] comes down to have a look and [if] he finds stuff that is
unsafe he stops the job. For me he said to me once to stop the job and to do [it] another way. It is
good because you can see the people, the general foreman, they try to keep the job safe. They don’t
just come down and say, ‘look I want this job done and that is it,’ they say ‘no I want this job
done’ but they try to do it in a safer way. And they are continuously watching you as well, like if
you do anything wrong, they are continuously checking your work [to see] if it is alright. (Workers,
TrajanCF Construction [Tier 2])
Similarly, the Tier 3 personnel also made it clear that they were expected to ‘toe the line’ in terms of
the health and safety procedures and systems in place on the site generally (which were there at the
insistence of the Tier 1 contractor):
It is mandatory; we have got to do it. If we don’t do it we will not be working on the contract and
I never had any complaints from anybody. (Supervisor, LegionCF Contracting [Tier 3])
Monitoring compliance in the oil tanker trade
As the section on the role of procurement procedures demonstrated, in the oil tanker trade, managers
and seafarers alike regarded the system of inspections of safety matters undertaken on behalf of the oil
majors as an unavoidable element of business in the sector and one with which they were obliged to
comply. However, the regular occurrence of such inspections through the SIRE system also meant that
they were obliged to ensure that their health and safety management systems and practices continued
to be maintained at levels that would pass the requirements of such repeated scrutiny. They also felt
this set them apart from other trades in merchant shipping. As one oil tanker company manager put it:
Tankers are better managed because they have so many extra inspections. Who takes interest in
bulk carriers? We have [equivalent bulk charterer] but they don’t get excited about safety
although we all know bulk carriers are probably far weaker in construction and take a lot of
beating [subject to damage during cargo operation]. Our tanker ship-owners have to allocate a
The limits of influence  59
higher level of budget for safety but the same cannot be expected from the bulk carrier ship-
owners. (TMAN 7)
The seafarers themselves were well aware of the consequences of failure to maintain these
standards: 
There is a lot of pressure to pass oil major inspections… If inspections fail the company will be
in trouble. (TSEA 10)
The loss will be huge if the ship does not pass oil major inspection. (TSEA 13)
A sense of being ‘set apart’ in terms of OSH management was conveyed in the interviews with
seafarers on oil and chemical tankers, as well as with the management of the companies operating
them. To an extent this was indirectly reaffirmed in interviews with management and crew in the
container trade case study. Thus, while in this case study there were virtually no interventions by
customers to monitor OSH management activities on board ship, many of the seafarers had
previously worked on board tankers and the ship management company involved also managed
support vessels involved in the oil industry. They were therefore able to compare their experiences in
the two sectors. Like those in the tanker trade, they all spoke of the strong presence of vetting and
inspection practices in relation to tankers and allied vessels in the oil sector, as well as of the
dominant influence of the oil companies. They frequently ascribed this dominance to the economic
power of the oil companies and their ability to thus determine the business of suppliers of transport
and other services in the sector.
When pressed as to the outcomes of this scrutiny, however, they agreed that while it meant
adherence to procedures and practices to meet the requirements of the oil majors, there was less
certainty concerning whether it led to an improved OSH performance over and above that found on
other vessels. In essence, there was a view that because oil and chemical tankers carried hazardous
cargoes, there was inevitably a raised consciousness of the need for safe working practices and
procedures on these vessels. But good standards of OSH were not solely dependent on strict
observance of the requirements of the oil majors. Indeed, interviewees were also conscious of less
positive aspects of oil major requirements, such as increased bureaucratic demands, unnecessary and
burdensome focus on petty issues and, in some cases, unintended consequences of over-rigid
demands on the qualifications of crews and other matters w were part of the oil majors’ vetting
procedures and which they argued could sometimes result in reduced safety rather than the
opposite. Moreover, the interviewees offered these reflections while on board a container trade
vessel on which they felt relatively safe and when working for a company they regarded as doing a
reasonably good job in managing health and safety on board. They attributed this to a combination
not only of health and safety management systems and scrutiny, but also to the stability of the
working relationships and knowledge of the work environment created by the relatively unusual
human resource retention policies of the ship operators, which meant that individual crew members
had a long-term relationship both with the ship and with each other: 
That is the one advantage, that the crew is always there and mostly these ships – if you will take
a look on it if we go around when it is empty – it is plenty doors to open, plenty doors to close,
plenty panels to close down, up. And the risk of accident is very near if you are injured, or [of] a
damage that will cost the company more money. And the work is much easier when you have
some same crew. That is for my own opinion. (SEA 17)
Similarly, the senior officers on board were seen by many seafarers as key in driving and
maintaining safety, and certainly in relation to their everyday working practices:
I think what makes a big influence when it comes to us for our safety… it starts with the captain
I guess, then the senior officers, chief officer. Because if these people… don’t give a damn about
our safety then maybe the company people in the office, they don’t see what is happening here.
(SEA 23)
With regard to the SMS, particularly in relation to checklists and risk assessment documents, it was
evident from the comments of seafarers (quoted on pages 54–55) that Eagle was seen as an
important influence on safety on board. As part of Eagle’s drive for safety, seafarers and shore-based
personnel referred to internal audits conducted by the company and these were said to be very
helpful in identifying areas where safety management could be improved. External audits from
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agents unrelated to charterers were also identified as key to the maintenance of high levels of
operational safety. For example, seafarers clearly identified responsiveness to regulatory
requirements as influenced by various forms of inspection:
Regarding safety, I think the flag state has a very strong effect on the vessel, on the flag state and
also the senior officers like the captain and, I believe on [safety]. (SEA 24)
But I also have to think about that now I am on a ship that is trading for the United States; we
have to think about that. That is a great thing, yes it is. So it fulfils the first safety anyway if we are
listening to the US coastguard. (SEA 16)
In short, inspection as a means of ensuring compliance with OSH management standards was valued
and widely perceived to be both necessary and useful in all cases. This was irrespective of whether
inspection was undertaken by an agency of public regulation such as that of the Flag or Port state (as
was primarily the case in the container trade) or whether it was additionally the result of private
regulation such as the SIRE inspections in the oil tanker trade, or a mixture of both. 
Explaining the effects of procurement, support and monitoring 
In summary, therefore, in both construction case studies and in the case of the oil tanker trade, the
health and safety demands of organisations that were at the head of the supply chain and in positions
to determine the business success of suppliers, were important influences on how supplier companies
represented their arrangements to manage their health and safety. This said, there was variation in the
degree to which these organisations intervened in supplier companies to influence the nature of the
OSH management concerned. At the risk of some oversimplification, it would seem clear that the high
profile of the activities concerned (large-scale building projects and the carriage of oil at sea), the
magnitude of the consequences of safety failures for the procuring organisation (both in terms of
reputational risk and the not inconsiderable direct and indirect financial penalties), along with the
closeness of the association between them and the supplier, were major factors which influenced the
extent of their intervention. A third factor, equally important, was the power (both economic and
political) wielded by the head of the supply chain and the extent of the power imbalance between it
and its suppliers. Related to this was also the technical and organisational capacity commanded by the
head of the supply chain to intervene appropriately. Thus, the oil companies were regarded by virtually
everyone in the tanker trade – from senior managers to ordinary seamen – as omnipotent in
determining the business practices involved in the carriage of their goods. They were seen as wielding
sufficient economic power to drive the safety management arrangements of the tanker operators not
only in their direct dealings with them, but also indirectly, through their control of oil terminals:
Even if your ship is contracted to carry cargoes by the shipper, the ship would not be allowed to
call at X’s [name of a major oil company] berth if the ship did not receive and pass its inspection.
Like this ship: it is chartered by Y [name of a small Chinese petrochemical company]. In the
contract terms, it is stated that the ship must pass X’s inspection since the charterer has cargo with
this oil major. It is also the case with other oil majors. If the ship failed to pass [oil major]
inspections, the charter party might be cancelled or hire would be deducted. (TSEA 5)
The business dependency of ship operating company managers on their oil company charterers
dominated interviews with them (for example, it was mentioned in nine of the 10 interviews conducted
by Bhattacharya in two of the four companies re-analysed here), with the sense that the very existence
of their business depended on them doing the oil companies’ bidding:
When we go to any terminal [non-oil major] or even charter our ships to non-oil majors, we still
need to be inspected and passed by them. Such is their reach in this sector. The whole [oil] industry
is run by them – you can’t do business without their approval. (TMAN 3)
Additionally, the oil companies’ economic resources enabled them to establish and support inspection
systems such as SIRE, which some seafarers saw as more significant forms of surveillance than
experienced through inspection by public regulatory bodies such as Port State Control:
Compared to [Port State Control] these people are more organised, more thorough. (TSEA 12)
We didn’t feel special in the [Port State Control] inspection. After the oil major’s inspection we felt
that it was simple to deal with the [Port State Control] inspection. We felt [that we] had
confidence. (TSEA 15)
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The strictness and thoroughness is more than [Port State Control]. (TSEA 11)
In combination, SIRE and TMSA lent the oil companies substantial technical capacity to demand
detailed requirements for OSH management from suppliers. In a similar way, the powerful position
of the ODA, the high public profile of its activities and its investment in substantial expertise in
construction OSH management practice, placed it in a strong and well-equipped position not only
to make OSH demands in its procurement processes, but also to engage with their effective
delivery.
Such an imbalance of power and relatively close, simple (and arguably unusual) relations between
procurer and supplier, as found in the petrochemical tanker trade and construction of the Olympic
Park, were not present in our fourth case study – that of container shipping. Here the nature of
supply chain relations was both more complicated and more arms-length than those in the tanker
trade or in the large high-profile construction work such as the building of the Olympic Park.
However, it is important to acknowledge that these relationships were not entirely absent from the
business relations in the sector. As we showed, the standard ship management agreement which
formed the basis of the business relationship between the charterer and the ship management
company made clear provisions requiring the ship management company to adhere to regulatory
requirements on OSH and SMSs on board specific vessels. It made further provision concerning the
appropriate qualifications and competencies of the crew of the vessels. Being seen to be delivering
these requirements was regarded by the ship management company as a measure of the quality of
its service and therefore important in ensuring its future business success. The difference between
this case study and the others seems to have rested more on the degree of intervention practised by
buyers in the different situations than on the absolute presence or absence of supply chain
influence.
The effects of the more complicated and arms-length relations demonstrated in the container case
study illustrate the importance of understanding the relationship between supply chain actors and
broader contextual factors such as the influence of public regulation and regulatory inspection. On
board the case study vessel, the seafarers were quick to point to the effects of regulatory inspection
and a powerful incentive to ensure compliance with good OSH management standards:
SEA 15: The Swedish Maritime Authority they are coming once a year, then we have the Port
State Control, coastguard – they are doing their own and that is one of the most important
ones – Port State is very important, and Eagle they are supposed to have an audit now and then
and on a regular basis; they should come every six months to help us with the Swedish
Maritime audit. That is how it should work.
Interviewer: And of those which would you say is the most influential in terms of bringing up
standards?
SEA 15: Swedish Maritime Authority.
Interviewer: That is the flag state?
SEA 15: Yeah, and then it is [US] coastguard.
Interviewer: The coastguard.
SEA 15: Yeah this vessel is trading over there so without them this is it.
Interviewer: So you have got the flag state first, the coastguard [Port State Control] next and
then the ship management company afterwards?
SEA 15: Yeah.
However, as we noted previously, the situation of the ship was relatively unusual, in as much as it
was exposed to the scrutiny of both a rigorous flag state (Sweden) and Port State Control
inspection (the US coastguard). This is not the situation for many merchant vessels regardless of
trade and therefore a similar significance for public regulation and its inspection cannot be
assumed to be the case for the maritime industry generally. We will return to a further discussion of
these issues in the following chapter.
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6 Explaining supply chain effects and their
significance 
Based on an extensive review of the research literature, Walters & James1 suggested a number of
propositions which might be useful in explaining the effectiveness or otherwise of supply chain-
mediated initiatives to influence health and safety management and practice among downstream
suppliers of goods or services. Here we consider these propositions in the light of our empirical
findings in the four case studies carried out in construction and the maritime industry. 
This chapter reviews the evidence from our case studies concerning these influences and offers an
understanding of their significance at both the micro and macro levels in the situations studied.
That is, it examines the usefulness of the propositions previously derived from the research literature
as a means of explaining how features of supply chain relations may support positive influences on
OSH management and practice. In doing so, the chapter accords attention to the extent of such
positive influences and how transferable or context-dependent they are. It also identifies some
unintended consequences of efforts to use supply chain leverage to influence health and safety
management and, more generally, seeks to better understand the implications of our findings for
wider policy and practice in regulating health and safety management in modern work situations.
The chapter begins with a reassessment, in the light of the findings in the present study, of Walters
& James’1 initial overarching propositions that supply chain influences on health and safety vary
both according to the business interests of the actors involved and the regulatory contexts with
which they are surrounded. It goes on to consider the evidence of the study in terms of the positive
and negative consequences of supply chain influence. Although our empirical study is deliberately
focused on the direct effects of supply chain intervention in OSH and has not set out to examine
wider indirect effects in this respect, it nevertheless has highlighted some unintended negative
consequences of supply chain attention to OSH and we explore the significance of these for the
application of the propositions developed by Walters & James.1 Finally, and again in the light of our
empirical evidence, we reconsider the relevance of Walters & James’ third set of propositions1
concerning the nature of supportive supply chain relations and the role of monitoring and
surveillance in improving supplier health and safety practice.
The role of business interest and regulatory context
Walters & James1 argued that attention accorded to health and safety related issues by supply chain
buyers varied, reflecting differences in two main features of supply chains. First, how far the way in
which health and safety is managed by suppliers had implications for the effective supply of the
required goods and services to buyers and second, the extent to which pressures were exerted by
private or public regulation to support the development and effective operation of health and safety
focused supply chain strategies. As shall be seen below, our case studies bear out both these
observations.
Implications of health and safety management for the effective supply of service 
In all our case studies the extent to which OSH was managed by suppliers had implications for the
effective delivery of the services they offered. As we have detailed in Chapter 5, the buyers and
suppliers involved understood these implications in various ways, but in all cases their awareness of
them influenced their strategies to promote effective OSH management and practice on the part of
suppliers. Even in the case of the container trade where, with few exceptions, the organisations
whose goods were being shipped displayed little interest in health and safety management on board,
this was not the case for the charterers or the ship management company involved. They clearly
identified the need for good health and safety management and, as evidenced in Chapter 5, regarded
it as a prerequisite for good business relations and profitability. In the case of the ship management
company they not only tried to ‘badge’ the quality of their company image by striving to deliver
OSH management at levels they regarded as beyond minimum for statutory compliance, they also
used the same approach with their own suppliers. For example, they sought to achieve better quality
in the safety on board the ships they managed by ensuring good quality PPE from their suppliers. In
the case of coveralls, they supplied ones with fire retardant properties on all the ships they
managed, even though these were not required by regulation on board container ships. They did
this partly to ensure one supplier for all of their coveralls, but also because they were thinking of
their public image, as is evident from the comments made by the ship management company quoted
on page 53.
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There was also evidence in all the case studies that while interventions from buyers were instrumental
in influencing the way suppliers managed their health and safety, there was a more subtle business
influence that was felt from other sources, such as for example the practices of other companies in the
same trade. Thus, in the construction case studies the principal contractor on which both studies
focused – TitanCF Industries – was one of an association of construction and civil engineering
companies that belonged to the UK Contractors Group (UKCG). UKCG has played a prominent and
leading role in promoting the business case for health and safety in the construction industry during
the last decade or so and in co-operating with the HSE in the delivery of the regulator’s campaigns on
improving health and safety in construction. Indeed, the strategy of the HSE’s Construction Division
has been to work closely with this organisation and its members to try to effect change at the highest
level in the companies concerned, on the basis that this would lead to such change being cascaded
downwards through organisations and through the relationships between upstream and downstream
contractors. This is highlighted in the HSE Construction Division’s most recent Plan of Work, in
which reference is made to continuing to ‘work in partnership with key stakeholders and
intermediaries’ on collaboration that includes ‘use of the supply chain to influence standards’.114
On the Olympic Park, TitanCF Industries was one of a number of principal contractors that were
also members of UKCG and therefore shared many aspects of a broad understanding concerning
leadership and the business benefits of being seen to deliver good practices in OSH management. At
the time of our fieldwork, there were various systems the ODA had put in place to ensure senior
representatives of these organisations met regularly and also met with representatives of the ODA,
CLM and HSE. On communications generally, the ODA’s HS&E standard stated:181
Each supplier, the ODA and Delivery Partner shall ensure that there are effective communication
arrangements to inform all site personnel of key issues including progress, lessons to be learned
from incidents, campaigns, and programmes of risk control.
Opportunities existed for communication across projects through a number of forums, including
Project Leadership teams, the Safety, Health and Environment Leadership team, and Health, Safety
and Environment forums, which also allowed Tier 1 contractor personnel and their suppliers to share
health and safety information.
That the ODA leadership used the supply chain strategically is evident from the comments of its
Director of construction (quoted on page 48). Nevertheless, this was not simply a matter of the ODA
imposing its own requirements on contractors. There was evidence that many of the principal
contractors on the site were already using similar management standards as part of their own
procedures prior to the intervention of the ODA. TitanCF Industries, for example, had been involved
in the development of the site from its outset. Interviewees believed that many of their systems and
procedures had been used as a basis for the systems and procedures later introduced, developed and
rolled out across the Park by the ODA and CLM. They described the formation of common health
and safety standards as a culmination of ideas from various different contractors as well as CLM and
the ODA, including, for example, the ODA’s induction programme:
… when that changed from [TitanCF Industries] managing the park to ODA then taking charge
and then we all had to have our new badges for it, when you went and sat in that induction we
were all sat there and went, ‘hang on, that looks very much like a [TitanCF Industries] induction
to me, with a little bit of [organisation].’ (Contracts manager, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
What seemed to be taking place as a result, therefore, was a balance that used contractors’ existing
experience of the business benefits of best practice in managing health and safety and combined this
with co-ordination and leadership from the ODA and CLM to ensure they not only adopted these
standards themselves but also sought to influence their own contractors into accepting there were
business benefits associated with adopting them. As the quotes from interviews with second and
third-tier suppliers reported in the previous chapter attest, this was a message that was heard and
acted upon by many of these downstream suppliers:
… if it is a high-profile site and high-profile job, it usually comes with high-profile health and
safety awareness. (Manager [link Tier 1 to Tier 3], ArgonautCF Construction [Tier 2])
In the Forum Development project, while much of the role of the project developer as the procurer of
good practices on OSH was devolved to principal contractors such as TitanCF Industries, the
procurer nevertheless held regular meetings of the principal contractors on the site in a way similar to
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that practised by the ODA. Again these contractors were nearly all members of the UKCG and
therefore shared experiences and approaches that were derived from a variety of sources external to
the project. At the monthly meetings for principal contractors organised by the developer there was
an emphasis on sharing experience:
At the principal contractors’ meeting… we basically have a very open discussion about what each
contractor is doing and interfaces, forthcoming things… how they are managed on site is our
responsibility still, but we try to encourage the contractors to have this relationship, and find it
works very well. (Project manager, Rome Enterprise Consortium [Procurer])
Interestingly, there was also a sense conveyed by some of the employees of TitanCF Industries that
they felt their practices influenced the procurer. A two-way process of downstream and upstream
communication existed between the procurer and suppliers:
Well I like to think we are, I like to think the client learns things off us, that is why they employ
us in the first place isn’t it?… If you haven’t got through health and safety record then you don’t
get through the door, it is as simple as [that] these days. You see it reflects on clients as much as
anybody, it is their job at the end of the day. (General foreman, TitanCF Industries [Tier 1])
A broadly similar scenario to that previously described on the Olympic Park prevailed in terms of
procedures to raise awareness among contractors concerning the business benefits of being seen to be
adopting arrangements and procedures regarded by upstream purchasers as good health and safety
management practices. Here again, there were also a variety of means in which the benefits of these
practices were communicated among lower-tier contractors which resulted in a horizontal influence
among peer group companies at the same level within the supply chain as well the vertical influence
of buyers on downstream suppliers. Overall, as a result the lower-tier contractors believed that their
health and safety reputation was integral to them getting more work:
At the end of the day we have got the contract; if we want more work then the incentive is to get
it right in the first place… so everything for them really. They have got to do it otherwise they
have got no work. (Procurement manager and OSH adviser, HadrianCF Construction [Tier 2])
In an interview with senior HSE personnel with responsibility for seeking compliance with regulation
in construction, a similar concern with the achievement of horizontal influence unfolded, this time in
relation to clients: 
… we have challenged other clients who are engaging or are having major works done to go and
speak to people like the ODA, look at the research that has come out of the Olympics.
… I mean, we are already engaged with [a large construction engineering company] who are
going to be building [a nuclear power station] and we’ve said, ‘go to the Olympic Park, go and
speak to those who engage down there – the client particularly – look at the standards that they
set out in relation to health and safety… See what they’ve done and learn the lessons and then,
you know, use them for your purposes…’ (HSE Chief inspector of construction)
None of these practices had occurred in a regulatory vacuum. However, the nature of the regulatory
influences which existed varied across the two industries.
Pressures of private or public regulation 
The second part of Walters & James’1 initial proposition argued that supply chain influences on
health and safety management represent a response to regulatory influences of one sort or another.
And they are more likely to occur where there is some form of regulatory scrutiny in place. We also
found this to be generally so in our case studies.
In the construction industry the response to regulation is obvious. The Construction (Design and
Management) Regulations are an overt attempt to ensure that the duty of care for workers’ OSH in
the UK construction industry is ensured despite the fragmented nature of its structure and
organisation. To achieve this, the regulations are explicitly focused on supply chain relations on
construction sites. As we have already noted, the delivery of compliance and reduction of the toll of
fatal and serious incidents in the industry has been the goal of a series of high-profile government
inquiries and political pressure since the early 1990s, much of which have been aimed at the top end
of the industry in which companies such as the one in our investigation are located. Moreover, as also
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discussed in Chapter 5, focusing on supply chain relationships is currently a central theme in the
approach of the regulator towards the industry, an approach in which the strategy of the regulator
has been to match its engagement with the different features of different parts of the sector. Thus at
the top end, such as represented by the case studies, the HSE no longer undertakes regular proactive
inspections on major construction sites, preferring instead to make its presence felt at the planning
stages of the work and in general oversight of such projects. 
Thus, on the Olympic Park the HSE largely exerted its influence through its engagement with the
ODA Board, rather than through site inspections. Its senior officials argued that it made its influence
felt at this level and thereon it was cascaded through the various levels of procurement by the
demands of the procurers involved, and that it helped to drive their efforts to ensure compliance from
their suppliers with OSH management requirements originally outlined in principle with the regulator
at board level.
… we took things to another level… how they could facilitate health and safety… actually how
you then co-ordinate and communicate the issues to be managed by the suppliers… A lot of this
comes back to the issue of, dare I say it, collaborative working… where you’ve got people in a
room… it’s harnessing those skills to deliver the outcomes you need. (HSE Chief inspector of
construction)
A similar approach occurred on the Forum Development project. In both cases, the regulatory
inspection of compliance was therefore replaced by the monitoring activities of the procurers in the
supply chain, while intelligence on the results of these monitoring activities was meant to be fed
upstream to alert controlling organisations and the regulator to problems of compliance in lower
tiers. It was not possible to systematically measure how effective this feedback mechanism actually
was in practice. The impression gained, however, from such data that were available and from
interviews with personnel in medium and upper tiers, suggested that broadly it worked. However,
there was concern among some interviewees from the lower tiers about the additional administrative
burdens, greater costs and perceived unnecessary precautions involved:
Half of this health and safety stuff I end up doing, I’ll end up going in on a Saturday or Sunday or
doing it at home. (Supervisor, ArgonautCF Construction [Tier 2])
But it is just the sheer volume of paperwork that you have to provide too. (Supervisor, DeltaCF
Contracting [Tier 3])
To be honest it’s [the level of client oversight] pissed my boss off. Yeah, it has made our job 20
times harder. Yeah, you’ve got boys here who’ve been planting trees for 20 years and then now
they’re getting told by someone who has been planting trees for three weeks, ‘no this is how you
[do it].’ Hold on a second, I’ve been doing it 20 years! (Workers, OmegaCF Contracting and
GammaCF Contracting [Tier 3])
It is like here, there is no incentives, they keep piling on the pressure saying the job needs to get
done and they pile you with all this health and safety rubbish. (Worker, OmegaCF Contracting
[Tier 3])
But even when companies and workers complained of these additional burdens associated with health
and safety requirements on the site, there was no evidence from the interviews that the procedures in
place were anything other than strictly adhered to. Indeed, it was the need to comply with them that
was the main reason for complaint. However, the additional burdens on suppliers that are created by
such interventions – and the possibility that there may have been unintended consequences of such
burdens – was an issue raised in interviews among suppliers in all of the case studies. We will have
cause to return to the implications of this theme later.
The regulatory strategy of the HSE therefore seems to have paid off on the Olympic Park while
reducing substantially the need for onsite intervention by inspectors.
I guess it comes down to the type of client you are [working] for and the nature and profile of the
job. This is the highest profile job in the country, if not Europe at the moment, so all eyes are
going to be on how the client, as in [Tier 1 organisation], performs and that, sort of, snowballs
down through the Tier 2s and Tier 3s and how they perform… (Manager [link to Tier 1 and Tier
3], ArgonautCF Construction [Tier 2])
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Although the Forum Development project did not experience the same high profile as the Olympic
Park, broadly speaking a similar situation concerning compliance behaviour and the role of the HSE
seems to have prevailed here too, with generally the same results.
The position in terms of regulatory scrutiny in the maritime industry was different. As we outlined
in Chapter 2, within the industry significant challenges for regulatory inspection exist. Primarily
these challenges arise partly from the global nature of the shipping industry and the complications it
creates for the application of national and international laws, and partly because of the problems of
inspecting workplaces that are seldom within the reach of shore-based inspectors and even when
they are, such as when ships are in port, they are engaged in activities that are often different to
those that occur while the vessel is at sea. These challenges have, however, also been further
complicated by the highly developed trend towards deregulation pursued by the industry in recent
decades, in which ‘flagging out’ has resulted in a major shift of ship registration (and hence
regulatory control) from the embedded maritime states to new administrations, many of which have
little experience of, and few resources for, the regulatory scrutiny of health and safety in the
maritime sector. The consequence of this is a highly varied experience of the role of regulation and
regulatory inspection in the sector. The case studies are, to an extent, testament to this.
As we demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the oil tanker trade, companies and seafarers alike
were of the view that the forms of regulatory inspection undertaken by both Flag States and Port
States were less demanding than the scrutiny to which they were subjected by the oil majors and
their inspection and vetting systems. The latter was also more of an immediate cause for concern in
terms of business interests and job security for tanker companies and the seafarers that worked on
their vessels.
That said, compliance with regulatory standards on health and safety was nevertheless a significant
issue for all the companies and seafarers in the case studies. In particular, ‘a clean sheet’ in terms of
regulatory inspections by various Port State or Flag State authorities was regarded as an important
measure of the reputation of both the ship management company and the charterer/ship owner. In
all cases, the public availability of this information meant that both buyers and suppliers of services
could and did use it as a source of information with which to gauge the quality of ships, their
owners and their operators. Indeed, the case studies showed that these measures could be used in
both directions in determining potential business relations between buyers and suppliers of services.
This applied in both the oil tanker trade and the container trade. The difference between them seems
to have been that in the tanker trade there were additional forms of surveillance that the oil majors
used, of which the companies and crews of tankers were very much aware and in thrall. Thus, the
personnel in the ship management company claimed that when they were tendering for business they
would consider very carefully before tendering for a contract to manage ships that had a record of
deficiencies or detentions by Port State Control, while the emphasis repeatedly expressed by oil
tanker companies first and foremost concerned the need to meet the requirements of the oil
companies.
Although inspection and monitoring by heads of supply chains did not feature significantly in the
minds of the seafarers as an influence on health and safety practices on board the container ship,
this is not to say that inspection and monitoring themselves were not regarded as important. Both
on board and ashore there was a significant tendency to want to conform to regulation and to
believe that non-conformity would be discovered and penalised. In relation to a notoriously difficult
issue to ‘police’, one manager stated, for example:
Having worked for Port State, I can assure you they are easy to catch out because the one thing I
can tell you is there is no way you can fiddle the work and rest hours, because all you have got
to do as a Port State officer is take that out of the ship’s log book: when did she arrive at the
pilotage, when did she arrive on the berth, when did she sail? And you then say, ‘Right, who was
stationed here, here, here and here?’ … people think you can fiddle it but it is not fiddle-able. If
you get a Port State officer who has been a seafarer, it is better than when they are a graduate
because then they know nothing; but if you have been a seafarer you know that there [are] other
documents down the line that will disprove what you have written here. That is the one thing
with seafarers, they have always kept records. There are always logs. (MAN 2)
Again, on the container vessel, as noted in Chapter 5, when asked about the drivers of safety
performance on board, the seafarers identified various kinds of inspection as significant. Inspections
The limits of influence  67
from regulators were fairly commonplace and seafarers discussed Flag State and Port State (mostly US
coastguard) inspections and audits. In preparation for the Flag State inspection, the ship management
company also conducted its own internal audit, which was supposed to help seafarers prepare. Thus, a
further effect of these external audits and inspections was to encourage the double-checking of items
that should be checked at regular intervals on board according to the SMS and the designated
responsibilities of seafarers. For example, life-saving equipment was supposed to be subject to regular
weekly and monthly checks but preparation for audits/inspections had been sufficiently thorough to
uncover some oversights:
Interviewer: And do you sometimes find things that you’ve overlooked? You know do you find
that something is… 
SEA 22: Yeah, yeah I admit like this time I am suppose to have this, I ordered already two
handrails because I thought… the requirements is only five, but when I check in this last regulation
[the requirement is] six in each lifeboat so I missed two.
Interviewer: OK.
SEA 22: But when I check in the SOLAS regulation it should be six in each lifeboat. But now it is
already ordered so probably I think in Liverpool I receive the two.
Interviewer: So you know they are coming so you go and check the regulations first to make sure
you meet the regulations?
SEA 22: Yeah.
Indeed, many seafarers were keen on the Flag and Port State inspections, seeing them as their defence
against an unsafe working environment:
They go onboard not for them, they go onboard for us because they are looking for safety and
safety is for us. When they talk safety it is all for the safety of the crew, not for them. That is why
we have some video that Eagle [is] showing us about the US coastguard going onboard, that you
must know your work, you know most what to do and don’t be afraid to any Port State that will
be onboard as long [as] you [are] following the rules. (SEA 17)
The message was reinforced by the Flag State’s capacity to force improvements onto vessels. For
example, on the container vessel, the last Flag State inspection had identified that some of the vessel’s
loudspeakers were not as audible as they should be. The seafarers had witnessed the replacement of the
old loudspeakers with new ones at the Flag State’s insistence. 
In short, rigorous and demanding inspections, in which significant sanctions or penalties would result
from failure to meet required standards, were regarded as important drivers of the standards of health
and safety practice on board ships. This was the case regardless of whether such inspection or
monitoring was the result of a regime imposed by public regulation or whether it was the consequence
of the private regulatory efforts of the oil majors in the tanker trade. However, in the case of the latter,
it is important to acknowledge that such supply chain based auditing is additional to the inspection
regime resulting from public regulation and clearly served to make up for the perceived deficiency in
the rigour and consistency of public regulation in some parts of the world.
In other words, what was seen to contribute most effectively towards driving a culture of safety on
board ships in both the tanker and the container trade was the constellation of external pressures in
which the regulatory environment helped to create business pressures driving both companies and their
workers towards compliance behaviours in relation to safety practices – as well as pressures to protect
and safeguard the safety, health and wellbeing of the seafarers. In the oil sector, because of the scale of
the risks involved, the oil companies at the head of the rather simple and unusual supply chains had
taken it upon themselves to vet and rigorously monitor the safety standards of independent tanker
companies. They were further aided in their capacity to do so by their controlling interests in many of
the terminals at which the tankers berthed.
In the container trade, in which the risks for the heads of the supply chains were more remote and
arguably less catastrophic, the supply chains involved in the transport of their goods more complex
and the power of their influence more diffuse, the capacity to exert such unilateral influence over
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health and safety management among the suppliers was considerably less. In these situations, therefore,
the role of public regulation and regulatory inspection of standards of OSH occupied a higher profile
in the nexus of external influences on safety practices on board ships. But in both trades, the
mechanism of inspection itself helped focus the minds of the seafarers and their management on the
need to meet standards.
This is of course a somewhat idealised picture and it is one that is only likely to apply at the better end
of both the oil and container trades. It is worth digressing for a moment to reinforce this important
limitation to our study. In both cases the ships on which we sailed and the companies that allowed us
access to their management and workers had comparatively good safety records and were striving to
meet quality standards in which this good safety performance was one indicator of success, largely
because such standards were perceived by them to be important to the commercial success of their
business. In the case of the oil sector, company management and seafarers alike repeatedly made the
point that to trade with the oil major members of the OCIMF there was little choice but to conform to
their requirements. The seafarers’ own testimony was clear on this. 
However, while many seafarers and managers made reference to the oil sector being ‘very strict on
safety’, this was not invariably the case. As one seafarer on the container ship made clear when talking
about his previous experiences:
I only worked on a supply ship and their standard there was way below here. They were a small
company and I got the feeling when I spoke to the pilot in Aberdeen that in the whole of Aberdeen
we were known as those crazy guys; they had a very bad reputation, that ship. So I don’t think that
is a fair comparison, that is the only time. As [a] cadet I was on a small tanker as well, but it was
about the same – a really old ship. They didn’t really get the good cargo anymore so they tried to
get something and their standard was very low as well. I don’t really think I have anything that I
can fairly compare to this. The only thing I have [in terms of experience] in oil is way below oil
standard, I think. (SEA 14)
In the container sector case study both the ship manager and charterer, and the kinds of companies
with which they sought to do business, were perceived to be concerned about quality in the transport
of their goods and the management of their ships. High safety standards were therefore regarded as
good for business. Again, this is not invariably the case in the industry, as the testimony of the
seafarers made clear when discussing their previous experience working on other ships and for other
companies:
Interviewer: The Port State Control survey? It couldn’t pass?
SEA 27: Yes, that is why it transferred a lot in Africa. Because my previous ship chartered by [a
large multinational container company], so the route from Spain, Lisbon and Europe.
Interviewer: But then when they kept finding deficiencies… ?
SEA 27: Yes, transfer to Africa, so always in Africa three months.
Interviewer: Can you remember what deficiencies they were finding?
SEA 27: In the ballast, mostly ballast, engine, some crack in the hull bottom, that is only the
problem. That is why I am always work[ing]. They are supposed to be in dry dock but I always
work there welding, that is why imagine more difficult job my previous company compared with
this vessel… 
Interviewer: Do you think this other ship was safe sailing with the cracks in the hull and so on? Do
you think she was a safe ship?
SEA 27: Sometimes I [was] scared because I know to have a crack inside the hull bottom, but in
the route that is it my previous ship is normally not difficult because only passing the [indicates
shore], not like here going to America.
The wider maritime literature is replete with similar examples, suggesting that the global reality is
somewhat less ideal than we found at the end of the market in which we undertook our investigation.
This literature is extensive and long-standing; there are few indications to suggest the situation in the
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maritime industry has fundamentally improved in the 21st century.68,115,184,185 Indeed, it seems likely
that a substantial proportion of the world fleet does not adopt the approaches we have recounted
in relation to either public or private regulatory pressure.
In summary therefore, the concern with compliance with OSH standards among the suppliers we
studied is not solely the result of concern with business advantage. It is also because of substantial
and long-term pressure to comply with regulatory standards, and especially with the development
of such standards to specifically address supply chain issues in the industry. As such, our findings
bear out the arguments of Walters & James’1 initial propositions concerning the role of both
business and regulatory contexts in shaping supply chain influences on OSH. They further endorse
the conclusion that while supply chain influences can be important sources of leverage towards
improved OSH practices, and as such are useful means of enhancing regulatory strategies in
certain situations, they are not a substitute for regulatory standards.
Negative or positive health and safety consequences of supply chain relationships?
Walters & James’1 second set of postulates argued that buyers influence health and safety both
directly and indirectly, the former exerting positive effects and the latter exerting negative ones. It
is important to be clear that nothing in our empirical studies of the (largely positive) direct effects
of buyers’ supply chain interventions on OSH management leads us to question the postulate that
overall the indirect effects of supply chain management are negative in terms of health and safety
outcomes. The main findings of the considerable literature reviewed by Walters & James,1 which
led them to this conclusion, are therefore not challenged by the present research. Indeed, arguably
the situations we have examined are somewhat exceptional cases and for the most part,
manipulation of supply chains to promote the business interests of buyers is likely to create price
and delivery pressures on suppliers, which may undermine their efforts to improve their
management arrangements to protect their workers’ health, safety and wellbeing. This in turn may
lead to poorer health and safety outcomes.
That said, in our case studies we have concentrated on exploring the direct effects of buyers’
supply chain strategies and thus, as already discussed, our conclusions generally support the idea
that within the somewhat narrow business and regulatory contexts we have described, buyers may
indeed have positive effects on the health and safety arrangements of their suppliers. Within these
direct interventions, however, there are some further unanticipated negative effects which it is
important to mention.
Negative consequences of direct supply chain intervention in our case studies
The concerns of buyers to impose conditions upon suppliers sometimes resulted in onerous
demands on the time and effort of the suppliers. These additional requirements were on occasion
seen as unnecessary or misguided by the suppliers on which they were imposed. The examples of
the concerns of lower-tier contractors and their employees given in the previous section were
mainly of these kinds. The demands of procurers were also perceived to sometimes lead to
situations in which the overall effects were to increase the stresses of the job tasks involved and
thus potentially increase the likelihood of unsafe acts. This was especially the case with the ‘paper
trail’ requirements associated with the monitoring of compliance in the requirements imposed by
the oil majors concerning OSH management in the oil tanker trade.
I check the bridge chart correction, passage planning, echo sounder logbook, GMDSS [Global
Maritime Distress and Safety System] logbook and many, many others on the bridge. I also
have to check the old records to ensure that the records are also correct. All the old logbooks
should also be in order. There is a lot of preparation before an oil major inspection, mostly
paperwork. (TSEA 7)
It is also the case that while companies and their seafarers may put enormous effort into preparing
their vessels and SMS for the scrutiny of oil major inspections, this does not necessarily mean that
they will keep up such efforts once the inspection has been passed. As two Chinese seafarers put
it:
Now the main issue in the management is to deal with the oil majors’ inspection. After the
inspection, it happened that the work became tardy, and the work would not be as serious as
the time before external inspection. (TSEA 14)
After inspection, for a certain period of time, the [bad] situation was resumed. (TSEA 17)
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It further needs to be acknowledged that since the introduction of the ISM Code more than a decade
ago, there have been numerous studies that have failed to demonstrate its widespread
effectiveness.186–190 These accounts have pointed to the over-bureaucratisation of safety arrangements as
one reason for the limited adoption of good practices and the growth of an appropriate safety culture
on board ships. Indeed, in his wider study of the operation of the ISM Code, drawing upon the same
sources as the data used in this report, Bhattacharya190 noted significant limitations in the application
and effectiveness of SMSs on board the tankers studied, which his subjects ascribed to such over-
bureaucratisation.
In addition, such inspections are focused on the signs and manifestations of safety on board ships
rather than those of health and wellbeing among seafarers. Much of the current concern about the
organisation of work and the work environment experienced by seafarers is addressed to its effects on
their health and wellbeing,68 but it is not obvious how such inspections aid its improvement. Indeed, as
well as the additional workload such over-bureaucratisation imposes on seafarers, the reduced
autonomy in job control it allows them, and the obvious stress caused to seafarers by the need to be
found compliant with the stringent requirements of such inspection, all raise the possibility that such
inspections actually contribute to increasing the psychosocial risks experienced by seafarers and, in this
sense, potentially worsen their health outcomes.
Clearly, some kind of optimal balance between the positive effects of supply chain leverage to stimulate
and support good practice and the necessary monitoring of compliance with requirements aimed at
achieving this would be desirable. Equally clearly, in the eyes of many of the suppliers affected and
those who work for them, there remains some way to go to achieve this. This is of course part of a
wider problem of how organisations address their encounters with risk and of the so-called ‘audit
culture’ that is frequently one of the outcomes of such efforts.
As has been argued elsewhere,191 there remains considerable mileage to be gained from further
exploration of the more targeted intervention of supply chain regulation at sectoral level. Our findings
add some weight to the suggestion that this could help stimulate and enhance business environment
pressures to ensure more positive direct effects from the engagement of heads of supply chains and
other upstream actors with interventions on OSH management practices among suppliers.
Consideration of the significance of such possible interventions leads us to an assessment of the
relevance of the final set of propositions developed by Walters & James,1 with particular reference to
what it is that makes the efforts of upstream actors successful. 
What makes buyers’ efforts to influence supplier health and safety management
work better? 
Based on their review of the business literature, Walters & James1 argued in their third set of
propositions that buyers’ attempts to influence suppliers will work better when they are supported by
adequate monitoring and penalty regimes. They further suggested in a final set of propositions to help
explain the outcomes of supply chain interventions on health and safety that they would be more likely
to support improved OSH practice when they occurred within a supply relationship which is relatively
collaborative and trust based; and that these relations were more likely to exist where buyers and
suppliers had worked together, satisfactorily, for a relatively long period and the wider institutional
context was supportive of them. We therefore next consider the extent to which our cases studies
support these arguments. 
Monitoring and surveillance
The evidence from our case studies set out in Chapter 5 and the discussion elaborated in the previous
sections are consistent with the suggestion that the monitoring and surveillance contribute to suppliers’
compliance with demands of the buyers that procure their services. While taking into account the
limitations of audit-orientated management regimes, they confirm that it is generally the case that
where supply chain interventions to promote OSH among suppliers are supported by adequate penalty
and monitoring regimes, they are likely to work better than when procurement practices require
compliance with OSH management standards but offer no means of monitoring this compliance. How
such monitoring and penalty regimes operate varies. The model found in the oil tanker trade and on
the large construction sites we studied – where buyers take a strongly interventionist role – is not
necessarily the only way in which monitoring may occur or how penalties for non-compliance might
be levied. As we saw in the container trade, it is possible that a combination of incentives, in which
public regulatory scrutiny as well as private monitoring arrangements, act in concert in certain
circumstances to promote compliance. A better and more specified understanding of such
combinations would undoubtedly improve the outcomes of public policies in this respect.
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The influence of power and other ‘relational’ elements
In their review of the business research literature Walters & James1 noted that although there is
enormous variation in the form and content of supply chain relations, they can usefully be viewed
through the lens of the distinction drawn by Sako between ‘obligational contractual relations’ (OCR)
and ‘arms-length contractual relations’ (ACRs).77
These two categories of supply relationships are, as already noted in Chapter 2, best understood as
representing ‘the ends of a multi-dimensional spectrum of possible trading relationships’ that can
exist between buyers and suppliers. At the OCR end of this spectrum, supply chains are characterised
by lengthy, ongoing links, mutual dependence, shared risk and power, with an emphasis on objectives
likely to extend beyond issues of cost – embodying, for example, quality and innovation, and the
presence of trust-based relationships which support more open communications and joint problem-
solving behaviour. At the other end of the spectrum, ACR types of supply chain relationship embody
characteristics that are the mirror image of these, in as much as they are relatively short-term,
encompass a strong emphasis on cost competitiveness, and are less marked by trust-based
relationships, power sharing, mutual dependence and joint problem solving.
While it is acknowledged that this two-fold categorisation is something of an over-simplification of a
complex reality in which many supply chain relationships will lie at different points along a
continuum with these two idealised forms representing the extremes, it can be seen to provide
heuristics that usefully highlight some of the central ways in which supply chain relations can vary.
When taken into account alongside available research evidence, it therefore led Walters & James1 to
their final set of propositions to help explain the outcomes of supply chain interventions on health
and safety, namely those suggesting that improved OSH practice would be most likely to be
supported in supply relationships that are relatively collaborative and trust based and in which buyers
and suppliers had worked together, satisfactorily, for relatively long periods and in a wider
institutional context that was supportive of them.
Examining our findings in the light of these propositions, we therefore find it is important to give
some consideration to their institutional contexts, and the degree of mutuality between the interests
of procurers and suppliers, in order to understand their effects on OSH and the extent to which such
effects might be transferable. In so doing we find there are several features of our case studies that
resonate well with the propositions, but possibly some others for which it is less easy to account.
Institutional context
Research shows that wider institutional contexts within which supply chain relationships are
established influence the extent to which relations between buyers and suppliers are either
collaborative or adversarial. In Chapter 2 we noted some of the features of the sectors in which we
have undertaken the case studies which may be influential in this respect. For example, the CDM
Regulations 2007 provide clients with legally based encouragement to influence the health and safety
management of their suppliers. The size, prominence and degree of risk on large construction sites
mean that they are both subject to relatively close scrutiny from regulatory agencies and that
operators are conscious of the significant reputational risks that are at stake in the case of poor OSH
performance – thus creating opportunities for regulatory inspectors to engage co-operatively with
companies and to influence the planning and management of the activities involved. As we discussed
in a previous section, this certainly happened during the building of the Olympic Park and was also,
but perhaps to a lesser extent, evident in the planning activities on the Forum Development project.
Moreover, such engagement was seen to help ensure appropriate leadership and commitment from
procurers upstream in supply chains as well as from the contractors supplying services. This in turn
led to considerable monitoring and auditing of compliance with OSH management standards on the
part of upstream actors.
Indeed, these institutional contexts set the projects that were the focus of our case studies at
considerable distance from a large part of the construction industry. As we have already noted in
previous chapters, this sector is dominated by small and micro enterprises. Thus, much of the
industry does not operate in institutional contexts of the type found in our case studies. As a result,
the positive aspects of supply chain pressures we have noted are unlikely to be transferable to the
parts of the sector where such supportive institutional contexts are absent.
Institutional contexts in the maritime industry are very different from those in construction and
indeed from those of most land-based industries. As a result, strong institutional pressures to utilise
supply chains to enhance labour standards are not ubiquitous in the industry. Despite this, however,
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our case studies demonstrate two significant features. First, they confirm that regardless of the
situation generally in the sector, there are some exceptions and such pressures clearly do exist in the
oil and chemical tanker trade. They do so primarily because of the reputational risks faced by the
relatively small number of high-profile, major petrochemical companies dominating the trade. Their
perceptions in this respect are largely driven by concerns about the scale of possible consequences for
company liabilities for safety failures in relation to environmental protection. Second, and in some
ways more interestingly, the case studies further show that even in the absence of such powerful direct
pressures evident in the tanker trade, under certain circumstances supply chain relationships are
influential upon safety management in other trades too. Our case study in the container trade
demonstrates how both companies and seafarers are made aware of these business pressures and how
they act through the supply relationship between ship managers and charterers to improve a range of
health and safety management practices within their control. However, the case study also shows that
these pressures do not act in isolation but rather exist alongside Flag and Port State regulatory
inspection, to provide a constellation of institutional pressures that operate in concert to cause
companies at the ‘better end’ of the container trade to use effective OSH management strategies. We
concluded that while such experiences were clearly demonstrated in our case study, they were not
necessarily widespread in the container trade or indeed in other trades in the maritime industry. Like
the case studies in construction, our container trade case study was one in which the companies
involved were projecting a trading image that they wished potential customers to understand as being
concerned with the quality of the service they offered, as much as with the competitiveness of its
price. We further showed that, at least as far as the previous work experiences of the seafarers we
interviewed were concerned, the same high standards of quality over price were by no means
universal in the sector.
Mutuality of buyer and supplier interests
Finally, returning to the experiences of monitoring compliance, as Walters & James1 have pointed out,
the responsiveness of suppliers to the demands of buyers cannot be understood without taking
account of the implications such demands might have for their own business interests. The balance of
dependency between buyers and suppliers therefore may serve to significantly shape the nature and
dynamics of immediate supply chain relationships by having important implications for the
distribution of power and risk between them, and as a result, also the degree of trust embedded in
their supply relationships. In our case studies in construction and the oil tanker trade there were
examples of strong dependencies by relatively weak suppliers upon powerful buyers. This was
certainly the case in the oil tanker trade where, as the quotes from the tanker company managers and
the seafarers make plain, suppliers had no illusions about their dependent position. In construction, in
the multi-tiered supply chains we examined in both our case studies, it was obviously also the case
that downstream suppliers perceived themselves in a strongly business-dependent position in relation
to the upstream procurers of their services. For the sake of future business they were prepared to
introduce arrangements for OSH which were heavily monitored, as well as to spend additional time
and resources in training and being certified as having the capacities required by their upstream
clients. However, the ‘mutuality’ of buyer and supplier interests in this context is heavily skewed by
imbalance in the distribution of power between them. To refer to such arrangements as being
‘collaborative’ is therefore rather misleading, since there was no indication that downstream suppliers
believed they had any choice in the delivery of their obligations on OSH matters.
More truly collaborative and partnership-based relations were seen among the major contractors and
the developers in the two case studies. As we showed in Chapter 5, large contractors and members of
the UKCG share a number of approaches to OSH in common, ones they have been obliged to
develop in recent years as a result of both regulatory demands and high-profile political exhortation.
As a consequence, major contractors are suppliers with an important source of specialist
expertise/knowledge, which places the procurers of their services in positions of relatively high
dependency and leaves them well placed to gain a substantial degree of influence over the supply
relationships established. At the same time, however, the procurers involved in our construction case
studies were in a position to offer large and high-value contracts and, as a result, also occupied a
relatively influential market position. The resulting balance of dependencies in these case studies
therefore acted to support relatively strong forms of collaborative working.
Indeed, it was clear that the supply chain-mediated management arrangements made by procurers on
both the case study construction sites were strongly influenced by the existing practices of the major
contractors involved, as were many of the arrangements to monitor them. In the Forum Development
project, the developer was content to leave much of the detail of supply chain-mediated OSH
arrangements to its major suppliers – the principal contractors on the site – citing their considerable
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experience in these matters as the reason for doing so. While in the case of the Olympic Park, the ODA
and its delivery partner played key roles in the leadership and co-ordination of these arrangements, their
content and delivery was very much a result of a mutually beneficial partnership between them and the
major contractors working for them.
Conclusions 
The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that the empirical results obtained from the case studies
undertaken in the present research broadly support the propositions concerning the contexts of supply
chain effects that were developed by Walters & James1 in their previous review. We have further
demonstrated that such effects are neither necessarily solely vertical within supply chains, nor only in
one direction. Thus, we showed that in the construction industry there were substantial horizontal
effects observed among organisations competing for business at the same level and in our case studies in
that sector, as well as in the container trade in the maritime sector, there were some upstream as well as
downstream influences at work in the supply chains involved.
Therefore, our findings also largely endorse the usefulness of the propositions as ways of guiding the
understanding of the wider contexts of supply chain effects. Such understanding is especially useful in
policy development in relation to the increasing number of scenarios in the economy where conventional
regulation, and the nexus of employment relationships to which it has applied, are no longer as
commonplace as they once were.
That said, it is perhaps also important to note that our findings departed somewhat from the
propositions in several respects, two of which may be especially significant for future policy
development. One concerns the extent of mutuality and partnership between procurers and suppliers
anticipated in the propositions. Although we found such mutuality and partnership among some Tier 1
suppliers and their procurers to be evident in our case studies, what struck us more forcefully for most
of the supply chain relationships in which leverage on OSH was delivered through procurement
strategies, was the high degree of power imbalance between procurers and suppliers, and the sense that
the latter believed they had little choice other than to follow the requirements of the former if they
wished to continue their business relationship. The implications of this finding for policy should not be
overlooked. However, there were also some negative consequences arising from the interventions in
which procurers exploited this power in the conditions they imposed upon the affairs of their suppliers.
These should not be ignored. In particular, additional burdens imposed upon lower-tier suppliers to
deliver evidence of compliance with procedures that were merely the requirements of ‘audit trails’ rather
than good OSH practices raised the possibility of them acting to indirectly lead to poorer but
unmonitored health and safety outcomes among workers at these levels.
A further significant finding that emerges from our case studies, and which is especially important for
policy considerations, concerns the extent to which leverage in supply chain relationships can be
developed as one element in a constellation of influences acting in concert to raise OSH standards, and
what might be the role of public regulation in this process. There were indications in the study –
especially in the case study in the maritime container trade, but also evident to some extent in the other
case studies – that the positive influence of supply chain driven effects on health and safety standards
may be more widespread than a focus on deliberate direct interventions may suggest. That is, we found
that buyers and suppliers in some supply chain relations that were not especially characteristic of OCRs
were nevertheless influenced to some extent to support good OSH standards because they perceived
them to be of relevance to their business interests. In such scenarios, and even where inspection and
monitoring regimes are not imposed by buyers on their suppliers to ensure compliance, there may be
opportunities for the further development of such pressure from public regulation to exploit such
perceptions of business criticality in ways that would enhance the health and safety practices and
outcomes for work activity that often lie beyond the reach of conventional regulatory practice.
Finally, it would seem entirely clear from this study that, while under certain conditions supply chain
relationships offer opportunities to leverage improvements in OSH arrangements and standards, they
always do so within contexts framed by regulation. There is no evidence in our study to suggest they act
effectively in the absence of, or as substitutes for, regulation or regulatory inspection. There is instead
much food for thought concerning how regulatory strategies could be more attuned to exploiting the
positive features of supply chain relationships to protect the workers whose health, safety and welfare lie
at the end of these chains and who are increasingly remote from the reach of conventional regulation.
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Annex: Sample documents
The empirical research for this study was originally intended to focus on the food production and
processing sector, as well as construction and shipping – hence the mention of three sectors
throughout the documents included in this Annex. However, access to food producing and processing
companies proved too difficult to enable sufficiently detailed and relevant fieldwork within the
timeframe of the project, and the researchers diverted resources from this sector to a more intensive
study of construction and shipping.
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Construction sector case studies: information sheet
The role of supply chains in influencing health and safety management in three sectors 
Summary for the investigation of supply chain management and health and safety
[Researchers’ names]
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University
[Researchers’ email addresses]
[Researchers’ telephone numbers]
Participant Information Sheet
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to
understand what the research will involve and why it is being done. Please take time to read the
following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish.
What is the purpose of the study?
Over the last 30 years there has been an increase in businesses outsourcing or contracting out the
provision of goods and services to other organisations. This has meant that supply chains are playing an
increasingly important role in the economy. As a result, there is now a great deal of interest in how, and
to what extent, supply chains can be used to support and improve health and safety management in
the supplier organisations in the chain. We are now trying to find out more about what works and why
in these situations by interviewing key people in a number of organisations.
Who are the researchers and who is funding the research?
The researchers are based at the Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC) which is part of
the Cardiff University School of Social Sciences. You can find out more about CWERC and our work on
our website:
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/cwerc/index.html
The study is being led by [researcher’s name] and [researcher’s name] with the assistance of other
members of CWERC staff. The research is funded by the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
(IOSH).
Who can take part?
The organisation you work for has agreed to take part in the study and has allowed us to approach a
number of staff with invitations to be interviewed for the research.
What do I have to do?
Taking part in the study involves being interviewed by the research team. The interview will cover a
number of areas around your views of health and safety management in your own and in other
organisations. It should take no more than about an hour. 
Will my taking part be confidential?
All interviews carried out during the project will be undertaken on a confidential basis and will be
audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed. As far as possible all comments will be anonymised in any
reports or papers that are produced as a result of the research. No individuals or organisations will be
named in any publications about the study and its findings but there is a possibility that some may be
identifiable through comments that are made.
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What will happen to the information that I give?
All transcripts of recorded interviews will be stored anonymously on University password protected
computers in strict accordance with the Data Protection Act. These will only be accessible to members
of the research team and will be kept securely. 
Do I have to take part?
Taking part in the study is entirely voluntary. You can decide whether you would like to be interviewed
or not and you can choose to withdraw from the study at any time.
Contact information
If you would like further information about the study please do not hesitate to contact:
[Researcher’s name]
[Researcher’s telephone number]
[Researcher’s email address]
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Construction sector case studies: consent form
The role of supply chains in influencing health and safety management in three sectors 
Summary for the investigation of supply chain management and health and safety 
[Researchers’ names]
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University
[Researchers’ email addresses]
[Researchers’ telephone numbers]
Consent Form
- I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. I have had the
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
- I am willing to take part in the interview for this study and for the interview to be recorded.
- I understand that no one will have access to the recording beyond the Cardiff University research
team.
- I understand that as far as possible all comments will be anonymised in any reports or papers that
are produced as a result of the research. Individuals’ names will not be included in reports, but I
understand that there is a possibility that I may be identifiable through comments that I make.
- I understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time.
Name of interviewee
Signature                                                                            Date
Name of interviewer
Signature                                                                            Date
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Construction sector case studies: 
interview schedules
The interview schedules that follow were used on the Olympic Park case study. They were altered as
appropriate for use on the Forum Development site.
A) Used with procurers
The role of supply chains in influencing health and safety management in three sectors 
Summary for the investigation of supply chain management and health and safety on the Olympic Park
[Researchers’ names]
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University
[Researchers’ email addresses]
[Researchers’ telephone numbers]
The aim of this study is to consider how, and to what extent, health and safety can be enhanced via
strategic supply chain management. We are particularly interested in investigating what factors
determine the development, implementation and operation of successful influence of this kind. We are
therefore talking to key players in the Olympic Park supply chain, including both managers and workers
and their representatives, to try and determine what works best and why. Below, we have outlined the
kinds of areas we would like to cover in the interview by giving some sample questions. However, these
are only our suggestions – if there are other areas that you think are important but are not covered
then please do tell us about them during the interview.
- Background
- Consent form
- Introductions
- Recording
- Abbreviations/specific terms – explain for the tape
Can you start by telling us a little about yourself please – who you are, what you do and what your
background is?
- Supply chain health and safety management – general
- How is H&S management and performance in suppliers influenced?
- How is this evaluated?
- Relative importance of H&S in the tender process
- How does this vary by supplier?
- What about TitanCF Industries in particular?
So, in terms of health and safety, can you tell us the main methods you use to seek to influence the
health and safety management and performance of suppliers – ie how do you exert this influence?
And how do you evaluate that? Presumably you have a set of criteria to evaluate that against?
So can you tell us a bit about the criteria for successful tenders? Can you tell us, for example, the kind
of comparative importance of different aspects of the tender? [Prompt: order of importance; relative
importance of health and safety in the tender process?] 
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Could you outline in more detail what you do in each of these areas of activity?
- Supplier selection 
- Gateway/holding process?
- Provision of guidance and training materials
- Delivery of training
- Documentary based monitoring
- Use of performance data
- Workplace inspections/audits.
How far does the use of these activities vary in relation to different suppliers?
Why do these variations exist?
To what extent do attempts to influence suppliers extend to cover occupational health issues, including
psycho-social risks arising from job design, working hours etc?
How would you describe relationships with suppliers, in general, on a continuum ranging from
‘adversarial’ to ‘co-operative’?
What factors do you feel influence the degree to which particular supply relationships are towards the
co-operative end of this continuum?
And do you feedback any of this information to suppliers? I mean, is there a feedback loop so that
suppliers know how they are doing over time, in relation to each other and so on?
As you know, we are doing a case study focusing on TitanCF Industries. Can you tell us a bit about
how this process has worked with them in particular please? [Prompts: they are a construction
engineering firm which, traditionally, might be expected to be at ‘the better end of the spectrum’ in
terms of H&S – given this, what have your systems etc done to try to influence their H&S management
and performance? What is the added value here?]
Supply chain health and safety management – historical evolution and motivations
How did your approach to influencing health and safety management and performance in supplying
organisations develop? [Prompts: You seem, to some extent, to have a uniform set of standards – how
did this come about? How did you get to where you are?]
How has the approach adopted to influencing health and safety management in supplying
organisations changed over time?
What are the main factors which have influenced your present arrangements and the way in which
they have evolved over time?
In what ways do you feel that present arrangements for influencing supplier health and safety
management might change in the future? [Prompts: After the Olympics, what aspects of the system
will you take away and apply to the next project?]
Supply chain health and safety management – effectiveness
Overall, how effective do you feel that present arrangements for influencing suppliers are in ensuring
that they manage health and safety adequately?
To what degree do you feel that the effectiveness of current arrangements varies in relation to different
suppliers?
Why do you think that this variation in effectiveness exists?
How far would you say that attempts to influence supplier health and safety sit uneasily with other
demands placed on them, notably in relation to cost, and obligations to respond to changes in supply
requirements?
[How many contractors? How many tiers?] How confident are you that the system you have in place is
able to reach down below Tier 1? Because often that is the problem that people kind of elaborate on
the supply chain influence, that you can have systems in place that focus on Tier 1, but that you kind of
lose it as you go down?
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Thinking about slightly wider perspectives, we very much wanted to do this project on the Olympic Park
because we would expect to find key examples of good practice here given the high profile of the Park.
But in dealing with procurement, what are the main influences on you outside of the contract type
relationship – what is driving your approach to procurement?
B) Used with Tier 1-3 managers 
The role of supply chains in influencing health and safety management in three sectors 
Summary for the investigation of supply chain management and health and safety on the Olympic Park
[Researchers’ names]
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University
[Researchers’ email addresses]
[Researchers’ telephone numbers]
The aim of this study is to consider how, and to what extent, health and safety can be enhanced via
strategic supply chain management. We are particularly interested in investigating what factors
determine the development, implementation and operation of successful influence of this kind. We are
therefore talking to key players in the Olympic Park supply chain, including both managers and workers
and their representatives, to try and determine what works best and why. Below, we have outlined the
kinds of areas we would like to cover in the interview by giving some sample questions. However, these
are only our suggestions – if there are other areas that you think are important but are not covered
then please do tell us about them during the interview.
[Aim to cover:
- Background
- Working as a supplier in general
- Working as a supplier to the ODA
- Working as a buyer in general
- Working as a buyer on the Olympic Park]
Background
[Aim to cover:
- Consent [including recording
- Abbreviations/specific terms 
- Introductions]
Can you start by telling us a little about yourself please – who you are, what you do and what your
background is?
Can you also tell us a bit about your organisation – what does it do, how many people does it employ?
Can you tell us about what your organisation is doing at the Olympic Park – which projects are you
(and have you been) involved with, for how long?
Working as a supplier - general
[Aim to cover:
- How H&S management and performance is influenced by buyers
- Variations from buyer to buyer
- Level of co-operativeness]
How is health and safety managed in your organisation?
Can you tell us a bit about your usual health and safety monitoring system? What sort of data do you
collect, how do you use it and so on?
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What are the main challenges to maintaining and improving your current standards and performance?
To what extent is your H&S management and performance influenced by the enterprises your
organisation has provided services for? [Prompts: Is health and safety generally part of the tendering
and contract process? If so, how and what is its influence relative to other factors such as cost in
securing the work? And once the work starts, is health and safety management and performance
monitored by these enterprises? If so how? Is it incentivised?]
Does this vary? If so, how and why?
Would you say that relationships with buyers vary in terms of the degree to which they are co-
operative? So are they more or less co-operative, or closer or more “hands off”?
Why do you think these variations in co-operativeness exist? 
Working with the ODA 
[Aim to cover:
- Differences in working with ODA
- Costs and benefits
- Legacy]
How have you found working with the ODA? [Prompts: Has this relationship been similar to that with
others or different? If different, in what way? What are the positives and negatives? Specific examples?]  
Thinking about health and safety in particular, has this been managed in the usual way for the Olympic
Park project? [Prompts: Is anything done differently? If so what, and in what way? Why have these
changes been made? How effective do you think these changes have been?]
If things are done differently, when did this start? Can you take us through the process from tendering,
through the contract stage to working on the park? Is it incentivised?
What about the health and safety monitoring system used on the Park? What sort of data does this
collect, how is it used and so on?
Do you think these changes have affected your organisation’s performance in other ways? [Prompts:
What have been the costs, benefits, drivers, barriers? How does this sit with other factors like costs?]
How would you assess the current level of your organisation’s health and safety performance on the
Olympic Park? [Is it better, worse or about the same as previous projects elsewhere?]
Do you think any of these changes will be continued when you move on to other projects? If not, why
not? If yes, which ones and why?
Working as a buyer – general
[Aim to cover:
- How H&S management and performance in suppliers is influenced
- How it is evaluated
- Variations by supplier
- Relative importance in tender process]
Does your organisation generally contract others as part of a project?
Do you seek to influence these suppliers’ health and safety management and performance? If so, can
you tell us the main methods you use? 
And how do you evaluate that? Presumably you have a set of criteria to evaluate that against?
So can you tell us a bit about the criteria for successful tenders? Can you tell us, for example, the kind
of comparative importance of different aspects of the tender? [Prompt: order of importance; relative
importance of health and safety in the tender process?] 
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Could you outline in more detail what you do in each of these areas of activity?
- supplier selection
- provision of guidance and training materials
- delivery of training
- documentary based monitoring
- use of performance data
- workplace inspections/audits.
How far does the use of these activities vary in relation to different suppliers? Why do these variations
exist?
To what extent do attempts to influence suppliers extend to cover occupational health issues, including
psycho-social risks arising from job design, working hours etc? 
Would you say that relationships with buyers vary in terms of the degree to which they are co-
operative? So are they more or less co-operative, or closer or more ‘hands off’?
How would you describe relationships with suppliers, in general, in terms of the degree to which they
are co-operative? So are they more or less co-operative, or closer or more ‘hands off’?
What factors do you feel influence the degree to which particular supply relationships are towards the
co-operative end of this continuum?
And do you feedback any of this information to suppliers?
Overall, how effective do you feel these arrangements for influencing suppliers are in ensuring that they
manage health and safety adequately?
To what degree do you feel that the effectiveness of current arrangements varies in relation to different
suppliers?
Why do you think that this variation in effectiveness exists?
How far would you say that attempts to influence supplier health and safety sit uneasily with other
demands placed on them, notably in relation to cost, and obligations to respond to changes in supply
requirements? 
Working as a buyer – Olympic Park
[Aim to cover:
- Differences in on the Olympic Park
- Costs and benefits
- Legacy]
Thinking about the methods and process you’ve just described, are there any differences in the way
things have been done for this Olympic Park project? [Prompts: If so, what are they? Why are they
different? What difference do you think this has made to their effectiveness?]
How would you assess the current level of your suppliers’ health and safety performance on the
Olympic Park? [Is it better, worse or about the same as previous projects elsewhere?]
Do you think these changes have affected your suppliers’ performance in other ways? [Prompts: What
have been the costs, benefits, drivers, barriers? How does this sit with other factors like costs?]
Do you think any of these changes will be continued when you move on to other projects? If not, why
not? If yes, which ones and why?
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C) Used with Tier 1-3 Supervisors
The role of supply chains in influencing health and safety management in three sectors 
Summary for the investigation of supply chain management and health and safety on the Olympic Park
[Researchers’ names]
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University
[Researchers’ email addresses]
[Researchers’ telephone numbers]
The aim of this study is to consider how, and to what extent, health and safety can be enhanced via
strategic supply chain management. We are particularly interested in investigating what factors
determine development, implementation and operation. So, that is about the preconditions,
drivers/pushes and barriers that affect these. We are therefore talking to key people in the Olympic Park
supply chain, including both managers and workers and their representatives, to try and determine
what works best and why; how H&S can be influenced by the supply chain. So, that’s both up and
down the chain.
To do this we are looking at the Olympic Park, with its very unique qualities, and also comparing how
things work here to how things work elsewhere in construction (both prior to the Park and since). Also,
we are looking at other sectors (food processing and marine transport) to see what sort of things can
be learnt from here and taken across to other sectors.
Below, we have outlined the kinds of areas we would like to cover in the interview by giving some
sample questions. However, these are only our suggestions – if there are other areas that you think are
important but are not covered then please do tell us about them during the interview.
[Aim to cover:
- Background
- Working as a supervisor in general
- Working as a supervisor for [Tier 2/3] 
- Working as a supervisor for Tier 2/3 with ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2 as client]
Background
[Aim to cover:
- Consent (including recording
- Abbreviations/specific terms 
- Introductions]
Can you start by telling us a little about yourself please – who you are, what you do and what your
background is?
Can you also tell us a bit the company you work for (Tier 2/3) – what does it do, how many people
does it employ? How many workers do you supervise? How many supervisors are working on the park?
Is there a maximum number of workers that you are allowed to supervise on any one project? Do you
supervise workers from other organisations? [NB IF YES REMEMBER TO ALSO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT
INFLUENCING TIER 3/4 H&S]
Can you tell us about what your company is doing at the Olympic Park – which projects are you (and
have you been) involved with, for how long?
And where is your organisation in the supply chain here on the Park? Which organisation are you a
supplier to and which organisations do you buy services from?
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Working as a supervisor - general
[Aim to cover:
- How H&S management and performance is influenced by clients
- Variations from client to client
- Level of contact – instruction/presence]
How is health and safety managed in your organisation?
Can you tell us a bit about your usual health and safety monitoring system? What sort of data do you
collect, how do you use it and so on?
What are the main challenges, as you see them, to maintaining and improving your current standards
and performance?
To what extent do you feel your H&S management and performance is influenced by the clients your
company has provided services for?
[Prompts: 
- Is health and safety generally an important factor in new projects? Have you found that its emphasis
has changed on different projects?
- If so, how and what is its influence relative to other factors such as more traditional concerns
(money, timelines)? 
- And once the work is underway, is health and safety management and performance monitored by
the clients (those that Tier 2/3 are doing the work for)? 
- If so, how? Can you give some examples? Is there an incentive/reward around good health and
safety? If so, does this come from the client or in-house?] 
Can you give some examples?
Does this vary? If so how and why?
Would you say that relationships with clients vary in terms of the degree to which they are
working/involved with you day to day? So are they closer or more ‘hands off’?
Why do you think these variations exist? 
Working for Tier 2/3 with ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2 as client/on the park
[Aim to cover:
- Differences in working with [ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2]
- Costs and benefits
- Legacy]
What is it like to work for Tier 2/3? [Prompt: What do you like most about working for them? What do
you like least?]
How have you found working with [ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2] as the client? [Prompts: Has
this experience been similar to that with others or different? If different, in what way? What are the
positives and negatives? Specific examples?]
Thinking about health and safety in particular, do you think this has been managed in the usual way for
the Olympic Park project? [Prompts: Is anything done differently? If so what, and in what way? Why
have these changes been made? How effective do you think these changes have been? Can you give
some examples?]
If things are done differently here, when did this start? Can you give us an example of how they are
different? [Meetings, paperwork, protocols, method statements, near misses?] Is this
incentivised/rewarded? If so, by whom?
What about the health and safety monitoring system used on the Park? What sort of data does this
collect, how is it used and so on? How effective do you feel this is?
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Do you think these changes have affected your company’s performance in other ways? [Prompts: What
have been the pitfalls, positives, pushes/reasons to do it, barriers? How does this sit with the company’s
usual outlook to outcome/completing works?]
Have the changes or executing them affected the way you do your job? If so how? Can you give some
examples? Has this made life easier or more difficult for you?
Do you think these changes and the effect of them on your role have been recognised by Tier 2/3?  If
so how? Has this been helpful? If not, is there anything you would like them to do?
How would you assess the current level of your company’s health and safety performance on the
Olympic Park? [Is it better, worse or about the same as previous projects elsewhere?] Can you give
some examples of what is different?
Do you think any of these changes will be continued when you move on to other projects? If not, why
not? If yes, which ones and why? 
Which changes would you like to see made to other work that you undertake in the future?
What changes would you not like to see made, and why?
What do you think the workers think about how things have been done on the Park? Has it made their
job easier or more difficult? Can you give some examples?
Occupational Health – use and access
Does your organisation provide you with an occupational health service? If so, what do you think about
it? How do you find the availability of your occupational health – easy or not? Do you think it is well
used? Do you think people feel at ease to use it?
On the Park there’s an on-site health centre, ‘Park Health’. Has this made a difference to you and your
workers? If so, how? Why?
Have you ever had to use any occupational health services? How would you rate Park Health in
comparison to your own occupational health?
Differences:  Ease of use? Why?
D) Used with Tier 1-3 Workers
The role of supply chains in influencing health and safety management in three sectors 
Summary for the investigation of supply chain management and health and safety on the Olympic Park
[Researchers’ names]
Cardiff Work Environment Research Centre (CWERC), Cardiff University
[Researchers’ email addresses]
[Researchers’ telephone numbers]
The aim of this study is to consider how, and to what extent, health and safety can be enhanced via
strategic supply chain management. We are particularly interested in investigating what factors
determine development, implementation and operation. So, that is about the preconditions,
drivers/pushes and barriers that affect these. We are therefore talking to key people in the Olympic Park
supply chain, including both managers and workers and their representatives, to try and determine
what works best and why; how H&S can be influenced by the supply chain. So, that’s both up and
down the chain.
To do this we are looking at the Olympic Park, with its very unique qualities, and also comparing how
things work here to how things work elsewhere in construction (both prior to the Park and since). Also,
we are looking at other sectors (food processing and marine transport) to see what sort of things can
be learnt from here and taken across to other sectors.
The limits of influence  95
Below, we have outlined the kinds of areas we would like to cover in the interview by giving some
sample questions. However, these are only our suggestions – if there are other areas that you think are
important but are not covered then please do tell us about them during the interview.
[Aim to cover:
- Background
- Working in general
- Working for Tier 2/3
- Working for Tier 2/3 with ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2 as client]
Background
[Aim to cover:
- Consent (including recording
- Abbreviations / specific terms 
- Introductions]
Can you start by telling us a little about yourself please – who you are, what you do and what your
background is?
Can you also tell us a bit the company you work for (Tier 2/3) – what does it do, how many people
does it employ? How many people do you work with directly?
Can you tell us about what your Company is doing at the Olympic Park – which projects are (and have
you been) involved with, for how long?
And where is your organisation in the supply chain here on the Park? Which organisation are you a
supplier to and which organisations do you buy services from?
Working – general
[Aim to cover:
- How H&S management and performance is influenced by clients
- Variations from client to client
- Level of contact – instruction/presence]
How is health and safety managed in your company?
Can you tell us a bit about your usual health and safety monitoring system? How do you use it and so
on?
What are the main challenges, as you see them, to maintaining and improving your current standards
and performance?
To what extent do you feel your H&S management and performance is influenced by the clients your
company has provided services for? 
[Prompts:
- Do you think health and safety generally is an important factor in new projects? Have you found
that the emphasis on H&S has changed on different projects you’ve worked on? 
- If so, how and what do you think has made it change in relation to other factors such as more
traditional concerns (money, timelines, completing the work)?
- Once the work is underway, is health and safety management and performance monitored by the
clients (those that Tier 2/3 are doing the work for)? 
- If so how? Can you give some examples? Is there an incentive/ reward around good health and
safety? If so, does this come from the client or in-house?] 
Can you give some examples?
Does this vary? If so, how and why?
Would you say that relationships with clients differ in terms of the degree to which they are working or
involved day to day with you/Tier 2/3? So are they more or less visible, or closer or more ‘hands off’?
Why do you think these differences exist?
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Working for Tier 2/3 with ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2 as client/on the park
[Aim to cover:
- Differences in working with [ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2]
- Costs and benefits
- Legacy]
What is it like to work for Tier 2/3? [Prompt: What do you like most about working for them? What do
you like least?]
How have you found working with ODA/CLM/TitanCF Industries/Tier 2 as the client? [Prompts: Has this
experience been similar to that with others or different? If different, in what way? What are the
positives and negatives? Specific examples?]
Thinking about health and safety in particular, do you think this has been managed in the usual way for
the Olympic Park project? [Prompts: Is anything done differently? If so what, and in what way? Why
have these changes been made? How effective do you think these changes have been? Can you give
us some examples?]
If things are done differently here, when did this start? Can you give us an example of how they are
different? [Meetings, paperwork, protocols, method statements, near misses?] Is this
incentivised/rewarded? If so, by whom?
What about the health and safety monitoring system used on the Park? What sort of information does
this collect, how do you think this is used and so on? How effective do you feel this is?
Do you think these changes have affected your company’s performance in other ways? [Prompts: What
have been the pitfalls, positives, pushes/reasons to do it, barriers? How does this sit with the company’s
usual outlook to outcome/completing works?]
Have the changes or executing them affected the way you do your job? If so how? Can you give some
examples? Has this made life easier or more difficult for you?
Do you think these changes and the effect of them on your work have been recognised by Tier 2/3?  If
so how? Has this been helpful? If not, is there anything you would like them to do?
How would you describe the current level of your company’s health and safety performance on the
Olympic Park? [Is it better, worse or about the same as previous projects you’ve worked on elsewhere?]
Can you give some examples of what is different?
Do you think any of these changes will be continued when you move on to other projects? If not, why
not? If yes, which ones and why?
Which changes would you like to see made to other work that you undertake in the future?
What changes would you not like to see made, and why?
What do you think other people you work with think about how things have been done on the Park?
Has it made doing the job easier or more difficult? Can you give some examples?
Occupational Health – use and access
Does your organisation provide you with an occupational health service? If so, what do you think about
it? How do you find the availability of your occupational health – easy or not? Do you think it is well
used? Do you think people feel at ease to use it?
On the Park there’s an on-site health centre, ‘Park Health’. Has this made a difference to you and your
colleagues? If so, how? Why?
Have you ever had to use any occupational health services?  How would you rate Park Health compared
to your own occupational health?
Differences:  Ease of use? Why?
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Issue Aim Indicator/target
Accidents Prevention of accidents Zero fatalities
Accident frequency rate (AFR): aspirational
benchmark of 1 in 1 million
(RIDDOR-reportable accidents; total person
hours worked)
Proportion of near-miss (accident) reports:
aspirational benchmark of 80%
Health Prevention of ill health
Provision and use of
excellent occupational
health service
Ill health frequency rate (RIDDOR-reportable
ill health; total person hours worked)
Provision and attendance – health checks,
health surveillance
Provision and awareness of support available
for workers returning after ill health absence
Wellbeing Promotion of wellbeing Health promotion programme activities and
participation
Competence Development and
maintenance of competent
workforce
100% of site workers hold CSCS or
equivalent cards, logged into scheme
Five days training per year
Training records log all training activities,
including ‘toolbox talks’
Designing for HS&E Reduction of HS&E risk
through design
Evidence of processes to identify and
evaluate design options with regard to:
• HS&E risks and opportunities
• lead designer and CDM co-ordinator  
scorecards
HS&E culture Positive HS&E culture
Incorporate sustainability
objectives for carbon,
water, waste and material
into a positive HS&E culture
Evidence of leadership, behaviour and culture
(scorecard)
Employee responses to HS&E climate surveys
Indicators to quantify practice and impact
Compliance and continual
improvement
Maintain a regulatory
compliant project
Maintain a competent
workforce
Zero non-compliances, breaches of planning
conditions, exceedance of conditions; and
zero work, prohibition, enforcement and
prosecution notices
Incident investigations and prevention of
recurrence, and compliance with project
health, safety and environment plans
Training and awareness records
Table 5
ODA aims and
indicators (adapted
from ODA181)
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